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1. Introduction 
European integration has become a contentious issue in mass politics in recent years, and political 
actors seeking to advance the establishing of an ever closer union are increasingly challenged by 
Euroskeptic parties that openly turn against the EU project (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; de 
Vries/Edwards 2009; Szczerbiak/Taggart 2008). The latter find themselves in an advantageous 
position, since public support for European integration is in decline (Hooghe/Marks 2009). This 
also applies to the case of Austria, where Euroskpeticism is strongly represented both in the 
public sphere and in the party system (cf. Fallend 2008). Under conditions like that, pro-
European parties are clearly at a disadvantage in the politicization of European integration and 
the latter can be expected to be strongly biased towards anti-EU sentiments. To what extent this 
assessment holds true will be explored in this dissertation, which aims at studying party 
politicization over the issue of Europe in Austrian domestic party contestation. 
 
Scholarly reflection about the politicization of European integration constitutes a recent 
phenomenon. For several decades, Europe was viewed a non-issue, depoliticized by political 
parties and thus of no electoral relevance (cf. Mair 2000; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004). The 
process of further European integration did not arrest attention by the general public and the issue 
of Europe was considered irrelevant for domestic contestation between political parties. Scholars 
spoke of a permissive consensus characterized by a generally positive or indifferent evaluation of 
European integration among European citizens (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009). As a consequence, 
national governments were not monitored by the general public and thus not constrained in their 
EU related political decisions. However, the last two decades have witnessed a growing 
importance of public debate and party conflict about European integration all over Europe, and 
scholars refer to the post-Maastricht era as a period of constraining dissent, meaning that political 
authorities increasingly have to consider citizens’ preferences in EU policy-making 
(Hooghe/Marks 2009). To put it differently, European integration has finally become politicized 
and thus relevant for domestic contestation between political parties all over Europe (ibid.).  
 
Politicization fulfills an important function in democratic politics. Given the fact that decision-
making within the complex, multi-level EU polity strongly differs from citizens’ experience of 
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democracy at the member state level, the politicization of European integration may give rise to 
doubts about the accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy of EU policy-making. By 
broadening the audience towards the public, it informs about the different political preferences 
and policy alternatives available in the party system. To the extent that voters react by 
considering the issue in their party choice in elections, politicization can lead to new party–voter 
alignments or reconfigurations in alliances for cooperation between political parties. 
Politicization thus is important for structuring political conflict (cf. de Wilde 2011; 
Carmines/Stimson 1986, 1989). Against this background, a better understanding of the 
politicization of European integration based on a systematic and empirically grounded in-depth 
analysis is an important endeavor. This is the starting point of the present dissertation project, 
which seeks to provide a detailed and systematic analysis of party politicization of European 
integration for the Austrian case. 
 
Despite increasing scholarly reference to politicization in the context of European integration 
research in recent years, the concept is rarely defined analytically, and systematic empirical 
evidence so far remains scarce (de Wilde 2011). The concept of politicization as applied in this 
study is understood as the extent to which the issue of Europe becomes part of competitive 
interaction between political parties expressed in public (cf. de Wilde 2011). The main objective 
of the dissertation is thus to investigate why and how—in terms of content—European integration 
becomes politicized in Austrian party contestation. Austria has been selected for the in-depth 
study of party politicization of European integration based on a purposive sampling approach, 
where the case selection is based on theoretical grounds in accordance with the nature of the 
research question (Silverman 2010: 141-46): The research purpose of this dissertation is to learn 
more about the mechanisms behind and the manifestation of the politicization of Europe, which 
presupposes politicization to actually appear. Not least due to the comparatively high level of 
public Euroskepticism, the strength of a Euroskeptic party firmly established in the party system, 
and strong anti-EU coverage in the yellow press, Austria is to be expected a suitable case for the 
study of party politicization of European integration. As indicated in the title of the dissertation, 
the specific conditions in the Austrian political environment also account for adverse conditions 
for parties supportive of European integration in the process of politicization. Due to these 
conditions, the politicization of Europe can be expected to manifest itself in a distinct way in 
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Austria, namely strongly driven by Euroskeptic parties’ concerns about European integration. 
Given the fact that party Euroskepticism has become a monopoly of the radical right in Austria 
(Pelinka 2004), we can further expect that the debate will be biased towards questions of national 
sovereignty, self-ruling, and identity, which constitute key issues in radical right parties’ policy 
program that perfectly fit with their anti-EU position (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; Edwards 2009; 
Kriesi 2007).  
 
The project at hand starts from a number of key assumptions that have strongly informed the 
analytical framework and research design:
1
 
(1) The dissertation starts from the premise that the politicization of European integration 
should be studied at the domestic level, which still constitutes the decisive sphere of mass 
politics (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe/Marks 2009). The empirical core of the project 
therefore focuses on the role of the EU issue in national election campaigns, which 
represent a particularly suitable setting for studying issue-politicization in domestic party 
contestation (cf. Netjes/Binnema 2007; Kriesi 2007). The analysis of the electoral arena 
will be complemented by a smaller study of the European integration issue in decision-
making arenas at the end of the dissertation. 
(2) It is argued that for the study of issue-politicization, a distinction has to be made between 
the potential for conflict between political parties on the one hand and the actual and 
publicly visible expression of such conflict on the other hand, since party conflict over an 
issue can also remain latent, meaning that the issue does not become politicized (cf. de 
Wilde 2011). This distinction demands a careful selection of data capable of capturing the 
public expression of conflict over the issue (cf. Mair 2006c). The in-depth analysis of EU 
politicization in general election campaigns builds on a rich data corpus including election 
manifestos, TV debates between rival candidates broadcasted during the election, and 
election posters. For the additional study devoted to decision-making arenas, the empirical 
analysis builds on coalition agreements as well as on voting behavior and speeches on EU 
treaty ratification in parliament. 
(3) Though the issue of Europe certainly differs from many other political issues due to its 
multi-faceted nature, its politicization is to be understood as an aspect of domestic 
                                                 
1
 A more detailed discussion is provided in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of the dissertation. 
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competition similar to contestation about any other issue. Therefore the empirical study is 
analytically embedded in comparative party research, in particular: the cleavage theory of 
party positioning towards European integration (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Edwards 2009) 
and the salience theory of party competition (cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 
2006). 
(4) Finally, the study of issue-politicization requires considering both components intrinsic to 
the concept of politicization, namely content and emphasis (cf. Laver 2001). The former 
refers to the substantive character of the debate about Europe and will be explored by 
means of a qualitative text analysis that not only distinguishes between evaluations of and 
claims-making towards European integration, but also considers different facets of 
European integration instead of using a general European integration category. Emphasis 
refers to the extent to which parties engage in the process of politicization and will be 
investigated by a combination of quantitative measures and qualitative indicators that also 
acknowledge interactive dynamics in party politicization of Europe. 
 
The empirical findings based on the analysis of the Austrian case demonstrate that despite a 
disadvantageous starting position, pro-European parties engaged more actively in the 
politicization of Europe during the 1990s and also strongly shaped the content of the debate 
during that time, which is at odds with theoretical expectations derived from the literature. 
However, the temporal trend clearly indicates an increase in anti-EU, radical right party 
politicization of European integration that in recent years has clearly put its stamp on the debate 
about Europe in the Austrian electoral arena. This results in a bias of the debate towards 
questions of national sovereignty and identity, whereas the focus on particular policies and 
conflict about different policy alternatives clearly diminishes. The analysis of coalition 
agreements and EU treaty ratification parliament, however, shows that the impact of increasingly 
anti-EU politicization on decision-making remains limited so far. Still, we find strong indications 
for more politicization and polarization of conflict between parties about European integration, 
which is in line with the findings from the analysis of election campaigns. 
Beside these results on the Austrian case, the dissertation also makes an important contribution to 
the broader study of party politicization of European integration: (a) It demonstrates the empirical 
relevance of an analytical distinction between the potential for conflict and the actual expression 
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of the latter. (b) By considering both the content and emphasis as constitutive to the concept of 
politicization, the dissertation provides an integrated approach to the study of politicization that 
points to the necessity of combining different strands of theories in order to provide for a better 
understanding of the manifestation of politicization as an empirical phenomenon. (c) The project 
at hand applies an innovative research design that considers a variety of different data and 
methods. This research strategy proves itself valuable, as indicated by the comparison of the 
empirical findings against other available data. (d) Though the analysis of election campaigns 
represents the empirical core of the study, the dissertation also makes an attempt to consider 
arenas of domestic decision-making. This is important insofar as it reveals that party response 
towards the EU issue can vary from one arena towards the other. 
 
Structure of the dissertation: 
Following the introduction, the next chapter will embed the topic of this dissertation within the 
broader field of EU studies and the role of political parties and party politics therein. It points to 
the initial neglect of parties in EU research (and the EU in party research), arguing that this was 
due to the observation that neither parties were particular important for understanding European 
integration, nor was European integration considered relevant for understanding domestic party 
politics. This scholarly view became increasingly challenged since the 1990s—and the main 
reason for this, as will be argued, is politicization. The chapter thus continues with a clarification 
of the concept of politicization. The concluding section puts forward the argument that the 
politicization of the EU issue should be studied at the domestic level. 
Chapter 3 develops the analytical framework guiding the empirical study of this dissertation. 
Based on the state of the art about party politicization of European integration, the chapter 
clarifies how politicization will be addressed analytically in this dissertation. It distinguishes 
between two ‘levels’ for the empirical application of party politicization, namely the individual 
party level and the party system level; and it differentiates between content and emphasis as two 
constitutive elements to the concept of politicization. The chapter argues that content and 
emphasis need to be embedded in different theoretical perspectives, namely the cleavage 
approach and party competition theory. Building on this literature, the chapter develops the 
explanatory framework guiding the empirical analysis. It concludes with a note on case selection 
based on selection criteria derived from the literature. 
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The following chapter provides information on data and methods used in this dissertation 
(Chapter 4). It discusses different data used by scholars for the study of issue-salience and politi-
cization and points to the limitation of different data types, before presenting the data selected 
and methods applied for the present study.  
Chapter 5 introduces the Austrian case. It starts with a brief introduction of the Austrian political 
and party system and the country’s way towards EU membership. This chapter provides 
information about the role of the EU issue in Austrian party and public discourse beyond the 
campaign arena. This is important for contextualizing the empirical findings within the broader 
political and public environment. The last section of this chapter takes up the explanatory factors 
for party politicization identified in Chapter 3 and collects information on their shape in the 
Austrian case.  
Focusing on the EU issue in the Austrian electoral arena, Chapter 6 represents the main empirical 
part of this dissertation, exploring in detail how and why Austrian political parties politicize 
European integration in general election campaigns between 1995 und 2008. The chapter is 
organized in three sub-chapters, each focusing on a specific aspect of party politicization in the 
electoral arena and each developing a discrete argument. Each of the sub-chapters can therefore 
be read separately. Chapter 6.1 focuses on individual parties and analyzes how Austrian parties 
refer to European integration in their election manifestos, i.e. whether they consider it a threat or 
opportunity, strive for more or less integration, and employ a nationalist or European perspective 
in their claims for reform. It will be argued that parties’ reference to European integration is to be 
understood in relation to a party’s ideological profile. Party ideology is also the main reason why 
the EU issue constitutes a challenge to the policy program of some parties, but not to others. 
Chapters 6.2 and 6.3 more explicitly address party politicization of Europe during the campaigns 
by focusing on confrontations between rival candidates broadcasted on TV. Chapter 6.2 explores 
parties’ emphasis on the EU issue during election campaigns. Building on the salience theory of 
party competition, it will be argued that party politicization of European integration is dependent 
on the particular opportunity structure the EU issue provides for individual parties’ vote-seeking 
attempts. Chapter 6.3 concentrates on the substantive character of the debate in the politicization 
of the EU issue. It argues that the debate will be biased towards the concerns of those parties 
actively engaging in EU politicization. These concerns, in turn, can be connected to the broader 
ideological profile of a party. This chapter is theoretically embedded in the cleavage theory of 
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party positioning and explicitly considers the distinct sources of conflict intrinsic to the multi-
faceted nature of the European integration issue.  
Chapter 7 broadens the empirical scope of the dissertation towards the governmental and 
parliamentary arena. It explores how the issue of Europe appears (a) in coalition agreements 
between parties that diverge in their positioning towards European integration and (b) in 
parliamentary contestation about EU treaty ratification. The chapter argues that despite a 
tendency towards stronger politicization and polarization in the debate about Europe in these two 
arenas, the impact on decision-making so far remains limited. 
The concluding chapter finally summarizes key points of the present study, highlights the most 
important empirical findings, and discusses the contribution of the dissertation to the broader 
study of party politicization of European integration. 
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2. European integration, national political parties, and politicization 
2.1 Introduction 
European integration is a complex, multi-faceted political phenomenon referring both to a 
process and a status (cf. Kohler-Koch et al. 2004; Bieling/Lerch 2005). The process-like aspect 
concerns the establishing of an ever closer union, as stated in the preamble of the EU treaty. As 
such, European integration is related to the development and transformation of the EU polity, its 
institutions and competences as well as its territorial boundaries. As a process, hence, European 
integration contains both a backwards and a prospective component, as it has yet no finality and 
is constantly developing. At the same time, European integration represents a status—though a 
currently transforming one: Through the process of integration, a system of governance has 
meanwhile developed at the EU level, featured with competences in a growing number of policy 
fields formerly regulated independently by member states at the domestic level. Together with 
the member states, this supranational political system produces policy output affecting European 
citizens to a growing extent and in an increasing number of policy areas, hence going beyond the 
removal of tariff barriers and the establishing of a single market as was the main focus in the 
early days of the European integration project. EU studies focus on different of these facets: 
European integration theories seek to explain the process of integration (cf. Haas 1958; Schmitter 
1969; Lindberg/Scheingold 1970; Moravcsik 1993, 1995; Hooghe/Marks 2009); the 
Europeanization literature deals with the impact of European integration on the domestic level 
(cf. Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2000); and comparative party research is interested in the structure of 
conflict over the issue of Europe (cf. Marks/Steenbergen 2002, 2004). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to embed the topic of the dissertation within the broader field of EU 
studies, respectively the role of political parties and party politics therein. It starts with a brief 
summary of why political parties have had a difficult start in EU research, more specifically in 
the theorizing of European integration and its impact on the domestic level. The next section 
provides a brief outline of important contributions from the last decade on European integration 
and national political parties. The following section deals with the concept of party politicization. 
It summarizes different domains for politicization, relates them to the EU issue, and outlines the 
conceptual understanding of party politicization guiding this dissertation. The section thus aims at 
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delimiting the theoretical and empirical scope of the concept as employed in this study. The 
concluding section, finally, puts forward two core arguments that have guided this dissertation’s 
analytical framework and research strategy. First, it argues that the study of politicization of the 
European integration issue should empirically be located at the domestic level. As will be 
outlined, this is because of the EU’s character as a polity sui generis and its absence of a 
European sphere of mass politics. Second, it will discuss whether European integration is also to 
be considered a sui generis issue when it comes to party politicization, and argues that the answer 
is composed of both a Yes and a No. 
 
 
2.2 The absence of parties in early EU research 
Research on national political parties has had a difficult start in EU studies. In the theorizing of 
European integration and its impact on the domestic level, political parties were largely 
neglected, or, as John Gaffney put it in 1996, “very little of the literature on [European] 
integration is on political parties, and very little of the literature on political parties is on 
[European] integration” (Gaffney 1996: 1). First, national political parties were not considered 
relevant actors for understanding the process of European integration; second, they were not 
viewed to be directly affected by the establishing of a European system of governance; and third, 
the issue of Europe was not considered a source for domestic party contestation. Each of these 
three observations shall briefly be outlined in the following. 
 
European integration theories focus on the process of European integration, i.e. the creating and 
establishing of the EU polity as a transfer of sovereignty from the level of autonomous and 
independent states towards a new political center, the EU (cf. Hass 1958). The theoretical debate 
about European integration has been largely dominated by two theories of European integration 
competing for supremacy in EU studies: neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. 
Without going into any detail on these two strands of theories
2
, one thing shall be highlighted 
here, and that is the role ascribed to parties for shaping the process of integration: While scholars 
                                                 
2
 For a summary of the former cf. Wolf (2005); see also Hass (1958); Schmitter (1969); Lindberg/Scheingold (1970); 
for a summary of the latter see Bieling (2005); see also Moravcsik (1993, 1995). 
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from both camps fundamentally differ in their understanding of regional integration
3
, they share 
the perspective that partisan conflict is considered of no particular relevance for understanding 
why regional integration takes place. As highlighted by Hooghe and Marks (2009: 4), this is 
because both neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism view preferences as economic and 
focus on distributional bargaining between interest groups, leaving little room for party politics.  
 
Different from integration theories, scholars interested in Europeanization do not seek to explain 
the process of integration, but ask about changes induced by the establishing of an EU system of 
governance. The literature offers a number of competing definitions (cf. Olsen 2002; Radaelli 
2000) and scholars highlight that “[t]here is no single grand theory of ‘Europeanization’” (Olsen 
2002: 944). Still, the concept of Europeanization serves as an analytical framework connecting an 
ever-expanding field of research that is concerned with processes of change resulting from the 
establishing of the EU system of governance. Originally developed in the study of policy or 
institutional change, such change is viewed to be triggered by a misfit between policies or the 
functioning of institutions at the domestic level on the one hand, and EU rules or norms on the 
other (cf. Börzel 2005). This misfit then causes some sort of adjustment. Similar to European 
integration theories, national political parties have long been neglected in Europeanization 
research—and for good reasons. As summarized by Robert Ladrech in a review article from 
2009, “unlike domestic policies and institutions, Europe does not ‘hit’ parties in a direct manner”, 
meaning that national parties are not obliged to adjust to any legal pressures imposed by the EU 
(Ladrech 2009: 8). Hence despite the establishing of a European system of governance, political 
parties continue to operate within the domestic arena of contestation. For a long time, the latter 
was viewed as largely unaffected by European integration (cf. Mair 2000). As will be shown in 
the next section, however, this diagnosis fundamentally changed during the last decade. 
 
Finally, European integration could also be relevant for national parties as a contested issue in 
national party system. However, also in this domain there was long seen no connection between 
European integration and parties, because Europe was considered a non-issue for domestic 
                                                 
3
 Simplifying the argument, neofunctionalists view regional integration as the result of functional pressures and see 
transnational organizations and the establishing supranational institutions as the drivers of the integration process 
that, once started, leads to spill-over in other policy domains; intergovernmentalists, on the other hand, understand 
regional integration as the outcome of bargaining between national governments, understood as carriers of 
geopolitical or economic interests (see Hooghe/Marks 2009 for a brief summary). 
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contestation. In the literature, this diagnosis was related to three interrelated circumstances 
accounting for the low importance of European integration in domestic mass politics: First, 
scholars argued that the EU issue did not attract public attention because of the nature of the EU’s 
policy competences, which would be low-salience and non-redistributive policies (Moravcsik 
2002). The notion of the EU as a regulatory state, introduced by Majone (1994), aptly 
summarizes this perspective.
4
 Second, scholars argued that the process of European integration 
was based on a permissive consensus amongst European citizens (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970), 
characterized by a generally positive or indifferent evaluation of integration and low issue-
salience. To put it differently, citizens did not care much about the EU issue and thus passively 
supported governments’ action in promoting further integration. Third, political parties 
depoliticized the European integration issue in order not to threaten the established structure of 
contestation. By taking moderate positive positions towards integration, mainstream parties did 
not offer policy alternatives and thus hollowed out contestation about Europe (cf. Marks 2004). 
Writing in 2000, Peter Mair states that “Europe fails to impact on national party systems because 
it is held at one remove by the competing political leaderships” and “it is not something that 
requires the active engagement of, or consultation with, the electorate at large” (Mair 2000: 48). 
However, this view became increasingly challenged in in recent years. As Hooghe and Marks 
(2004: 6) put it, “European integration has disrupted established patterns of democratic 
competition in the member states”.  
 
In conclusion, early EU research did not pay much attention to the role of national political 
parties. The last decade, however, witnessed a clear shift in the scholarly assessment of the 
mutual importance of European integration and national political parties. This will be discussed 
in the next section that briefly summarizes the state of the art on national political parties and 
European integration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Though this view has been heavily disputed in the academic debate about whether or not the EU suffers from a 
democratic deficit (see Follesdal/Hix 2006 for a summary), it has been an important point of reference in the 
literature. 
18 
 
2.3 Climbing the research agenda: political parties and European integration 
Following the same structure that organized the previous section, this section summarizes 
important contributions in (1) European integration theory, (2) Europeanization studies, and (3) 
research on domestic party contestation that pay explicit attention to national political parties in 
studying European integration or to European integration for studying domestic party politics. 
 
In European integration theory, the most important contribution with a view to the role of parties 
comes from Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009). In their postfunctionalist theory of 
European integration, they argue that for understanding the course of European integration, 
scholars need to take into account the question of politicization and the “substantive character of 
the debate over regional integration” (ibid. 2). They start their argument by summarizing the 
basic ideas of the two most influential theories of regional integration competing for supremacy 
in EU studies—neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism—and by pointing to two 
commonalities of these two different strands of theoretical thinking: Both nefunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists understood preferences as economic and focused on distributional 
bargaining among interest groups (ibid. 4), leaving little room for partisan conflict and other than 
economic foundations for preferences. However, if looking at the period since 1990, Hooghe and 
Marks argue “that one must probe beyond the economic preferences of interest groups to 
understand the course of European integration” (ibid. 5). Similar to neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist thinking, their postfunctionalist theory identifies “a mismatch between 
efficiency and the existing structure of authority” (ibid. 2) as the decisive source for regional 
integration. However, “we make no presumption that the outcome will reflect functional 
pressures [...]. Political conflict makes all the difference, and that conflict, we argue, engages 
communal identities” (ibid.). Their core argument is that understanding the process of European 
integration since the 1990s requires an examination of the mobilization of identity. The authors 
continue by developing a model describing the process of domestic politicization (ibid. 8-9): The 
process starts with a reform impetus, leading to issue creation, i.e. political parties responding to 
pressure from public opinion or interest groups. The issue can then be dealt with in the mass 
arena or in the interest group arena. Arena choice is shaped both by parties and arena rules, i.e. 
for instance whether referenda on EU questions are mandatory or constitutionally prohibited. 
Finally, the arena in which the issue finally is negotiated is decisive for the conflict structure. 
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Hooghe and Marks argue that in the interest group arena, conflict will follow a distributional 
logic; once the issue enters the mass arena, however, conflict may arise both on questions of 
distribution and identity. Unlike earlier theories, thus, the post-functionalist theory of European 
integration takes into account party preferences and public opinion towards the issue of Europe, 
which is understood as being increasingly politicized. 
 
Although rather late, the Europeanization framework has also been applied to research on 
national political parties (cf. Ladrech 2009 for an overview). In this field, scholars usually refer to 
the definition offered by Robert Ladrech (2002), who states that “Europeanization has something 
to do with the penetration of the European dimension into national arenas of politics and 
policymaking” (ibid. 391). European integration itself is considered an independent variable that 
“influences the operating arenas, or environments, of national political parties, and the 
Europeanization of parties is consequently a dependent variable” (ibid. 395). Analytically, the 
concept of Europeanization is seen as “an opportunity to systematically analyze political parties 
as organizations responding to the effects of European integration upon their primary operating 
arena, the national political system” (ibid. 390). The focus is therefore on adaptation or change at 
the national level, for which European integration serves as the key explanation. Ladrech (ibid.) 
presents five areas worth investigating for evidence on party Europeanization, namely policy or 
programmatic change, organizational change, patterns of competition, party-government 
relations, and relations beyond the national party system. In all of these areas, a vivid field of 
scholarly research has emerged in the last decade.
5
 In all of these domains, however, European 
integration won’t serve as a sufficient explanation for party adaptation and programmatic change, 
which seems to be more influenced (or strongly mediated) by domestic factors related to party 
competition (cf. Ladrech 2009).
6
 Scholars have recently considered the explanatory limits of the 
Europeanization concept for understanding party behavioral change in the domestic context and 
started to include additional explanatory factors coming from classical comparative party 
                                                 
5
 E.g. Ladrech (2007) and the contributions in Poguntke et al. (2007) on party organizational change; Cole 2001, 
Aylott 2002, Binnema 2002, Bomberg 2002, Kritzinger/Michalowitz 2005, Baun et al. 2006 on programmatic 
change; Ladrech (2007) and Mair (2000, 2006c) on indirect impact affecting the power relations within parties, the 
room for maneuver for national governments, and the devaluation of electoral competition. The list provided here of 
course only represents a selection. 
6
 As criticized by Ladrech (2009), this is also the reason why a large number of studies embedding their research 
question within the Europeanization framework actually provide little information on how European integration 
functioned as a driver of party change, but rather explore party behavior related to European integration (e.g. party 
positioning). 
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research (e.g. party goals and leadership strategies; cf. Ladrech 2009; Lefkofridi 2008; Bomberg 
2002). These efforts are certainly useful, since they acknowledge the political environment within 
which national parties operate, which, as has been argued previously, is still largely defined and 
determined domestically (cf. Ladrech 2002, 2009). However, the necessity to shift attention to 
domestic factors as drivers for party change—as opposed to European integration as the main 
source for change—leaves room for doubting the additional explanatory value provided by the 
Europeanization framework in the case of party research. This brings us back to the initial 
diagnosis that “the EU’s direct impact is upon the domestic political environment in which 
parties operate, not on parties per se” (Ladrech 2009: 8). Whether or not parties respond to such 
potential changes in their environment, however, is largely dependent on factors endogenous to 
parties (e.g. leadership change or parties’ specific organizational structure) or related to party 
competition dynamics. 
This also applies to the subject of this dissertation, i.e. party politicization of European 
integration, which is certainly related to the process of integration—after all, without European 
integration, there would be nothing to politicize. However, as will be argued in this dissertation, 
understanding why parties politicize the issue of Europe requires looking at dynamics of 
domestic competition between parties and not searching for any direct EU impact. Ladrech 
(2009: 12) makes a similar point when highlighting that “the tendency for parties to downplay or 
even suppress the EU as an issue is again a decision that rests with party leaders”. Though over 
time this suppression could lead to latent pressure resulting in adaptation of party behavior, this 
will be a reaction towards changes in public opinion or other parties’ behavior, and not a response 
to any direct EU impact (ibid. 8). This nicely illustrates why the present study is not embedded 
theoretically in the Europeanization framework, but in comparative party research (see Chapter 
3). The latter is also the point of departure in the third scholarly domain focusing on European 
integration and national political parties, to which we will attend to next.  
 
The third strand of research focuses predominantly on the question of whether conflict over the 
European issue is related to the domestic structure of political contestation, i.e. the left-right 
dimension. The established structure of conflict emanated from the social cleavages in society 
(i.e. the class cleavage, the religious cleavage, the center-periphery cleavage) that found their 
expression in European party systems (cf. Lipset/Rokkan 1967). Scholars argue that these 
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cleavages are important for understanding how parties respond to new issues (cf. Sartori 1969; 
Bartolini/Mair 1990; Kitschelt 1997). Following the cleavage perspective, political parties can 
thus be expected “to interpret new issues in light of existing cleavages such as the Left/Right 
ideological dimension” (Marks/Steenbergen 2002: 881), because anything else would be costly 
because of path dependencies (ibid.). Hence party ideology will constrain how parties respond to 
new issues such as European integration, which have not been constitutive to the establishing of 
the left-right structure in the developing of European party systems. To put it differently, one 
would expect party location on the left-right dimension to structure party positioning towards 
European integration (Marks/Steenbergen 2002, 2004). However, the issue of Europe might not 
perfectly fit in with the left-right dimension, which is why different scholars suggested different 
variants for the relation between the European dimension (representing party positioning towards 
European integration) and the left-right dimension—some rejecting any connection of the two, 
others providing distinct versions of a relationship. According to Marks and Steenbergen (2002, 
2004), four different approaches—or, in their terminology, models—characterizing the 
relationship of the European integration and the left-right dimension can be distinguished: The 
international relations model argues that contestation over European integration is structured by 
a single pro- vs. anti-integration dimension, with no relevance of and relation to the left-right 
dimension.
7
 Accordingly, conflict over European integration is viewed to fundamentally differ 
from domestic contestation. The Hix-Lord model (Hix/Lord, 1997; Hix 1999a, b) identifies two 
relevant, but unrelated dimensions, structuring conflict over European integration, i.e. left-right 
and national sovereignty. Both are important and represent different aspects: The left-right 
dimension reflects conflict over the distribution between different functional groups, whereas the 
national sovereignty dimensions is about distribution between territorial groups. According to 
this view, several combinations of positioning towards European integration are possible on these 
two dimensions, resulting in an orthogonal coexistence of the two dimensions. The Tsebelis-
Garret or regulation model (Tsebelis/Garrett 2000), on the other hand, states that these two 
dimensions—i.e. the functional or left-right and the territorial dimension—are fused into a single 
                                                 
7
 Marks and Steenbergen (2002) summarize this model based on intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist 
integration theories (cf. Moravcsik 1998; Haas 1958). Scholars from the realist tradition highlight the importance of 
governments and national interest for political contestation over European integration; liberal intergovernmentalists 
focus on governments and national producer groups as well as costs and benefits for trade; neofunctionalists point to 
functional pressure in a dynamic process of problem-solving, spillover and learning, mediated through national 
coalitions and supranational entrepreneurs (Marks/Steenbergen 2002: 833-4). 
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dimension. This means that contestation over European integration is completely absorbed by or 
incorporated into the left-right dimensions. Finally, the Hooghe-Marks model (Hooghe/Marks 
1999, 2001) assumes a relationship between the two dimensions, though not their fusion. The 
argument here is that some aspects of European integration are absorbed into the left-right 
dimension, while others are not. From the latter cases, a distinct dimension of contestation 
emerges that is structured along nationalism vs. supranationalism, where conflict is about 
regulated capitalism versus market liberalism. Recently, however, Hooghe and Marks have 
modified their approach and now argue that questions of identity have to be taken into account 
(Hooghe/Marks 2009, see above).  
How do these four approaches fit with empirical findings about party positioning towards 
European integration? A large number of comparative empirical studies show that there is indeed 
a relation between parties’ left-right location and EU positioning, thus challenging the 
international relations model that suggests the European integration issue to differ fundamentally 
from parties’ left-right concerns. This relation, however, is not a linear one, which means that 
party positioning towards European integration is not identical with left-right location (thus 
challenging the regulation model described above). Rather, it takes the form of an “inverted U 
curve” (Hooghe et al. 2002): Parties on the margins of the left-right dimension (i.e. holding 
extreme positions on either side of scale) tend to be against European integration, while parties in 
the ideological mainstream are consistently supportive.
8
 The inverted U curve clearly depicts that 
positioning towards Europe is not chaotic or mainly a question of national peculiarities, but 
reflects a similar pattern in various EU member states. This pattern can be explained both with 
reference to cleavage theory and rational choice theory, and both arguments can be found in the 
literature (Hooghe et al. 2002).  
While this strand of research has definitely contributed significantly to our understanding of party 
conflict over European integration, it has two weaknesses. First, the European integration issue is 
often conceptualized as a single—and very general—pro- and anti-integration category (but see 
Hooghe et al. 2002). While suitable for cross-national generalization, it gives no insight on the 
substantive meaning of this category or dimension, i.e. the way parties refer to Europe when 
picking up the issue. Second, scholars hardly differentiate between positioning and contestation, 
                                                 
8
 Indeed, the picture slightly changes when unfolding positions along different policy fields and considering 
developments of European integration towards regulation (cf. Hooghe et al. 2002). However, the inverted U curve is 
still viewed as an appropriate general description of parties and their EU-stances. 
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operationalizing the latter as the potential for conflict resulting from inter-party differences in 
positioning. While reasonable with respect to data availability and parsimony, this approach 
cannot provide information on whether the issue of Europe becomes actually part of contestation 
among parties within the national political discourse. Hence, as Peter Mair (2006d: 162) put it, 
scholars need to pay more attention to “how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, 
as well as [to] the way in which it is conceived: is Europe usually cited as a constraint by parties 
at the national level (...), or is it seen as an opportunity, or do these parties scarcely cite it at all”. 
This is at the core of this dissertation’s research interest directing our focus to the politicization of 
the European integration issue.  
 
 
2.4 The politicization of European integration: clarifying the concept 
Considering the initial neglect of parties in EU studies and the neglect of Europe in party 
research, why is it that the last decade suddenly brought forth studies on political parties and 
European integration in an ever growing number? This is due to changes in the importance of 
European integration for mass politics. European integration seems to affect domestic 
contestation to a growing extent and has become a source for party choice among voters in 
national elections (cf. Tillman 2004; de Vries 2007b; Schoen 2010). Scholars argue that the 
growing relevance of European integration for mass politics is related to the fact political 
entrepreneurs started to pick up the issue of Europe for mobilizing voters, i.e. they began to 
politicize what had previously been considered a non-issue for domestic competition (cf. 
Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Wilde 2011). 
Though we find increasing scholarly reference to politicization in the context of European 
integration research (cf. de Wilde 2011 for an overview), Pieter de Wilde (2011: 560) rightly 
criticizes that “the concept is rarely defined resulting in ambiguity as to its exact meaning, its 
relevance to our understanding of European integration, and regarding possible ways in which we 
may extend our knowledge of this process and its product”. Since politicization is at the core of 
this dissertation’s research interest, clarification of the concept is essential and a precondition for 
empirical exploration of the phenomenon. 
Scholars define politicization differently—if they provide a conceptual definition at all: Some 
refer to it as a synonym for the emerging of politics or contestation in partisan terms, others use it 
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as an equivalent for the public saliency of an issue, and still others understand politicization as 
the process whereby an issue becomes subject to governmental deliberation when it previously 
has not been (cf. Hix 2006; Green-Pedersen 2011; Hay 2007; Papadopoulos/Magnette 2010). In 
the context of European integration research, Pieter de Wilde (2011) provides a very useful 
systematization of different conceptual understandings of the term as used in the literature by 
distinguishing between the politicization of institutions, decision-making processes, and issues. 
First, the politicization of institutions refers to the increasing importance of political parties and 
partisan conflict within institutions. It is thus the triumph of ideological dimensions of conflict 
over territorial or sectoral dimensions for structuring political institutions. Scholars find evidence 
for an increase in the politicization of several EU institutions—including the European 
Commission, which was long considered a strongly bureaucratized institution largely decoupled 
from party politics.
9
 Second, the politicization of decision-making processes describes a 
development away from technocratic decision-making. It thus refers to the predominance of 
politicians rather than bureaucrats or non-elected experts in the decision-making process (ibid. 
562). Finally, the politicization of issues refers to their contentiousness, which might also result 
in an increase of their electoral importance. De Wilde (2011: 562) argues that “whether an issue 
is politicized or not and deemed important by the electorate can indirectly be assessed by 
studying the extent to which it is publicly debated”. While the politicization of an issue can be 
short-lived and linked to specific events, it can also be more durable.  
De Wilde states that these different manifestations of politicization are part of “an encompassing 
process which concerns the input of political demands into the EU political system” (ibid. 563). 
He therefore finally defines the politicization of European integration “as an increase in 
polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced 
towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” (ibid. 566-7).10 According to de Wilde 
(ibid.), thus, politicization implies three interrelated components. First, opinions among an issue 
must be polarized, including not only latent differences in opinions but some sort of conflict. 
Second, these diverse opinions or conflicts must be voiced publicly, resulting in an intensified 
debate. Finally, the public must respond to the dispute on the issue in one or the other way. This 
starts with the public following the debate and may finally lead to an emotional attachment. 
                                                 
9
 For a brief summary of this literature see de Wilde (2011: 561-2). 
10
 For similar though less comprehensive and systematic definitions cf. Schmitter (1969); Hooghe/Marks (2009); 
Green-Pedersen (2011). 
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Though I agree with de Wilde’s (2011) argument that the manifestation of politicization at 
different loci or in different arenas—i.e. institutions, decision-making process, and issues—are 
related and thus part of a larger process of EU politicization, the empirical scope of this 
dissertation is explicitly limited to the third form of politicization, i.e. the politicization of the 
European integration issue. As de Wilde rightfully points out, issue-politicization can involve 
different societal actors (ibid. 568). In this study, however, the focus is on one specific actor 
group, namely national political parties. The latter are decisive actors for putting a new issue on 
the political agenda, framing the public debate, and shaping people’s preferences about the issue.  
 
 
2.5 European integration: a sui generis issue for the study of party politicization? 
An important point of departure guiding the analytical framework and research strategy of this 
dissertation is the conviction that the politicization of the European integration issue should be 
studied at the domestic level and, in particular, in general election campaigns. Talking about 
European integration, this may cause amazement, since a focus on European Parliamentary 
election campaigns or other more explicitly European events would certainly be more obvious. I 
argue, however, that there are a number of convincing reasons for why the domestic sphere of 
political contestation, and national election campaigns in particular, deserve our attention when it 
comes to the politicization of European integration (for similar claims cf. Kriesi 2007; 
Netjes/Binnema 2007). 
This is related to the structure and functioning of the EU polity, which is described in the 
literature as sui generis: It is characterized by a complicated system of governance, with no 
clearly identifiable government and no executive electoral arena (cf. Follesdal/Hix 2006). The 
EU further lacks intermediary structures such as a European public sphere, civil society, and 
party system (cf. de Vreese 2007; Finke 2007; Lord 2010). Hence despite an enormous and 
growing interdependence between the EU and its member states constraining the latter’s room of 
maneuver in policy-making, mass politics, political contestation, and the communication of 
politics are still largely concentrated at the national level, thus reflecting the spatial or territorial 
boundaries of EU member states.  
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Election campaigns can be described as periods of intensified public debate about and 
concentrated public attention towards politics (cf. Lengauer/Vorhofer 2010), which renders them 
important focal points for issue-politicization. Due to the lack of an EU executive electoral arena 
and thus the downgrading of European Parliament elections to second-order national elections, 
(Reif/Schmitt 1980) general elections at the member state level continue to be the first-order 
elections all over Europe (cf. Marsh/Mikhaylov 2010). Equally important, national elections are 
decisive for the creation of national governments, which not only hold office at the domestic 
level, but are also involved in EU decision-making: Represented in the Council of the EU and the 
European Council, national governments are decisive actors for shaping EU policies and, in 
particular, the course of European integration, which makes national general elections an 
important channel for representation within the EU polity (cf. Mair 2005). European Parliament 
elections constitute the second channel for democratic representation within the EU polity. 
However, since EP elections by definition address the EU level, attention towards the issue of 
Europe by political parties during EP election campaigns would tell us little about the 
politicization of the issue beyond this specific setting, since parties are expected precisely to 
discuss Europe (even if this is not always their focus). This is different for general election 
campaigns: Whether or not the issue of Europe becomes politicized during these events provides 
a good indication for the importance of the issue in public and domestic party politics.   
Taken together, general election campaigns serve as a particularly suitable setting for studying 
the politicization of the European integration issue: First, they represent episodes of intensified 
public attention towards politics; second, they take place at the national level, which still delimits 
mass politics and communication; third, together with EP elections, they function as a channel for 
representation within the EU. 
 
This section started with a short reference to the multi-faceted nature of European integration as a 
political phenomenon. This characteristic could also make the issue of Europe distinct from other 
issue domains when it comes to its politicization. Is European integration perhaps to be 
considered an issue sui generis for party politicization—just as the EU is considered a polity sui 
generis? The argument put forward in this dissertation is that in part it is—and in part it is 
definitely not.  
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Three characteristic features make the issue of Europe different from many other political issues. 
First, it is no classic domestic issue, but no foreign policy issue either. This means that conflict is 
about things that are clearly out of exclusive domestic reach, but need to be approached at the 
European supranational or intergovernmental level, which renders alternative positions between 
parties less weighty in practical terms. For parties in power this also means that they may have to 
justify decisions taken at the EU level that could actually be far away from their own ideal policy 
position. Second, the multi-faceted nature of European integration contains quite distinct sources 
for political disagreement, which can be related to political integration, economic integration, or 
EU policy output in the growing number of policy domains where the EU has acquired policy 
competence over the course of time. As mentioned previously, the EU issue thus challenges the 
established left-right dimension, which means that a party’s response to European integration is 
likely to vary for the different facets of integration. Finally, the issue of Europe not only cuts 
across the left-right axis, but also cuts across the boundary of policy fields, since it does not 
represent a policy field in the first place. This makes the issue of Europe much more complex 
compared to other policy domains—and therefore also more difficult to communicate.  
Thus assuming that the complexity of European integration will be reflected in the politicization 
of the issue, we can therefore expect the latter to manifest on different dimensions of conflict; and 
we would expect parties to hold different positions on some or each of these different 
dimensions.  
Despite these characteristics of the European integration issue, however, party politicization is 
still a question of domestic party competition. Hence the argument put forward in this dissertation 
is that though European integration (i.e. the process) is not predominantly determined 
domestically, its politicization largely is. In particular, it is to be seen as the product of 
competitive strategic interaction between parties seeking to address voters. In order to understand 
the dynamics in the politicization of European integration hence one need to look at the different 
opportunity structures the issue of Europe offers to individual parties. This is related to their 
overall policy program or party ideology a party, the behavior of its competitors, public opinion 
towards the issue of Europe etc. Therefore, the analytical framework of this dissertation is 
embedded in the literature on cleavages and party competition, as will be described in more detail 
in the following.  
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3. Party politicization of European integration: towards an analytical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Having clarified the conceptual understanding of politicization in the previous chapter, the aim of 
this chapter is to develop the analytical framework guiding the empirical study. The chapter starts 
with providing a brief state of the art on the study of EU politicization. The next section focuses 
on party politicization as explanandum by outlining the different components intrinsic to the 
concept of issue-politicization, namely content and emphasis. It will be argued that these two 
components need to be distinguished analytically as well as empirically: The content of 
politicization strongly relates to party positioning and should therefore be embedded theoretically 
in the cleavage perspective. Emphasis, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which the issue is 
politicized by different parties; it thus strongly related to the concept of salience and should 
therefore be viewed from the perspective of party competition. This section also makes a 
distinction between two levels for the empirical application of party politicization, namely the 
individual party level and the party system level. The following section then introduces the 
theories of cleavages and party competition and relates them to the study of party politicization of 
European integration. Building on these literatures, the next section summarizes the explanatory 
framework within which the empirical analysis is embedded. The last section summarizes 
facilitating conditions for the rising of EU politicization that served as criteria in the selection of 
the Austrian case. 
 
 
3. 2 Party politicization of European integration: state of the art 
When scholars observed that European integration became more and more prominent as a 
political issue in public discourse, public opinion, and party conflict, this caused vivid scholarly 
debate and empirical research addressing the politicization of Europe. While there is large 
consensus in the literature that the times of the permissive consensus (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970) 
are past behind us, there is considerable dissent on whether the politicization of European 
integration is either to be seen positively as contributing to strengthening the electoral linkage 
between citizens and political elites or as a serious threat to the integration project (see Papado-
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poulos/Magnette 2010 for a summary). Most prominently within the former camp, Simon Hix 
(2006) argues that politicization would translate EU politics into a left-right structure similar to 
the one decisive for politics at the national level and absorbing the pro-anti European integration 
dimension, thus also alleviating Euroskepticism. In contrast, Bartolini argues that the EU polity 
would not be capable of such politicization, which could turn out to be “a medicine worse than 
the disease” (2006: 47). According to him, this is because politicization can be expected to spill 
over from so called isomorphic issues (e.g. welfare, education or immigration policy) to 
constitutive issues about the EU polity as such (i.e. its competences, boundaries etc.), which are 
not transformable into left-right conflicts and challenge the territorial and constitutional base of 
the EU polity. Though Hix and Bartolini primarily address the politicization of EU institutions, 
i.e. the increasing importance of party politics within institutions of EU decision-making, this 
cannot be seen in isolation from the politicization of the issue of European integration (cf. de 
Wilde 2011), which takes place, as argued in the previous chapter, at the national level that still 
represents the decisive sphere of mass politics and communication.  
The passion of the debate about the virtues and downsides of politicizing European integration 
can be explained with the importance of these processes for the future prospects and further 
development of the EU project. When political entrepreneurs start politicizing EU issues, this 
cannot only result in more effective democratic representation within the EU polity, but could 
also lead to shifting public support for European integration, since parties also serve as cues to 
voters’ policy preferences.11 In turn, the more salient the European integration issue becomes for 
voters’ party choice, the more governmental actors “must look over their shoulders when 
negotiating European issues” (Hooghe/Marks 2009: 5). Hence, the politicization of European 
integration could ultimately even alter the course of integration. Whether viewed as the “right or 
wrong sort of medicine”, to borrow from the title of the Hix–Bartolini debate (cf. Hix 2006; 
Bartolini 2006), the politicization of Europe at least seems to be a process that once started 
cannot easily be reversed.  
Evidently, the normative debate about the virtues and downsides of EU politicization has an 
important empirical component: Hix and Bartolini’s diverging conclusions are to a large extent 
based on different expectations about how the politicization will manifest itself in substantive 
                                                 
11
 To be precise, the elite-mass linkage seems to be reciprocal in its nature, i.e. parties both respond to and shape 
voters’ preferences (cf. Steenbergen et al. 2007, Ray 2003). 
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terms. Will it translate into left-right conflict about different policy alternatives, as claimed by 
Hix (2006)? Or will it challenge the territorial and constitutional base of the EU polity, as argued 
by Bartolini (2006)? These are empirical questions that need to be explored empirically. This 
requires a clear research program, including the formulating of theoretically driven hypotheses. 
In recent years, important scholarly contributions have been brought forth in this respect. These 
will be briefly summarized in the following. 
 
While the process of European integration so far has been largely shaped by mainstream 
governing parties, who tend to support integration, the politicization of European integration has 
not: Several authors state that the politicization of integration is driven by those parties that reject 
the EU and integration (cf. van der Eijk/Franklin 2004; Kriesi 2007; de Vries/Edwards 2009; 
Hooghe/Marks 2009). As Erik Tillman (2004: 605) puts it, it seems “that there are more votes to 
be won in opposition to European integration than in support”. Hence, a guiding assumption in 
much scholarly work is that Euroskeptic parties generally have an advantage in politicizing the 
issue of Europe. Summarizing the literature cited above, we arrive at three core arguments for 
this presumed advantage: First, the orthogonality of the EU issue to the left-right dimension 
makes it difficult for mainstream parties to emphasize the issue because of unpredictable 
reactions of the electorate. Second, Euroskeptic parties mostly are parties located at the fringes of 
domestic party systems
12
 and are thus more often to be found in opposition than in government. 
Different from governing parties, these parties do not have to take responsibility for EU policy 
outcomes and the course of integration
13
, leaving them with more room to criticize previous and 
current developments related to European integration.
14
 Finally, under conditions of increasing 
public Euroskepticism, it is clear that Euroskeptic parties have an advantage over pro-European 
(mainstream), since the former are in line with the increasingly Euroskeptic majority view. 
Though party Euroskepticism is found both among the radical left and the radical or new populist 
right, scholars hypothesize that it will in particular be the latter that politicize Europe (Kriesi 
                                                 
12
 Recall the figure of the inverted U curve (Hooghe et al. 2002). 
13
 Governing parties are further constrained by the fact that they have only limited capacity to realize their own EU 
policy agenda because of the complex decision-making system at the EU level, leaving enough room for their 
domestic competitors to criticize the outcome of EU summits, treaty negotiations and the like.  
14
 Some scholars further argue that opposition parties have a general structural advantage in shaping the party system 
agenda by putting new issues on it (cf. Green-Pedersen/Mortensen 2010). Government parties, on the other hand, 
have to respond to all sorts of issues that are salient on the party system agenda, since they are required to offer 
policy solutions to any societal problem identified by relevant political and societal actors. This leaves them with less 
room to actively and continuously promote issues they wish to politicize. 
31 
 
2007; Hooghe/Marks 2009). This is related to a broader argument about the emerging of a new, 
non-economic conflict dimension in the last decades that structures political competition in 
Western European countries to a growing extent (cf. Kriesi 2010). This new politics dimension 
highlights the importance of different values and thus significantly differs from the classic left-
right dimension associated with economic interest. It is labeled differently in the literature, and 
also conceptualized differently (Hooghe et al 2002: 976). With a view to the EU issue, this 
conflict dimension gives rise to concerns about political integration rather than economic 
integration or the outcome of EU policies. Hooghe et al. (2002) show that there is a powerful 
connection between parties’ location on this new politics dimension and party positioning 
towards European integration, much stronger than on the economic left-right dimension. 
Conceptualizing the new dimension along the poles gal (green/alternative/libertarian) and tan 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist), they find a particularly strong connection with 
Euroskepticism for the tan-side of this dimension, where radical, nationalist, and new populist 
right parties are to be found (ibid.). These parties “reject European integration because they 
believe it weakens national sovereignty, diffuses self-rule and introduces foreign ideas”, thus 
opposing European integration for “it undermines national community” (Hooghe/Marks 2009: 
17). Given the importance of the new politics dimension—and the tan-side in particular—for 
structuring party response towards European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2009) claim that 
the issue of Europe reinforces the non-economic dimension of conflict. However, it does so in the 
sense of pre- rather than post-material values, i.e. it raises concerns about group membership and 
identity (ibid. 18). This would be even more the case the more European integration will involve 
non-economic issues or policy domains. The politicization of European integration, they 
continue, is therefore expected to be most pronounced in countries with strong parties on the tan-
side of the political spectrum, i.e. radical, nationalist, or new populist right parties (ibid.). 
Hanspeter Kriesi and colleagues go one step further and argue that the new conflict dimension in 
fact constitutes a new cleavage (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). A cleavage is distinct from the notion 
of division or conflict as indicated in the term of conflict dimensions; it combines three 
characteristics: social structure, an awareness of group membership, and the organizational 
expression of both (cf. Mair 2006a; Kriesi 2010). Kriesi (2007) suggests understanding the 
mobilization of the European issue as part of a broader structural conflict transforming the party 
systems in Western Europe, namely conflict between the winners and losers of globalization. He 
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conceptualizes this new cleavage as expressing “conflict between ‘integration’ (into the European 
or global community) and ‘demarcation’ (of the national community)” (Kriesi 2007: 85; see also 
Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). This conflict contains both an economic and a cultural dimension. 
While both are also important with a view to the EU issue, Kriesi (2007: 86) highlights the 
particular importance of the cultural dimension in this respect. Thus similar to Hooghe and Marks 
(2009), who talk about tan-parties, Kriesi claims that the politicization of European integration 
will be driven by parties on the demarcation side of the new cleavage, in his terms liberal 
conservative, national conservative, and new populist right parties, “which make the most explicit 
appeals to the fears of the losers from denationalization” (Kriesi 2007: 88).15 
As indicated by this summary, scholars state that the politicization of European integration is 
primarily driven by radical, nationalist or new populist right parties that mobilize against political 
integration on a cultural conflict dimension. The latter reflects these parties concerns about 
national sovereignty and identity, which link the issue of Europe to the broader policy program of 
these parties, e.g. the issue of immigration. If politicization were driven by radical left parties, 
however, this would reinforce the economic dimension of conflict, which fits in with radical left 
parties’ rejection of market liberalization and the primacy of market interest. Hence the substance 
of conflict in the politicization of European integration will be dependent on Euroskeptics’ party 
family. As summarized by Hooghe and Marks (2009), “[w]here the challenge comes from tan 
populist and national conservatives, the debate is conducted in terms of identity. Where the 
challenge comes from the radical left, the debate is about distribution” (ibid. 25). 
 
As this summary outlines, much of the literature suggests that one needs to look at the more 
extreme and Euroskeptic parties in order to understand the politicization of the European 
integration issue. In contrast, Christoffer Green-Pedersen (2011) argues that the politicization of 
European integration should be explored by focusing on the incentives the issue offers to 
mainstream parties. Building on the agenda setting literature, Green-Pedersen approaches issue 
competition between parties as a process of agenda setting, where all parties try to put ‘their’ 
issues on the agenda (ibid. 3). This in turn raises the question which factors affect the hierarchy 
of issues on this party system agenda (see also Green-Pedersen/Mortensen 2010). According to 
                                                 
15
 To be precise, Kriesi does not explicitly refer to politicization, but speaks of mobilization. However, the way he 
uses the term is very similar to the concept of politicization as used here and in the cited literature.  
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Green-Pedersen (2011), mainstream parties are decisive in this respect. In other words, if 
mainstream parties refuse to respond to Euroskeptic fringe parties, the issue will remain low on 
the party system agenda (see also Meguid 2005, 2008). He further claims that there are two 
decisive sources for mainstream parties’ incentive to politicize the issue of Europe, namely the 
electoral and the coalition factor. The latter in particular would constitute a constraint to the 
politicization of European integration by mainstream parties, which cannot simply engage in 
Euroskeptic politicization as this would threaten their chance for building a coalition with parties 
supportive of European integration. Building on the Danish case, Green-Pedersen (2011) 
concludes that this is the main reason for the lack of politicization in a country where other 
scholars might have expected its occurrence because of Euroskeptic parties’ representation in the 
Danish party system.  
The scholarly controversy about whether it is Euroskeptic fringe or mainstream parties that are 
decisive in the politicization of the EU issue is to large extent the result of applying the concept 
of politicization at different ‘levels’: Whereas Hooghe/Marks (2009) and Kriesi (2007) first and 
foremost point to individual parties’ attempts to politicize Europe and thus conclude that 
Euroskeptic parties are the drivers of politicization, Green-Pedersen (2011) focuses on the degree 
of politicization at the party system level (in his terms: the party system agenda). For individual 
parties, however, his analysis actually supports the claim raised by other scholars about 
Euroskeptic parties as the drivers of politicization (ibid. 10).  
 
As indicated by this summary, the study of party politicization of European integration has made 
significant progress. However, it is still largely at a speculative stage, meaning that the focus is 
on the development of theoretically driven hypotheses, while empirical analyses remain scarce. 
Preparing for the empirical analysis of this dissertation, the next section will explore in more 
detail how politicization will be approached in this study both analytically and empirically. 
 
 
3.3 Party politicization as explanandum: two levels, two components, two theories 
Building on de Wilde (2011), the previous chapter already provided a definition for the concept 
of politicization. To recall, the politicization of European integration can be understood as the 
extent to which the issue of Europe becomes part of the political game expressed in public—
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indicated by an increase in the polarization of opinions towards the issue and the extent to which 
this polarization is publicly advanced (ibid. 566-7). From this perspective, issue-politicization is a 
product of party interaction towards the issue, thus focusing on the ‘aggregate level’ of all parties 
competing in the domestic sphere of contestation.
16
 However, individual parties might differ in 
their engagement in the process of politicization, i.e. some parties may be more active in that 
respect than others. The previous section clearly outlined that some scholarly dispute about which 
parties to consider as decisive for the politicization of the EU issue (i.e. Euroskeptic fringe parties 
or mainstream parties) stems from employing the politicization concept at these two different 
‘levels’. For avoiding such confusion, this dissertation makes an explicit distinction between the 
two levels, which will be referred to as the party and the party system level of politicization: 
 Politicization at the party level: Shifting the focus to individual party behavior, de Wilde’s 
(2011) definition requires further specification. Party politicization of European 
integration at the level of individual parties will therefore be defined here as an individual 
party’s attempts to publicly emphasize the issue of Europe. Similar to de Wilde’s 
definition addressing the party system level, this definition emphasizes public expression 
as constitutive of the politicization concept. Unlike the party system level, however, the 
focus on the party level allows us to explore individual parties’ engagement in the 
politicization of Europe irrespective of other parties’ response or lack of it. 
 Politicization at the party system level: Following de Wilde (2011), the degree of 
politicization at the party system level refers to the polarization of opinions and the extent 
to which this polarization is publicly advanced. This definition implies that party conflict 
over the issue of Europe has to find its expression publicly and is thus to be distinguished 
from the potential for conflict resulting from the existence of diverging party positions in 
parties’ policy programs. At the party system level, thus, the engagement of different 
parties and party interaction are quite an important point: If only a single party politicizes 
the issue of Europe, but no other party responds, the degree of politicization at the party 
system will still remain low. However, when all parties are involved in the politicization 
of the issue, polarization is likely to be higher, as will be the degree of politicization at the 
party system. 
                                                 
16
 Green-Pedersen (2011) refers to this as the party system agenda. 
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The focus on public expression in party politicization of European integration at both levels is a 
crucial point, and not only analytically. It is also important with a view to research strategy, since 
it requires a carefully considered selection of data and operationalization that are capable of 
capturing public expression—a point to which we will return in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
The above presented definitions first and foremost refer to politicization in terms of quantity. 
However, politicization can also take different facets in terms of content: When politicizing 
European integration, actors will have different thematic priorities and will frame the issue 
according to their policy position towards the issue. As outlined in the previous section, different 
parties will embed the issue of Europe according to their overall policy program. Hence some 
parties will politicize European integration on the cultural dimension, whereas others will focus 
on the economic dimension (cf. Kriesi 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vries/Edwards 2009). 
Hence the debate about Europe might look fundamentally different in terms of its substantive 
character depending on which actors engage in the politicization. Therefore, further precision is 
demanded for conceptualizing politicization analytically. This can be achieved by distinguishing 
the two components intrinsic to the concept of politicization, namely content and emphasis:
17
 
 Content: The first component of issue-politicization is content. It refers to the substantive 
character of a party’s issue-politicization and thus strongly overlaps with parties’ policy 
position. However, it is different from the latter insofar, as it only considers positions that 
actually become politicized rather than parties’ complete policy program towards an issue. 
At the party system level, this can be labeled the content of the debate, which could be 
biased towards the policy concerns of particular parties (most likely those that actively 
engage in the politicization of the issue) or could be more diverse and reflect the policy 
concerns of several political actors. 
 Emphasis: The second component of issue-politicization is more quantitative in its nature, 
as it refers to the emphasis put on the respective issue that is being politicized. The notion 
of emphasis is strongly related to the concept of salience. In fact, both are mostly used as 
                                                 
17
 A similar approach can be found in the literature about parties’ issue-positioning and the distinction between 
positioning in terms of direction (e.g. whether supportive or adverse to the respective issue) and the importance or 
salience of an issue to a party (cf. Laver 2001). 
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synonyms in the literature (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006). However, in line with the 
definition of politicization outlined above, emphasis as understood here is limited to 
publicly expressed issue-focus. Emphasis thus describes whether and to what extent 
parties address the issue of Europe publicly. At the party system level, emphasis equally 
reflects the intensity or degree of politicization in quantitative terms, resulting from the 
aggregation of individual parties’ issue-emphasis.  
 
The distinction between content and emphasis is of utmost analytical importance. As argued in 
this dissertation, both components connect to different strands of theory, namely cleavage theory 
on the one hand, and party competition theory on the other hand: The content of politicization 
strongly overlaps with parties’ policy positioning. It is therefore connected to the broader 
programmatic and ideological profile of a party that constrains how parties can respond to new 
issues. This perspective is aptly summarized by Gary Marks and Carole Wilson (2000: 434), who 
state that “parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to 
electoral or constituency pressure; rather, they are organizations with historically rooted 
orientations that guide their response to new issues”. Hence for understanding the content of 
politicization, we need to go back to the decisive factors for party positioning towards European 
integration. Cleavage theory, it is argued here, provides us with the theoretical framework for 
understanding why parties respond to the issue of Europe in the way they do. Whether a party 
will actually emphasize the issue of Europe, however, will rather be dependent on strategic 
considerations related to party competition: If a party considers the issue of Europe to be 
beneficial in electoral terms, it will politicize (here: emphasize) it. Contrariwise, it will refrain 
from doing so, if the issue could damage its electoral success. The salience theory of party 
competition provides the theoretical framework for this argument. 
 
The next section will briefly introduce these two strands of theory as a theoretical basis for 
developing the explanatory framework within which the empirical analysis of this dissertation is 
embedded.  
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3.4 Theorizing the content and emphasis of issue-politicization 
3.4.1 Cleavage theory and the content of EU politicization 
Seeking to understand how parties respond to new issues—European integration among them—
scholars go back to the cleavage theory developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Lipset and 
Rokkan linked the establishing of party systems in Europe in the 19
th
 century to social and 
cultural divisions in society that emanated from historical upheavals, in particular the national 
revolution, the Protestant reformation, and—most important—the industrial revolution. In Lipset 
and Rokkan’s own words, their focus is on “conflicts and their translation into party systems” 
(ibid. 5, emphasis in original). The cleavages that have found their expression in European party 
systems—though in various forms—are the class cleavage, the church-state cleavage, and the 
center-periphery cleavage. As argued by many scholars, these cleavages were not only 
constitutive to the evolution of European party systems more than a century ago, but are still 
decisive in shaping parties’ response to new issues appearing on the political agenda, since they 
reflect parties’ historically rooted ideological orientations (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Edwards 
2009). This idea is put forward in the cleavage theory of party positioning. 
 
In an attempt to explain parties’ response to the European integration issue, Gary Marks and 
Carole Wilson (2000) developed a cleavage theory of party positioning towards European 
integration. They argue “that European integration is assimilated into pre-existing ideologies of 
party leaders, activists and constituencies that reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental 
domestic issues” (ibid. 433). The core argument thus is that parties are ideologically constrained 
in their response to the issue of Europe. A party’s response will also vary for different facets of 
integration, which is related to the “dual character of European integration” (ibid. 437), namely 
economic and political integration. The former refers to the removal of tariff barriers, the creation 
of a single market, the establishing of a Monetary union etc. The latter concerns the establishing 
of an EU system of governance and the transfer of competences towards this supranational level. 
Both dimensions are intrinsic to the EU project, though there weight varies for different periods 
of integration. While economic integration clearly dominated the foundation phase of the 
European communities, political integration at first lagged behind. Over the last three decades, 
however, political integration has made substantial progress through a number of treaty reforms 
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that further deepened political integration in the EU. Though a party may favor integration on one 
of these two dimensions, it can reject in on the other dimension. The cleavage theory of party 
positioning suggests that this will be dependent on the cleavages within which parties are 
embedded.  
The tensions emanating from the dual character of EU integration for parties that compete on the 
class cleavage are quite obvious (Marks/Wilson 2000): Parties on the left side of the class 
cleavage have difficulties with economic integration, since it undermines welfare state 
achievements at the national level and increases international economic competition; political 
integration, on the other hand, provides new opportunities for re-regulation at the supranational 
level and may thus compensate for the loss of regulation capacity and effectiveness at the 
national level. Parties on the right side face similar problems, though in reverse: They strongly 
support economic integration for it constrains state intervention on economies. Political 
integration, on the other hand, is more problematic for these parties, since the establishing of a 
supranational government facilitates regulation at the European level (ibid.).
18
  
Despite the class cleavage’s dominance in European party systems, certain parties though 
compete on the church-state or the center-periphery cleavage. However, the dual character of 
European integration seems less of a challenge in these cases, where the economic dimension is 
subordinated to other tensions (ibid.). Catholic parties employ a supportive position to both 
economic and political integration, which is related to “the supranational aspirations of the 
Catholic Church and the anti-national bias of Catholic parties that arose from their historic battles 
with national state-builders” (ibid. 438). This is different for Protestant parties, who will be more 
skeptical towards supranationalism because of the national feature of Protestant churches and 
their rejection of central authority (ibid., see also Edwards 2009). On the center-periphery 
cleavage, Marks and Wilson make a distinction between parties that represent territorially 
concentrated and those representing territorially dispersed minorities (2000: 438). For the former, 
European integration constitutes an opportunity, since it weakens state authority and allows for a 
strengthening of their region. The latter, on the other hand will most likely view European 
integration as a threat “because it shifts decision making even further away from their control and 
is yet more alien to their cultural milieu” (ibid. 438).19 
                                                 
18
 For earlier efforts to link parties’ EU positioning to the class cleavage see Hix (1999a). 
19
 Following this broader outline of party positioning towards European integration for parties embedded in the class, 
the church-state, and the center-periphery cleavage, Marks and Wilson (2000) then compare parties’ EU positioning 
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Applying the cleavage theory of party positioning to the study of intra-party cohesion on the EU 
issue, Erica Edwards (2009) expands Marks and Wilson’s (2000) theoretical argument towards 
the younger party families competing on the so called new politics dimension/cleavage, namely 
radical right and green parties.
20
 Rejection of European integration perfectly fits in with radical 
right parties’ ideological profile advocating nationalism and traditionalism, and strongly rejecting 
immigration. Though in some cases this program is complemented by economic neoliberalism 
(and thus compatible with economic integration), the clear privileging of the cultural or value 
based dimension over the economic dimension by these parties largely eclipses potential tensions 
as to whether or not to support economic integration (Edwards 2009). Radical and new populist 
right parties thus share a clear anti-EU profile that is in line with their programmatic focus to 
protect national sovereignty and identity. Green parties face similar tensions as social democrats 
with assimilating the issue of Europe to their overall policy program. While being far from 
pleased with EU market liberalism and the focus on economic growth (which contradict green 
values like social justice and sustainability), the establishing of a supranational system of 
governance provides opportunities for addressing core ‘green’ policy concerns, which require 
coordination and regulation beyond the level of member states (e.g. environmental and climate 
protection). The EU’s constitutional architecture and decision-making procedures, on the other 
hand, are clearly at odds with green parties’ claim for direct democracy, decentralization, and 
local influence—values strongly related to these parties’ roots in the new social movements of 
the late 1960s and later (ibid.).  
 
Deriving party response towards new issues—European integration as one specific case—from 
the cleavage theory of party systems emphasizes that parties are not simply vote-maximizing 
machines. As Marks and Wilson (2000: 345) put it, “although political parties exist in a 
competitive electoral environment, their policy position cannot […] be predicted as an efficient 
                                                                                                                                                              
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s (based on expert survey data). They find that differences within party families 
are much lower than within countries (ibid. 441), thus supporting the expectation that parties’ response to the issue of 
Europe is mediated by the cleavages within which they are embedded. They further argue that the cleavage 
perspective can even explain variation within party families (resulting from variation in the manifestation of the 
cleavages in European party systems) (ibid. 442). To support this argument, they provide a detailed analysis for 
Europe’s largest party families, namely the social democrats, the liberals, the Christian democrats, and the 
conservatives. 
20
 Edwards (2009) adds a third new family, namely radical left parties “of the new left variety” (ibid. 11). However, 
given the heterogeneity of this group and the fact that Edwards comes to quite similar conclusions as for green 
parties, they will be blanked out here.  
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response to electoral incentives”. Rather, party response is mediated by the cleavages from which 
parties emanated, making party family the core explanatory factor for parties’ response towards 
the European integration issue. The cleavage argument can easily be applied to the study of 
politicization, since party positioning can reasonably be expected to be reflected in the content-
aspect of issue-politicization. This will be outlined in more detail in section 3.5.1. 
 
 
3.4.2 The salience theory of party competition and EU politicization 
From the numerous issues competing for public attention, only a few are taken up by political 
actors and thus actually arrive on the party political agenda, i.e. become politicized (cf. 
Carmines/Stimson 1986, 1989). Whether or not a party will publicly emphasize and thus 
politicize an issue can be expected to be dependent on strategic considerations related to party 
competition. A party will only politicize an issue if it does not risk electoral damage from doing 
so. The salience theory of party competition provides the theoretical framework for this argument 
(cf. Budge/Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). 
The salience theory of party competition argues that parties compete by strategically 
manipulating the salience of issues, i.e. by emphasizing certain issues while downplaying others. 
According to salience theory, competition between political parties is not merely competition 
about different positions towards the same issue, but is a contest about the different issues each 
party expects to electorally benefit from and thus emphasizes. This theory of party competition 
has been developed as an explicit critique of the classic Downsian model of competition (Downs 
1957), which holds that parties compete by shifting their locations in the policy space, i.e. they 
simply change their policy positions according to strategic consideration (Ray 2007: 16). Salience 
theory thus acknowledges that parties might not be able to easily shift their position towards an 
issue in order to maximize votes. After all, “parties are not empty vessels into which issue 
positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures” (Marks/Wilson 2000: 
343). However, being rational actors that act strategically, parties will only publicly emphasize 
issues they expect to benefit from while trying to downplay others. 
Salience theory suggests that parties ‘own’ different issues (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006), i.e. 
different parties are associated with different issues on which they enjoy reputation and 
credibility because of their previous activities towards or repeated emphasis on these issues (e.g. 
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in their parliamentary work, in government policy, in campaigning). Green parties, for instance, 
can be seen as the issue owners of the environmental issue, radical right parties are considered the 
owners of the immigration issue. Competing for voters, parties will therefore try to emphasize 
‘their own’ issues. To put it differently, party competition reflects a battle for control over the 
agenda (cf. Green-Pedersen 2011; Green-Pedersen/Mortensen 2010). Important to note, however, 
issues do not naturally ‘belong’ to any party. Issue ownership rather evolves over time if a party 
prioritizes a certain issue, constantly emphasizes it, and thus becomes associated with the issue 
(cf. Steenbergen/Scott 2004). However, even without holding ownership over an issue, political 
parties can emphasize specific issues that they expect to increase their electoral success. While 
this could lead to issue ownership in the long run, it can also be employed as a short-term strategy 
in response to changes in the political environment (ibid.).  
 
Applying the salience theory of party competition to the study of EU politicization requires 
relaxing the importance of the issue ownership argument. This is because the point of departure is 
the politicization of a relatively new issue, i.e. an issue that has not played prominently on the 
public and party agenda previously and is thus not yet ‘occupied’ by a particular party 
competitor. Hence for studying party politicization of European integration, the core question is 
which parties start emphasizing the issue in order to obtain ownership in the long run—and why 
they do so. Beyond the issue ownership argument, the salience theory of party competition 
suggests that issue-emphasis will be dependent on an electoral calculus. Scholars applying 
salience theory to the issue of Europe have developed a number of potential explanatory factors 
for the salience or emphasis parties devote to the European integration issue (cf. Steen-
bergen/Scott 2004; Netjes/Binnema 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vries/van de Wardt 2011): 
Most basically, a party will refrain from emphasizing issues that threaten intra-party cohesion, as 
this could damage the party profile with regard to clarity and credibility. Intra-party unity thus 
represents a precondition for issue-politicization (Steenbergen/Scott 2004).
21
 Moreover, parties 
have to consider their overall programmatic commitment. If, for some reasons, the party position 
on a particular issue contradicts the party’s overall ideological orientations, it could be 
counterproductive to emphasize the issue (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009). Hence the ideological fit of 
                                                 
21
 However, in case a party is deeply divided over an issue, this could finally increase issue salience, because the 
issue cannot be suppressed any longer (cf. Steenbergen/Scott 2004; de Vries/van de Wardt 2011). 
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the issue with a party’s policy profile constitutes another requirement for parties’ ability to 
politicize an issue. As parties attempt to win votes, they will also pay attention to their (potential) 
voters’ preferences towards an issue. This means the closer the party position to the position of 
voters, the more likely the issue will be beneficial in electoral terms (cf. Steenbergen/Scott 2004). 
Additional factors concern parties’ location in the policy space and their government-opposition 
status: Distinguishing between parties located at the margins of the dominant left-right 
dimensions and those located in the mainstream, the former can be expected to emphasize a new 
issue that does not fit into the left-right dimension (like European integration), while the latter 
will mostly likely downplay the issue (cf. Netjes/Binnema 2007). This is because more extreme 
parties at the periphery of the party system are generally to a much lesser extent successful in 
competing on left-right issues than mainstream parties and will therefore try to accentuate new 
issues in order to gain more votes. A similar argument can be made for opposition parties, who 
might have an interest in restructuring contestation (ibid.). Opposition parties can also be 
expected to be more successful in putting new issues on the public agenda. Unlike governing 
parties, they do not have to offer policy solutions to all issues raised by their competitors and can 
therefore focus more effectively on the issues they want to emphasize (Green-Pedersen/Morten-
sen 2010). Finally, a political party is also constrained in emphasizing or downplaying an issue 
dependent on how salient the issue already is on the policy agenda of other parties. In the context 
of the EU issue, scholars refer to this as systemic salience (cf. Steenbergen/Scott 2004, 
Netjes/Binnema 2007). Based on the assumption that a party cannot ignore other parties’ 
behavior, issue salience is expected to increase for any political party, the more the other parties 
emphasize the issue (Steenbergen/Scott 2004: 169). A similar claim is raised by Green-Pedersen 
and Mortinsen (2010). Building on agenda setting theories of political communication research, 
they introduce the concept of a party system agenda in their model of issue competition. The 
party system agenda reflects a “hierarchy of issues, to which the relevant actors must pay 
attention even as they compete about the future content of this hierarchy” (ibid. 260).  
 
 
3.5 Explanatory framework for party politicization of European integration 
This section develops the explanatory framework for the empirical analysis of party politicization 
of European integration. Building on the cleavage theory of party positioning and the salience 
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theory of party competition and drawing on the literature applying these theories to the issue of 
Europe, it summarizes the most convincing explanatory factors for party politicization, 
distinguishing between content and emphasis of EU issue-politicization, and considering both the 
party and the party system level. 
 
 
3.5.1 Explanatory factors for the content of EU issue-politicization 
European integration could be politicized in various forms as regards content, because the issue 
contains various sources for conflict. This is inevitably related to the multi-faceted nature of 
integration that includes economic and political integration as well as EU policy output in an 
increasing number of policy fields. Applying the cleavage theory of party positioning to the study 
of EU issue-politicization, political parties can be expected to politicize Europe in accordance 
with their ideological profile (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Edwards 2009). For the content of issue-
politicization, this results in a variety of possible options for the content of the debate, depending 
on which facets of integration parties choose to emphasize and whether they focus on evaluating 
the status quo or claiming for change. We can draw a—clearly simplified—picture for EU issue-
politicization for individual parties based on the cleavage approach:
22
 
 Social democratic parties: Given the tension that economic and political integration 
causes for these parties but considering their support to the ‘overall EU package’, they 
will combine demands for further integration with strong claims for different policy 
priorities (e.g. employment rather than monetary stability) and the establishing of a social 
Union. 
 Christian democratic parties: For the catholic camp within this party family, the dual 
character of integration is not much of a challenge. The supranational character of the 
Catholic Church and the center-right location of these parties on the class cleavages make 
them strong advocates of both political and economic integration, allowing them in 
principle to politicize both facets. 
 Liberal parties: If not belonging to the conservative camp but the social or radical liberals 
within this party family, liberal parties can be expected to support European integration in 
                                                 
22
 This outlook only considers party families represented in the Austrian party system (see Chapter 5). 
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a similar vein as Christian democrats. They favor market liberalism and oppose 
nationalism and can thus politicize European integration from both perspectives.  
 Radical right parties: Since the rejection of European integration perfectly fits in with 
these parties’ ideological profile (nationalism, traditionalism, anti-immigration), they will 
assimilate the issue of Europe on the cultural dimension by raising concerns about 
sovereignty, identity, and self-ruling. Economic integration will be less important even if 
the party program is complemented by economic neoliberalism, because these parties 
clearly privilege the cultural dimension over the economic in party competition. 
 Green parties: Since the dual character of EU integration causes tension for green 
parties—because they reject market liberalism and criticize the EU constitutional 
architecture, but at the same time focus on issues that clearly require policy solutions 
beyond the national level—they can be expected to politicize European integration on a 
functional dimension about policy alternatives rather than a cultural dimension about 
group membership. I.e. they will focus more explicitly on the direction of policies 
adopted at the EU level and claim for changes according to the parties’ policy program. 
Claims for EU polity reform will most likely strive for a democratization of the EU. 
 
At the party system level, the content of the debate about Europe is likely to vary depending on 
which parties actively politicize the issue and thus put forward their particular concerns. As 
argued previously, a number of scholars expect this to be the Euroskeptic parties, which have an 
interest in challenging their (mainstream) competitors. As indicated by the inverted U-curve (and 
consistent with the cleavage approach), Euroskeptic parties are found at the fringes of the left-
right or new-politics dimension. Assuming that they are the drivers of EU politicization, the 
overall debate about Europe might be biased towards these parties concerns (Hooghe/Marks 
2009): 
 Euroskeptic EU politicization by the radical right: In this scenario, EU politicization will 
focus on political integration and will evoke conflict on the cultural dimension, 
emphasizing questions of national sovereignty and self-ruling, thus expressing conflict 
about group membership and identity. 
 Euroskeptic EU politicization by the radical left: If EU politicization is driven by radical 
left parties, the focus will be on questions of distribution, thus reactivating the economic 
45 
 
dimension with conflict about distribution between functional rather than territorial or 
cultural groups. 
 
Clearly, the content of the debate about Europe in the politicization at the party system level not 
only depends on the challengers or drivers of politicization, but on other parties’ response. Hence 
parties can shift the focus of the debate towards different facets of integration. To what extent 
they are able to do so, remains an empirical question that will be explored in Chapter 6.3 of this 
dissertation. 
 
 
3.5.2 Explanatory factors for the emphasis of EU issue-politicization 
What factors can be expected to account for the extent of EU issue-politicization at the party and 
the party system level? Starting with the party level, the question is when would we expect an 
individual party to pick up the issue of Europe for domestic contestation? As argued previously, 
EU issue-politicization at the party level equals a party’s emphasis or salience on the issue of 
Europe. Following salience theory, parties act strategically in this respect, meaning that a party 
will emphasize an issue when it supposes to gain electoral advantage through it. Based on this 
theoretical approach, recent studies on the salience of European integration for parties have 
developed a number of explanations for variation in EU salience across parties (cf. 
Steenbergen/Scott 2004; Netjes/Binnema 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vries/van de Wardt 
2011). The following explanatory factors derived from this literature will be taken into account 
when exploring the politicization of the EU issue in Austrian general election campaigns:  
 Party position vis-à-vis voter position: As parties attempt to win votes, a party will 
depoliticize issues on which its supporters hold different positions compared to the party’s 
(cf. Steenbergen/Scott 2004). 
 Internal dissent: Parties will deemphasize European integration if the issue challenges 
internal party cohesion, as internal dissent could damage the party profile with regard to 
clarity and credibility (cf. Netjes/Binnema 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2009). 
 Location in policy space: Distinguishing between parties located at the margins of the 
dominant left-right dimensions and those located in the mainstream, the former can be 
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expected to emphasize a new issue that does not fit into the left-right dimension—like 
European integration—, while the latter will most likely downplay the issue (cf. 
Netjes/Binnema 2007). This is because more extreme parties at the periphery of the party 
system are less successful in competing on left-right issues than mainstream parties and 
will therefore try to accentuate new issues in order to gain more votes. 
 Government/opposition status: Following a similar logic as location in the policy space, 
opposition parties might have an interest in restructuring contestation and are therefore 
more likely to politicize European integration (ibid.). In addition, they do not have to take 
responsibility for EU policy outcomes and the course of integration, leaving them more 
room for promoting their ideas and criticizing the course of integration compared to 
government parties. 
 Party family: Based on cleavage theory, the party family factor is based on the idea that 
the European integration issue is more challenging to some parties compared to others, 
depending on each party’s ideological profile. This is due to the dual character of 
European integration (Marks/Wilson 2000: 434), namely economic and political 
integration. Following this argument, it is again mainstream left and right parties which 
can be expected to downplay the issue, as either economic (in the case of center-left 
parties) or political integration (in the case of center-right parties) contradicts the party’s 
overall policy program, making in counterproductive for these parties to politicize the 
issue of Europe. 
 Systemic salience: Based on the assumption that a party cannot ignore other parties’ 
behavior, issue salience is expected to increase for any political party, the more the other 
parties emphasize the issue—even if a party actually has no incentive in politicizing the 
issue (Steenbergen/Scott 2004: 169). 
 
Variation in the politicization of European integration may not only occur between different 
parties, but also between different campaigns, labeled here as variation at the party system level 
in distinction from the party level. Such different degrees in the overall politicization of the issue 
at the party system level—i.e. the systemic salience in Steenbergen and Scott’s (2004) terms—
will mostly result from the dynamic interaction of the factors described above. Still, certain 
conditions related to specific events or party competition dynamics may boost or decrease the 
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salience of the issue of Europe collaterally, resulting in different degrees of politicization at 
different points in time within a given country. The following factors can be considered in that 
respect: 
 Date of EU accession: The more recently a country joined the EU, the higher will be the 
degree of politicization. This expectation is based on the assumption that EU issues are 
higher in public focus shortly after accession, when membership is new, the country must 
adopt the aquis communautaire, and the public attentively monitors whether membership 
has brought the befits promised by the government previously to accession (cf. Tillmann 
2004). 
 Party repositioning: If a party alters its EU position, this can be expected to increase the 
politicization of the issue, since those parties formerly ‘on the same side’ will criticize the 
positional shift whereas the other parties will question the party’s credibility on the issue 
in order to defend them against the new competitor, thus boosting the importance of the 
issue (cf. Meguid 2005, 2008). 
 Government participation of Euroskeptic parties: Government participation of 
Euroskeptic or anti-EU parties will most likely constrain these parties in their ability to 
emphasize and criticize European integration. Given that Euroskeptic parties are seen as 
the driving forces for the politicization of Europe in much of the literature (cf. 
Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vries/Edwards 2009; Kriesi 2007; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004), 
their government participation can plausibly be expected to decrease the overall 
politicization of the issue. However, in case there is more than one Euroskeptic party—
and at least one is not in power—we would expect the contrary, i.e. an increase in the 
politicization of the issue, since the opposition party is likely to actively challenge its 
Euroskeptic counterpart. 
 
 
3.6 National context and EU politicization: case selection and country hypothesis 
An in-depth analysis of party politicization on European integration demands that the issue of 
Europe actually becomes politicized. Otherwise, there would not much to be learned from such a 
study. Representing a rather new issue that, moreover, challenges the domestic structure of 
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political conflict, why should European integration become politicized in terms of domestic party 
contestation in the first place? While the decisive actors in this respect naturally are individual 
parties—whose behavior towards the issue of Europe represents this study’s object of 
investigation—, the relevant literature also refers to conditions external to individual parties. This 
is reasonable, since parties operate within a political environment that can be favorable or 
unfavorable to the politicization of a particular issue. Consulting the literature on issue-evolution, 
-politicization and -voting, we can identify a number of favorable conditions for European 
integration to enter mass politics (cf. Carmines/Stimson 1986, 1989; de Vries 2007a; de Vries 
2009; de Wilde 2011). Applying a purposive sampling approach, where a case is selected on 
theoretical grounds in accordance with the nature of the research question (Silverman 2010: 141-
46), Austria has been identified as a country with favorable conditions for the politicization of 
European integration based on the following criteria derived from the above-cited literature: 
 There is visible conflict between parties over the issue of European integration. If all 
parties agree on an issue or party differences are not visible, there is no incentive to 
politicize it in terms of party contestation, as it would not benefit any of the competitors 
(cf. de Vries 2007a). 
►► This condition is met in Austria, as different measures of party positioning as well 
as several scholarly contributions reveal (cf. Pelinka 2004; Fallend 2008; Hooghe et al. 
2010; Kriesi 2007; Klingemann et al. 2006). 
 The issue of Europe is related to the dominant structure of conflict. Whether the left-
right dimension or new politics dimension, the assumption behind that is that existing 
dimensions of conflict serve as cues or shortcuts for people in a political landscape with 
a virtually unlimited number of issues. However, if the issue of Europe perfectly fits 
into one of these dimensions, it would add nothing new, making it less attractive for 
political challengers (cf. de Vries 2007a). 
►► In Austria, there is evidence that European integration is related to the gal-tan or 
demarcation-integration dimension (cf.  Hooghe/Marks 2009; Kriesi 2007; Kritzin-
ger/Michalowitz 2005; see also Pelinka 2004). 
 European integration is perceived as important by voters, i.e. the issue is salient to 
them. This is based on the assumption that parties not only drive but also respond to 
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voter preferences. If an issue is important to voters, parties can be expected to pick it up 
(cf. Steenbergen et al. 2007; de Vries 2007a; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004; Ray 2003).  
►► The increasing salience of the issue in media coverage (cf. Kriesi 2007) and clear 
indications for EU issue-voting suggest that European integration is important to 
Austrians (cf. Schoen 2010; Kriesi 2007; Sora 2006; Tillman 2004). 
 There is a high level of public Euroskepticism and there exists a strong Euroskeptic 
party. This criterion is based on the argument of an asymmetry in the importance of 
support for and opposition to European integration among voters for party contestation, 
suggesting that public opinion is more relevant when expressing opposition to rather 
than support for European integration (cf. Tillman 2004). 
►► As Eurobarometer data show, the level of Euroskepticism among Austrians is 
comparatively high and with the radical right Freedom Party, a strong anti-EU party is 
represented in the Austrian party system (see Chapter 5 for details). 
 Existence of EU referenda: Referenda related to EU questions can be expected to spur 
politicization, as they typically lead to intensified public debate and bring to light latent 
dissent within parties (cf. de Vries 2009). 
►► Except for the accession referendum in 1994, there have been no referenda on EU 
related questions in Austria. Different from the literature, however, I would argue that in 
combination with public and party Euroskepticism, it may actually be the absence of 
referenda that spurs the politicization of European integration at the party system level 
in the long run. This is because parties cannot shift the issue away from the party system 
agenda to the general public. Furthermore, if referenda are not prohibited 
constitutionally, this provides Euroskeptic parties with further opportunities for 
criticism. In Austria, claims for referenda play an important role in electoral and 
parliamentary contestation between parties, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7 
of this dissertation. 
 
Given the particular shape of these contextual factors, we cannot only expect politicization of 
European integration to appear, but can also hypothesize on its specific manifestation in Austrian 
party contestation. Considering the hypotheses for emphasis and content presented in the 
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previous section, politicization is expected to be driven first and foremost by Euroskeptic parties. 
Since party Euroskepticism in Austria has become a radical right phenomenon, we can thus 
expect EU politicization to take the following shape: 
 The politicization of European integration in Austria will be driven by the radical right 
parties. As a consequence, the content of the debate will strongly be biased towards 
question of national sovereignty and identity and will thus raise conflict on the cultural 
dimension of conflict. 
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4. Data and methods 
This chapter provides information on the data and methods used in this dissertation. It discusses 
strengths and weaknesses of different data types and methods typically used in research on party 
response to the European integration issue before presented the data selected for and methods 
applied in the present study. In doing so, the chapter outlines why the study departs from the 
‘standard’ data and methods used in the study of party politicization, or more broadly party 
positioning and issue-emphasis. Before going into detail about data in 4.2 and methods in 4.3, the 
chapter starts with a brief summary of the broader research design, including information about 
the time frame delimiting the empirical study, arenas of contestation explored, and parties 
considered in the analysis. 
 
 
4.1 Summary of research design 
For studying party politicization of European integration in Austria, the project considers the time 
frame from 1995 to 2008. This is period starts with Austria’s EU membership and ends with the 
most recent general election in Austria. The focus of the dissertation is on party politicization of 
European integration in domestic party contestation. The empirical study distinguishes between 
two types of arenas for domestic party contestation, the electoral arena and decision-making 
arenas (cf. Bardi/Mair 2008). Important to note, the empirical core of this dissertation focuses on 
the former and will explore party politicization of Europe in Austrian national election 
campaigns. The analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 has therefore been developed first 
and foremost with a view to party contestation in the electoral arena. The aim is to explore and 
explain which parties drive the politicization of Europe and to learn about the content of the 
debate during national election campaigns. The detailed discussion about strengths and 
weaknesses of data provided in the next section is also focused on the core purpose of the 
dissertation, namely to study party politicization in electoral contestation. 
This main empirical part will be complemented by a smaller study on the role of the EU issue in 
arenas of domestic decision-making, for which coalition agreements as well as speeches and 
voting behavior in the Austrian parliament will be analyzed. The aim of this complementary 
study is to explore whether parties behave contradictory on the issue of Europe in decision-
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making arenas as opposed to the electoral arena, which will provide an indication for whether 
party politicization in electoral contestation eventually impacts on EU-related decision-making.  
This study focuses on the politicization of Europe promoted by a specific type of actors, namely 
national political parties. Parties will be considered in the analysis if they are relevant for 
contestation, i.e. if they have coalition potential and/or blackmail potential (Sartori 1976; see also 
Katz/Crotty 2006). In the period of interest (1995-2008), the Austrian Nationalrat consisted of 
four to five parties. Four parties have permanently been represented in parliament in the time 
frame of the present study. These are the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), the People’s Party 
(ÖVP), the Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Greens. Additionally, the Liberals have been represented 
in parliament until the 1999 (to be precise: from their foundation in 1993 until the 1999 election) 
and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) since 2005. All them are to be considered 
relevant for contestation and are therefore included in the empirical analysis—the latter two of 
course only for the periods of their existence (BZÖ) or relevance in terms of domestic 
contestation (Liberals). More information on these parties will be provided in Chapter 5 of the 
dissertation, which introduces the Austrian case. 
 
 
4.2 Data 
This section first discusses strengths and weakness of different types of data typically used in the 
study of party positioning and issue-salience. It then present the data selected for this study and 
provides information on data collection. 
 
 
4.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of different data types 
For studying parties’ issue-positions and issue-salience, scholars refer to different sorts of data. 
Following Ray (2007), these can be grouped in four types, namely reputational, textual, 
behavioral, and self-reported data. Research focusing more explicitly on the politicization of the 
European integration issue most commonly uses reputational or textual data, in particular expert 
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surveys, election manifestos, and, most recently, media data.
23
 Each of these data has strengths 
and weaknesses, which shall briefly be outlined (drawing on Mair 2001; Ray 2007; Marks et al. 
2007; Statham 2008). Expert surveys represent a reputational source and are based on subjective 
judgments of experts. The latter can base their judgment of various sources (like parties’ media 
appearance, policy initiatives, or voting behavior in parliament). Though this can also be 
considered an advantage compared to other data, the problem is that we generally do not know on 
what sources experts base their evaluation, making it more difficult to come to a conclusion about 
the accuracy of their judgments. The quality of data from expert surveys will strongly depend on 
the selection of experts and the framing of the questionnaire. Manifesto data belong to the group 
of textual sources (Ray 2007). They represent official documents produced by individual parties 
according to their internal procedure and provide information on parties stated policy preferences. 
They typically provide a—more or less comprehensive—overview of a party’s policy program, 
which makes them a useful source for studying party positioning. The drawback, however, is that 
manifestos will most likely not include issues that are controversial either within the party or in 
public discourse, since parties will refrain from including issues that may threaten intra-party 
cohesion or cause electoral damage. Media data constitute another textual source for exploring 
party positioning and issue-emphasis or -salience. The value of this type of data is that it provides 
information on the positioning and emphasis as reflected in the public sphere. Given the 
importance of media as a source for political information in contemporary mass democracy, 
media coverage will to a large extent determine how voters perceive parties’ issue-positioning 
and -emphasis. The drawback, however, is that it is the media ultimately deciding about which 
political actors to include in the coverage about a particular issue, which can result in a bias based 
on the ‘newsworthiness’ of parties’ issue-positions (e.g. privileging more extreme positions or 
more powerful actors).  
Data from expert surveys, manifestos, or media coverage are the most commonly used sources 
for studying party positioning and issue-emphasis related to the European integration issue. The 
following three large-scale comparative data sets are the most widely used in this field of 
research: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on party positioning towards European 
integration (Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen/Marks 2007), the Comparative Manifesto Project 
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 Green-Pedersen (2011) deviates from these approaches by using parliamentary data instead. Following the logic of 
this dissertation, however, these data tell us more about the role of issues in decision-making arenas and not 
necessarily about their politicization. 
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(CMP) analyzing parties’ election manifestos (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), and 
media data conducted as part of the project on National Political Change in a Globalizing World 
(NPCGW, Kriesi et al. 2008). Each of these data provides information on party positioning and 
issue-emphasis towards European integration. However, scholars attempting to cross-validate the 
measures derived from each of these (or similar) sources come to mixed conclusions. Regarding 
parties’ EU positioning, scholars find that the different data by and large yield to the same 
findings (cf. Helbling/Tresch 2011). With a view to issue-emphasis or -salience, however, this is 
different. Netjes and Binnema (2007: 48), who provided the first cross-validation of EU salience 
measures derived from different sources, come to the conclusion that the validity of measures 
across different data sources is weak. Likewise, Helbling and Tresch (2011: 180) find that 
salience measures from manifesto data and expert surveys cannot be used interchangeably with 
those from media data, “as they seem to measure different constructs”.  
Considering the research purpose of this dissertation, namely to study party politicization of 
European integration, and the definition of the latter as an individual party’s attempt to publicly 
emphasize the issue of Europe in domestic party contestation, the focus on issue-
emphasis/salience is of particular importance. With this definition in mind, each of the above 
mentioned data reflect certain weaknesses: Expert surveys do not provide information regarding 
parties’ emphasis on the issue of Europe as part of domestic contestation: The CHES 
questionnaire asks its experts to assess how important the EU has been to a party in its public 
stance over the course of a particular year (Hooghe et al. 2010). Though this certainly implies 
some sort of public visibility of the party on the issue, this is not exactly the same as asking about 
parties’ emphasis on the issue in public, which is important for the study of party politicization 
according to the above-mentioned definition. Furthermore, regarding the CHES salience 
measures, the authors of the survey confess that more abstract concepts like salience seem more 
difficult for experts to evaluate (ibid.). Manifesto data are even more problematic for studying 
issue-politicization. Though they are often used for studying parties’ issue-salience towards a 
variety of issues (cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), manifestos actually do not 
provide any information as to whether an issue included in a manifesto is also publicly 
emphasized by parties in a campaign. Given the fact that manifestos typically include a variety of 
issue hardly ever mentioned during a campaign and thus not appearing on the public agenda, they 
serve as a weak indication for party politicization (cf. Kleinnijenhuis/Pennings 2001; Pennings 
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2006; Dolezal 2008b). Media data perform better in this respect. However, they suffer from the 
intervention of the media in the selection of issues and actors included in the coverage 
(Helbling/Tresch 2011) and hence do not directly reflect a party’s attempts to politicize the issue 
of Europe (or any other issue). 
 
With a view to the Austrian case, a comparison of salience measures derived from the three data 
sets referred to above yields to contradictory findings for Austrian parties’ emphasis on the issue 
of Europe.
24
 While this may not be surprising considering the different characteristics of these 
data, it is indeed problematic, since scholars using any of these data claim to make a contribution 
to the salience or politicization of the EU issue in domestic party contestation (cf. de Vries/van de 
Wardt 2011; Netjes/Binnema 2007; Ray 1999; Steenbergen/Scott 2004; Kriesi 2007). Insofar we 
would expect them to come to similar conclusions about different parties’ emphasis on European 
integration. The comparison of the different data sources for the Austrian case, however, reveals 
an inconsistent picture and therefore leaves us with uncertainty about party politicization of 
European integration in Austria. 
A second problem occurs with a view to the content of politicization. With the exception of the 
CHES data, the data only provide information about European integration in two very general 
categories, one including positive mentions of integration, the other negative mentions 
(Klingeman et al. 2006: 154-155; Dolezal 2008b: 58-60). As argued previously, however, 
European integration is a multi-faceted phenomenon and political controversy is likely to occur 
related to different aspects of integration. If we want to explore how EU politicization manifests 
itself substantively, different data—or at least different measures—have to be considered in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
 
4.2.2 Data selection 
Considering the limitations of the most typically used data for the study of party politicization of 
European integration, this dissertation departs from the common approaches and creates its own 
data corpus for an in-depth analysis of the Austrian case providing information on (a) the 
substantive manifestation of politicization with a view to different facets of European integration 
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 See Chapter 6.2 for a more detailed discussion of the findings. 
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and (b) parties’ active involvement in the politicization of Europe. Since the empirical core of the 
study focuses on politicization in the electoral arena, the material constituting the data base for 
the study on EU politicization is ‘produced’ in the context of election campaigns. This is different 
for the complementary and smaller study of the EU issue in decision-making arenas. Table 4.1 
provides a summary of the material included in the analysis. I will first discuss the data selected 
for studying the electoral arena and will then present the data for the study of decision-making 
arenas, in both cases including information on data collection.  
 
Table 4.1: Data selected for empirical analysis 
Arena Data 
Electoral - Manifestos (24) 
- Two-party TV debates (46) 
- Final TV debate of a campaign with all competitors (5) 
- Placards (8) 
Decision-making - Coalition agreements (3) 
- Voting results of EU treaty ratification in parliament 
- Speeches by MPs on EU treaty ratification in parliament (20) 
Note: Number of documents included in analysis in parentheses. 
 
 
Electoral arena: 
For studying party politicization of European integration in the electoral arena, I will consider 
election manifestos, TV debates between candidates, and election posters. 
 
Election manifestos: As outlined in the previous section, manifestos do not provide information 
as to whether the issue of Europe is actually politicized by a party, since manifestos include a 
variety of issues hardly ever mentioned during a campaign. Still, they provide a good overview of 
parties’ overall policy program and will therefore be used to explore parties’ positional response 
to different facets of European integration in the first part of the empirical study (Chapter 6.1), 
upon which the following parts focusing more explicitly on politicization will build (Chapters 6.2 
and 6.3). By now, Austrian parties’ manifestos mostly include a chapter dedicated to European 
integration, Europe, or EU politics. Information on parties’ EU preferences can also be found in 
the other parts of manifestos, which are typically structured along policy fields or broader issue-
categories (e.g. economy, environmental protection, immigration, education). As mentioned 
above, the most widely used source for manifesto data is the CMP (Budge et al. 2001; 
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Klingemann et al. 2006). However, the CMP data only include two categories referring favorable 
or hostile mentions of “European integration in general” (Klingemann et al. 2006: 154). 
Considering this limitation, the present study builds on the original textual sources of manifestos 
instead of relying on the CMP measures for party positioning towards European integration. Part 
of the original manifesto documents have been derived from the CMP collection, the rest has 
been collected by me (for details see Appendix).  
 
TV debates between party candidates: For exploring party politicization of European integration 
in the electoral arena, TV debates between party candidates constitute the most important source 
of the present study. Since this source represents a type of data not often used in party research, a 
more detailed discussion is required at this point. I start with basic information about the setting 
of the debates and their increasing significance in Austrian election campaigns, before outlining 
why they constitute a very suitable data source for studying party politicization in the electoral 
arena. 
Already in 1970, the Austrian public broadcast station ORF (Österreichischer Rundfunk) started 
to broadcast debates between the candidates for chancellorship of the two largest parties. In 1994, 
the format of these debates or “confrontainments” (Plasser/Ulram 2004: 413, emphasis in 
original) was expanded and since then includes two-party debates between candidates of all 
parties represented in parliament prior to the election and one final debate with all the 
frontrunners together. The two-party debates typically take approximately one hour; the final 
debate is longer (see Appendix for a detailed list). Despite considerable variation, these debates 
reach a broad audience, sometimes more than a million viewers (Posselt/Rieglhofer 2000; 
Plasser/Lengauer 2010b), which is due to the ORF’s predominant position on the Austrian 
television market (see Chapter 5). Today, these debates often represent the highlight of a 
campaign, attracting not only attention among voters but also among other media, which report 
extensively about the debates (cf. Plasser/Lengauer 2010b). Hence, the debates serve as a good 
representation of the overall campaign dynamics. 
Surveys indicate great importance to TV debates as an informational source for voters during 
election campaigns (Plasser/Ulram 2004). In 1999, for instance, 86 per cent of survey 
respondents stated to have watched (some of) the ORF-debates (ibid. 411). Though scholars are 
cautious not to overestimate their impact on vote choice, survey data suggest that a considerable 
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proportion of viewers reports that watching the debates did have some effect on the personal vote 
choice (1995: 32 per cent, 1999: 43 per cent; ibid. 417) or even a strong effect (1999: 16 per cent, 
2002: 25 per cent; ibid. 418). These figures indicate that the TV debates play an important role in 
Austrian election campaigns. 
For studying issue-politicization, TV debates have several advantages. First, despite a clear trend 
towards more intervention by the anchorperson moderating the debates
25
, the format still provides 
party representatives with a number of opportunities to actively address the issues they like to see 
emphasized. Second, interaction between candidates constitutes the core element of such debates, 
making them the perfect ground not only to study which parties are proactive in addressing an 
issue, but also whether and how other parties respond. These two characteristics make TV 
debates eminently suitable for the research purpose of this study—also in comparison with print 
media data or television news reports. A certain weakness of the data relates to the fact that some 
parties send different speakers to represent the party on TV in one and the same election 
campaign. One could therefore argue that differences in the emphasis devoted to the EU issue 
and the specific content referred to for one party in different debates of the same campaign are 
due to personal viewpoints of the different speakers. Though we cannot rule out this possibility, it 
is reasonable to consider the speakers strategic actors that first and foremost represent the policy 
views and priorities of the party they belong to—after all they are all highly ranked party officials 
like party leaders, frontrunners in the campaign, and/or members of the governing team. 
For analyzing TV debates, literal transcriptions have been used. For 2006 and 2008, 
transcriptions were retrieved from the Apa-DeFacto database. For the other debates, no such 
transcriptions have been available. Therefore, transcriptions were prepared by the author. Due to 
the large number and the length of the debates, it was not possible to produce full transcriptions 
for all the debates. Full transcriptions, hence, were only prepared for the 1995 debates.
26
 For the 
1999 and 2002 debates, notes were taken in order to record the overall characteristics and issues 
of each debate, and literal transcription was only implemented for passages of the debate with 
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 This assessment is a by-product of the detailed analysis of TV debates conducted as part of this study. 
26
 This was a deliberate decision based on two reasons—one practical and one substantive: First, video copies of the 
1995 debates are in my possession, thus allowing to convert the format into digital audio format, which facilitated 
transcription. The 1999 and 2002 debates, however, could only be accessed in video format locally at the 
Österreichische Mediathek, which made the transcription process extremely costly in terms of time. Second, the 
length of the TV debates reflects much larger variation for the 1995 debates compared to the 1999 and the 2002 
debates. Using averaged numbers as an indication for the length of the debates is thus less problematic for the latter 
two. 
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reference to European integration aspects. Important to note, at this stage a very inclusive 
conceptualization of European integration has been applied in order to include all aspects 
potentially related to European integration.
27
 
 
Election posters: Though only including short messages, election posters represent a useful 
source for exploring whether a party actively politicizes as issue. Though placards are denied to 
affect voters’ party choice or voting intention, they serve as a good indicator for the overall 
direction of a party’s campaign and the issues the party prioritizes (cf. Lederer 2007; 2010). 
Compared to other countries, posters still play an important role in Austrian election campaigns 
(ibid.). In both design and content, they often equal advertisements in newspapers, on which 
Austrian parties spend most of their campaign budget (Lederer 2007). Whether or not posters 
contain mentions of European integration suggests if a party actively mobilizes on the EU issue, 
thus serving as strong evidence for issue-politicization. I collected the posters from parties’ 
websites, available archives, and by contacting parties.  
 
 
In addition to the original data collected for examining the politicization of European integration 
in Austria, further data are required for operationalizing the explanatory framework outlined in 
Chapter 3. For that purpose, this study draws on existing data sources and scholarly literature 
summarized in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: Operationalization of explanatory framework for politicization 
Level of politicization Explanatory factor Data source 
Party level Party vis-à-vis voter position European Election Study 
 Internal dissent Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
 Location in policy space Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
 Government/opposition status Literature 
 Party family Literature 
 Systemic salience My data 
Party system level Date of EU accession Literature 
 Party repositioning My data 
 Government participation of 
Euroskeptic parties 
Literature 
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 Therefore, some of the transcribed passages have been excluded from the analysis at a later point because of their 
loose or absent connection to European integration. 
60 
 
Decision-making arenas: 
For studying the EU issue in decision-making arenas, I will focus on the government policy 
towards European integration as outlined in coalition agreements and on parliamentary 
contestation about EU treaty ratification (voting behavior and speeches). 
 
Coalition agreements: These documents present the final outcome of coalition negotiations and 
typically outline the government program for the upcoming legislative period. They provide 
information on the government’s political priorities related to a variety of political issues, often 
including European integration. In particular, the latter will most likely be included in case the 
two coalition partners diverge in their general position towards European integration in order to 
determine the joint position as agreed upon for the time of cooperation in government. Coalition 
agreements have been collected via online search. 
 
Voting behavior and speeches in EU treaty ratification in parliament: For studying party 
behavior towards European integration in the national parliament, we need to focus on EU 
matters on which the parliament has a say. EU treaty amendments constitute such matters. The 
present study will consider voting behavior and speeches held by MPs as part of the 
parliamentary discussion about the ratification of EU treaties. Information about the debates, 
including voting behavior and literal transcriptions of speeches, has been derived from the 
website of the Austrian parliament (for details see Appendix).  
 
 
4.3 Methods 
This section summarizes the methods used to explore party politicization of European integration 
in the electoral arena. It will first focus on the content of EU politicization and will then turn to 
issue-emphasis as the second component of politicization. The slightly different procedures 
applied in the smaller study of decision-making arenas will be discussed separately in the final 
empirical chapter explicitly devoted to these arenas (see Chapter 7). 
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4.3.1 Measuring party positioning and the content of EU politicization 
In research on issue-positioning and party contestation towards European integration based on 
textual sources like manifestos or media data, scholars mostly use these texts to translate party 
statements into numerical criteria and aggregate them on a single pro-anti European integration 
scale for statistical testing (cf. Helbling/Tresch 2011; Pennings 2006; Gabel/Hix 2004; 
Kleinnijenhuis/Pennings 2001; Ray 2007; Marks et al. 2007). Most often, a clear-cut 
conceptualization of European integration, on which the identification of relevant text passages 
builds, is lacking. However, most of the studies seem to focus on general references towards 
European integration and mentions of general support for or opposition to further integration that 
are found in the texts. This is problematic insofar, as we lose a lot of information on the 
complexity of the European integration issue and how parties actually refer to the issue. This 
complexity, however, is required if we want to empirically answer questions related to parties’ 
issue-positioning and the content of EU politicization in domestic contestation.
28
 As argued in 
Chapter 3, some parties will express their general support to the project of European integration, 
but may be concerned about the EU’s policy priorities. Furthermore, they may refrain from 
negative evaluations in their general mentions of European integration, but express critique more 
implicitly in their claims for EU reform. These nuances can only be captured empirically by 
applying a more fine-grained analysis of textual data. 
 
The present study opts for a qualitative analysis of the selected textual data (cf. Mayring 2008; 
Kuckartz 2007) that (a) considers different types of references in parties’ mentions of European 
integration and (b) distinguishes between different facets of European integration referred to in 
these mentions. The analysis is therefore employed in two stages that together provide a more 
nuanced picture towards parties’ EU positioning and politicization compared to previous 
research. The methodical procedure for analyzing the texts is summarized in Table 4.3 and will 
be described in more detail in the following.  
                                                 
28
 More recently, scholars have also started to apply frame analysis to the study of parties’ EU positioning and 
politicization. The framing approach seeks to go beyond the classification of actors as either supportive or adverse to 
a particular question or issue by providing a more comprehensive description of the specific interpretations that 
actors apply to give meaning to a particular phenomenon, which is labeled a ‘frame’ (cf. Entman 1993; Donati 2001; 
Benford/Snow 2000; Snow/Benford 1998). However, the framing approach is very ambiguous and in the context EU 
party research, scholars mostly arrive at rather abstract frames or explicitly important aspects constitutive of the 
concept of frames from their analysis (cf. Van Os 2008; Helbling et al. 2010).  
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Table 4.3: Procedure for analyzing textual data 
Reference to EI Category Description 
Type of reference Evaluations 
Claims for change/reform 
Mentions of EI describing its value or downside 
Mentions of EI demanding change or reform 
Content of reference General EI General mentions of EI without further 
specification 
 Constitutive EI Mentions of EI concerning the ‘nature’ and polity 
of the EU and process of EI; geographi-
cal/functional boundaries; competences and 
decision-making rules; widening and deepening 
 Policy direction EI Mentions of EI concerning policy alternatives, i.e. 
EU policy priorities, policy direction of EU 
policies  
Note: EI means European integration. 
 
 
Identifying text passages related to European integration, the present analysis considers different 
types of references, namely evaluative statements and claims for change or reform. The former 
allow for assessing to what extent political parties value European integration, i.e. whether they 
conceive of it as an opportunity or threat. The latter captures whether parties strive for change or 
reform, which can be in support or opposition to further integration or related to the policy 
direction (see below). Considering both evaluative statements and claims for reform is of utmost 
importance. First, it allows for including all sorts of references related to European integration, 
even if they are embedded in a paragraph or statement that first and foremost deals with a 
different policy issue, as illustrated in the following example. If a party discusses its political 
concepts related to climate protection and in this context claims for a kerosene tax implemented 
at the European level, this statement entails a different understanding of European integration 
compared to a statement about immigration policy that expresses demands for full sovereignty on 
questions of immigration control. In the former example, a party implicitly expresses support for 
further integration, whereas in the latter example the opposite is the case. Second, the distinction 
between evaluative statements and claims-making is important for capturing critique towards or 
dissatisfaction with European integration that is not expressed explicitly by parties but masked as 
claims for reform. This can be expected to be of particular relevance for parties supportive to 
European integration that may be reluctant to explicitly expressing critique in order not to 
undermine the EU’s already weak legitimacy. To the extent that these parties are unsatisfied with 
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the current state of integration, they will instead make use of claims-making to outline their 
political priorities for Europe. Therefore, including parties’ EU related claims is necessary for a 
comprehensive understanding of parties’ views towards European integration. 
 
In a second step, the analysis will consider different facets of European integration. Instead of 
using one all-encompassing European integration category, I distinguish between three 
substantive categories: general statements about European integration (e.g. ‘we’ve always been 
supportive of the EU project’); constitutive statements referring to the EU’s institutional 
architecture, its functional and geographical boundaries, competences and decision-making rules; 
and statements related to the direction of policy, including e.g. different views towards EU 
agricultural policy or different policy priorities for economic development. These categories 
build on Bartolini’s (2005, 2006) distinction between general, constitutive, and isomorphic 
issues. Different from Bartolini, however, I apply this distinction to parties’ EU related 
statements and not to the topics or issues they mention in a statement. This means that I do not 
predetermine whether an issue is of general, constitutive, or isomorphic ‘nature’, because I would 
argue that issues can be discussed from different angles (even if one or the other issue may be 
more familiar to either of the categories). To provide an example, a claim for reform of EU 
agricultural policy is neither constitutive nor isomorphic per se; whether it falls under former or 
latter category depends on the exact claim rather than the issue category (agricultural policy): If a 
party claims for democratization of EU agricultural policy (e.g. to grant a say to the European 
Parliament in this policy field), the claim is of constitutive nature, since it concerns the allocation 
of competences and decision-making rules; however, if the party argues for reform with a view to 
different funding priorities (e.g. to subsidize organic farmers and small businesses instead of 
large companies), this concerns the direction of policy (and is thus of isomorphic character in 
Bartolini’s terms). Hence the latter category concerns what we typically call policy alternatives, 
and these need not necessarily imply any preference regarding the composition of the EU polity 
and its competences but rather refer to EU policy priorities. I will therefore assess for each 
statement whether it falls under the general, constitutive, or the category of policy direction. This 
approach will provide us with a much more detailed picture of parties’ concerns related to 
European integration that allows for disentangling party positioning towards different aspects of 
the multi-faceted EU issue. 
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4.3.2 Measuring issue-emphasis and parties’ active EU politicization 
For measuring parties’ emphasis on the EU issue and their active engagement in the politicization 
of Europe in the electoral arena, this study uses a combination of different measures—both 
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative measures for EU issue-emphasis will be derived from 
the analysis of TV debates. It is operationalized as the number of words devoted to European 
integration questions relative to the total number of words for each party in each debate. This 
includes all sorts of topics related to European integration and is thus a very inclusive approach. 
Important to highlight, it also includes all side-references mentioned within the context of an 
issue identified as European. While this could be seen as overestimating the salience of European 
integration, it is reasonable insofar, as this best reflects the proportion of time that each debate 
centers on Europe, even if this includes the seesaw between parties and excludes an analysis of 
other domestic issues, as this would not be possible to code for a single person. The number of 
words is derived from the literal transcriptions of the debates. Given the lack of full transcriptions 
for the 1999 and 2002 debates, party averages have been calculated from the total number of 
words of the 1995, 2006, and 2008 debates in order to receive comparable figures for 1999 and 
2002 despite the lack of the exact total number of words for these debates. 
In addition to these quantitative measures, the analysis also includes three qualitative indicators 
providing information about whether or not parties’ consider European integration a top-priority 
issue and actively politicize it: 
Agenda setting dynamic in TV debates: Making use of the interactive element of TV debates, I 
will explore the agenda setting dynamics related to the EU issue, i.e. I will analyze whether a 
party behaves proactively by putting the issue on the agenda of a debate or only responds to 
questions or critique raised by the anchorperson or its direct competitor in a debate. This serves 
as a very good indication for parties’ attempts to politicize European integration. 
Most-important-issue question in final TV debate: Unlike the previous indicator and the 
quantitative measures for parties’ EU issue-emphasis, this indicator does not use the two-party 
TV debates but the final TV debate between the leading representatives of all parties that is 
broadcasted at the end of each election campaign (referred to as Elefantenrunde). This final 
debate often starts with an introductory round: The anchorperson asks each party speaker to 
briefly outline its policy priorities in response to the so called most-important-issue question. If a 
party mentions European integration in response to this question, this is a clear indication that the 
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party considers it a top-priority issue in its campaigning. Though the question is only available 
for three of the five final debates, it will be included in the analysis.
29
 
Election posters: The final indicator used to assess parties’ active engagement in the 
politicization of Europe is whether or not a party refers to European integration on its election 
posters. Given the public visibility of posters and the fact that parties refer to their top-priority 
issues on placards, whether or not posters contain mentions of European integration suggests if a 
party actively mobilizes on the EU issue, thus serving as strong evidence for issue-politicization.  
 
The combination of quantitative measures and qualitative indicators for identifying EU issue-
emphasis is a very innovative approach in the study of party politicization. As will be 
demonstrated in the empirical analysis, this approach provides us with more convincing results 
compared to other available data for Austrian parties’ EU emphasis in domestic party 
contestation (see Chapter 6.2).  
 
  
                                                 
29
 The question was not asked in the final debates of the 1995 and the 2002 election campaigns. 
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5. Austria and European integration: introducing the case 
This chapter will introduce the Austrian case. It starts with a very brief introduction into Austria’s 
political and party system, including information on the parties identified as relevant for this 
study. The next section summarizes Austria’s way towards EU membership, the political and 
public debate prior to accession, and key information about the accession referendum. The 
following section then focuses on the post-accession period, providing preliminary insight into 
the role of the European integration issue in public discourse since the country’s membership in 
the EU. It includes information on public and published opinion as well as popular initiatives 
addressing European integration questions. The section is intended to contextualize the empirical 
study and to sketch opportunities and constraints for parties to politicize the issue of Europe. The 
last section briefly summarizes the state of the art on Austrian parties and European integration, 
before turning to the expectations for politicization and its manifestation in the Austrian case. 
 
 
5.1 The Austrian political and party system: a brief introduction 
5.1.1 The Austrian political system 
The Austrian political system reflects a parliamentary system with presidential elements: The 
government is dependent on a majority in the Nationalrat, composed according to the outcome of 
the general elections, and is formed upon the formal order of the Federal president after the 
general elections. The president is directly elected by the people and enjoys comparatively wide-
ranging competences—at least according to the formal constitution. The constitutional reality, 
however, clearly gives primacy to the parliamentary element, making the Federal Chancellor—
and not the President—the leading figure in Austrian politics (cf. Pelinka 2009; 
Pelinka/Rosenberger 2007). Austria is a federal state, though a centralized one. This is reflected 
in the comparatively wide-ranging competences located at the federal level and also expressed in 
the quasi legislative monopoly of the parliament’s lower chamber (Nationalrat), whereas the 
federal assembly (Bundesrat), composed according to the results of elections at the regional level 
in the nine Bundesländer, lacks significant political power. Until 2008 elections to the 
Nationalrat took place every four years, since then every five years. The 183 MPs are directly 
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elected by the electorate via party lists and according to proportional representation (cf. Müller 
2006b).  
Since the 1980s, the Austrian political system has undergone substantial transformations. 
Previously it was labeled “hyper-stable”30 (Pelinka 2009: 638), characterized by a number of 
specificities that distinguished the country from other Western European liberal democracies—in 
particular, a highly concentrated party system with strong political loyalties and great importance 
of political parties not only for recruiting the political personal but for structuring social life in 
many respects (cf. Pelinka 2005). Another characteristic was the dominant role of corporatist 
interests groups, represented in the Austrian system of social partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft), 
with strong ties to political parties, a large degree of organizational density, and privileged access 
to as well as considerable influence in political decision-making processes (cf. Tálos 1993; 
Karlhofer/Tálos 2005). The political culture, moreover, was characterized by a strong consensus-
orientation (cf. Pelinka 1994b; Pelinka et al. 2000; Pelinka/Rosenberger 2007; Gehler 2006). 
However, the predominance of both political parties as well as corporatist interest groups 
gradually and significantly decreased since the 1980s (cf. Pelinka 2005; Tálos 2005). This is also 
to be viewed in connection with the shortening of the state sector, through which parties formerly 
executed great influence on the structure of the economy and society more generally: The 
privatizations starting in the 1980s and the successive reduction of the welfare state in the 1990s 
limited parties’ societal influence and the perpetuation of partisan attachments (cf. 
Pelinka/Rosenberger 2007). This development is also to be viewed in connection with attempts 
since the late 1980s to join the EU as a full member (cf. Pelinka 1994b). 
Another important factor specific to the Austrian political culture was the rarity of ‘minimum 
winning coalitions’: For several decades, Austria was governed by single-party governments or 
‘grad coalitions’ between the two largest parties—both highly untypical configurations under an 
electoral system of proportional representation (cf. Pelinka 1994b; Müller 2006b). This 
specificity is to be seen in connection with the consensus-orientation of the Austrian political 
culture since the end of World War II, which was a historical product of the experience of the 
First Republic, when societal disruption had politically been expressed towards conflict, 
ultimately leading into civil war in 1934 (cf. Gerlich/Campbell 2000; Pelinka/Rosenberger 2007). 
However, due to the steady decrease of the two mainstream parties’ vote share since the mid-
                                                 
30
 Translation by SM. 
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1980s, single-party governments have become virtually impossible; and also the building of 
‘grand coalitions’ does not constitute an unwritten rule anymore,  will be outlined in more detail 
in 5.1.2. 
To sum up, the previously extremely stable Austrian political system has undergone significant 
transformations since the 1980s and became more similar to other Western European liberal 
democracies. Scholars describe this development and as a process of de-austrification 
(Entaustrifizierung) and westernization (cf. Pelinka 1994b, 2009; Rosenberger 2000). The 
political consequences are less predictability of political majorities in the party system and 
intensified political competition, thus departing from former hyper-stability and strong 
consensus-orientation (cf. Müller 2006b; Pelinka 2005; Müller/Fallend 2004; Plasser/Ulram 
2006; Plasser/Seeber 2007; Dolezal 2008a). 
 
Austrian peculiarities and delays also concern the media landscape. In particular, two 
characteristics are worth mentioning with a view to the subject of this study. First, an extremely 
high level of concentration on the print sector and, second, a delay in the dualization of the radio 
and TV market (cf. Plasser/Lengauer 2010a): 
 Print sector: The Austrian press is characterized by extremely high concentration. This 
concerns both daily newspapers as well as weekly magazines. The two largest daily 
papers together reach a distribution rate beyond 50 per cent (ibid.). Another characteristic 
is the “tabloidization” (Boulevardisierung, ibid. 40f) of the Austrian print sector, which 
significantly increased since the 1960s (Uris/Lucht 2009, cited in Plasser/Lengauer 2010a: 
40f) and is much higher than in other European countries: The proportion of tabloid 
papers against the total print run of quality, mixed and tabloid press increased from 16 per 
cent in 1960 to 66 per cent in 2006. In comparison, it reflects 36 per cent in Germany and 
41 in Switzerland (ibid.). Important to notice, Austria’s biggest tabloid, the Neue Kronen 
Zeitung (hereafter: Krone), stands out worldwide with a distribution range above 40 per 
cent (!),
31
 making the paper an extremely important actor for published opinion and 
politics, more generally: Survey data indicate that a vast majority of both Austrian 
journalists and politicians ascribe strong influence on politics to the Krone (Plasser/Seeber 
                                                 
31
 In comparison, the market leaders in Germany and the UK reach 18 per cent (Bild-Zeitung) and 20 per cent (The 
Sun), respectively (Plasser/Lengauer 2010a: 38). 
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2010).
32
 
 Television market: Among all European countries, Austria was the last to open the radio 
and television market for private providers (radio since 1993; television since 2001) 
(Plasser/Lengauer 2010a: 48). This is the reason for the predominance of the Austrian 
public broadcast station (Österreichischer Rundfunk, ORF) on the television market: 
Despite significant decrease since the 1990s, it still arrives at a distribution rate of 42 per 
cent, which is relatively high in international comparison (ibid.). Regarding political 
information and news, the ORF still represents the most important “content producer” in 
Austria and has a “quasi-informational monopoly”33 (ibid. 30), whereas the newscasts 
provided by private stations so far do not exceed the 2 per cent threshold. 
 
In a nutshell, the Austrian media landscape is strongly dominated by two media—the Krone in 
the print sector and the ORF on the television market. Plasser and Lengauer (2010a: 45) even 
label the two Austria’s “journalistic power and opinion centers”34. 
 
 
5.1.2 Political parties and party system 
Despite proportional representation in the electoral system, the Austrian party system was long 
referred to as a two or two-and-a-half party system, characterized by high stability and 
concentration and dominated by the two largest parties, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the 
People’s Party (ÖVP) (cf. Müller 2006a, 2000b; Pelinka 2005; Pelinka/Plasser 1989). The SPÖ 
and the ÖVP are rooted in the historical party camps dating back to the late 19
th
 century—the 
Socialists and Christian democrats, respectively (cf. Ucakar 2006; Müller 2006a). These two 
parties have historically dominated the Austrian political system and society for several decades, 
also reflected in a high concentration of votes: From 1945 until 1986, the share of votes for these 
two parties together ranged between 83 and 94 per cent of all valid votes—and still between 75 
and 88 per cent of all eligible voters (Table 5, Müller 2006b: 290). In terms of seats, the 
concentration was even higher, ranging between 86 and 98 per cent due to the electoral system 
                                                 
32
 96 per cent of the surveyed journalists and 87 per cent of politicians think that the Krone has strong or very strong 
influence on politics (Table 1 in Plasser/Seeber 2010: 280). 
33
 Translation by SM. 
34
 Translation by SM. 
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(ibid.). The SPÖ and ÖVP also dominated federal government until the end of the 1990s—either 
in a ‘grand coalition’ or in single party governments.35 However, strong dealignment tendencies 
among the electorate steadily decreased the SPÖ and ÖVP’s predominance in the Austrian party 
system since the 1980s (cf. Plasser/Seeber 2007), accompanied by electoral gains for the third 
traditional party represented in the Austrian party system—the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs, FPÖ)—and the establishing of new parties—the Greens (Die Grünen) and the 
Liberals (Liberales Forum): 
The FPÖ originates from the much smaller third traditional camp represented in Austria since the 
late 19
th
 century, the so called German-nationalists (cf. Pelinka 2002; Luther 2006). Founded in 
1956 as the succession party of the VdU (Verband der Unabhängigen), the FPÖ’s party elite 
consisted of former members of the NSDAP and until the late 1990s the party rejected the 
conception of an Austrian nation, while proclaiming that Austria were a German state and the 
Austrians part of the German people (cf. Frölich-Steffen 2004). For a short period during the 
1980s, then-party leader Norbert Steger redirected the FPÖ towards a more liberal profile and 
away from German-nationalism. This is also the period when the FPÖ was in a government 
coalition with the SPÖ (1983-1986). However, when Jörg Haider took over party leadership in 
1986, the FPÖ recollected its ideological origins, resulting in a termination of the coalition on the 
part of the SPÖ. In the 1990s, Haider repositioned the FPÖ as a radical right and populist right 
party and from then onwards proclaimed an Austrian patriotism instead (ibid.). Consistent with 
the party’s founding personals’ ideological rooting in the NSDAP, Haider as well as other 
members of the FPÖ repeatedly stood out with statements relativizing National Socialism and 
contacts with the extreme right milieu (cf. Wodak/Pelinka 2002). Compared to the SPÖ and the 
ÖVP, however, the ideological fundament of the FPÖ is much less coherent and recurring 
attempts to move the party into a different direction (either more liberal or more nationalist) 
resulted in several split-offs (see below). Under the lead of Haider, the FPÖ could record 
considerable electoral success and became the most successful party internationally compared to 
either other radical right or populist right parties (cf. Picker et al. 2004; Pelinka 2002). The 1999 
election so far marked the peak of the continuous electoral success: With a vote share of 26.9 per 
                                                 
35
 ‘Grand coalitions’ from 1947-1965 (ÖVP-SPÖ) and 1987-1999 (SPÖ-ÖVP), single party governments from 1966-
1970 (ÖVP) and 1970-1983 (SPÖ); this pattern was only interrupted from 1983-1986 by an SPÖ-FPÖ coalition (cf. 
Müller 2006b). 
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cent the FPÖ for the first time became second strongest party (415 votes ahead of the ÖVP) (cf. 
Müller 2000a). 
The Greens, elected to the parliament in 1986 for the first time, were the first successful party not 
rooted in one of the three traditional camps mentioned above. The party is the product of the 
merging of two parties formerly only successful at the regional level, one focusing on 
environmental questions and the other striving for a broader alternative conception of the 
functioning of society (cf. Dachs 2006). These groups emanated from protest movements 
occurring as an expression of the emerging of post-material values and far-reaching societal 
transformations. The Greens’ party profile combines a strong environmental commitment with 
left-wing social and economic policies. The party, however, is characterized by large 
heterogeneity, which has repeatedly led to intra-party conflict about the programmatic orientation 
(ibid.). Still, considered as a party at the margins—in programmatic terms—in the beginning, the 
Greens have meanwhile established themselves as a potential coalition partner and participate in 
government coalitions at the regional and local level.  
The Liberals were founded by former MPs of the FPÖ in 1993, who formed a separate 
parliamentary group. This step was caused by the FPÖ’s repositioning under party leader Mr. 
Haider towards a populist right and anti-immigrant party, which discomfited the liberal wing 
within the FPÖ (cf. Ligl 2006). The final triggers of the formerly latent conflicts were the FPÖ’s 
public initiative (Volksbegehren) “Austria first” (which was seen as a xenophobic campaign 
against immigrants by the liberal FPÖ representatives) and the FPÖ’s rejection of Austria’s 
accession to the EU (ibid.). While the Liberals succeeded in achieving the minimal threshold to 
be represented in parliament in the 1994 and 1995 elections, they failed in 1999 and later 
elections. Though still existing as a party, the Liberals today represent a negligible actor in 
Austrian politics. 
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Table 5.1: Election results Austrian general elections 1983-2008 
Party 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995
i
 1999 2002 2006 2008 
SPÖ 47,6 
(90) 
43,1 
(80) 
42,8 
(80) 
34,9 
(65) 
38,1 
(71) 
33,2 
(65) 
36,5 
(69) 
35,3 
(68) 
29,3 
(57) 
ÖVP 43,2 
(81) 
41,3 
(77) 
32,1 
(60) 
27,7 
(52) 
28,3 
(52) 
26,9 
(52) 
42,3 
(79) 
34,3 
(66) 
25,9 
(51) 
FPÖ 5,0 
(12) 
9,7 
(18) 
16,6 
(33) 
22,5 
(42) 
22,0 
(41) 
26,9 
(52) 
10,0 
(18) 
11,0 
(21) 
17,4 
(34) 
Greens - 4,8 
(8) 
4,8 
(10) 
7,3 
(13) 
4,8 
(9) 
7,4 
(14) 
9,5 
(17) 
11,0 
(21) 
10,4 
(20) 
Liberals - - - 6,0 
(11) 
5,5 
(10) 
3,7 
 
0,9 
 
- 2,1 
 
BZÖ - - - - -   4,1 
(7) 
10,7 
(21) 
Notes: 
i 
including results of election rerun in several districts in October 1996; number of seats in parentheses. 
Source: Official records of the Interior Ministry, see 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/NRW_History.aspx, accessed 19/9/2011. 
 
 
Not least to the establishing, respectively growth of these parties (FPÖ, Greens, and Liberals), the 
Austrian party system has undergone substantial transformation from a two-party system to 
moderate pluralism, to use Sartori’s (1976) well-known typology. Applying the more fine-
grained classification for party system change developed by Mair (1997), the transformation of 
the Austrian party system becomes even more apparent. Mair distinguishes between the openness 
and closeness in the structure of competition for control of the executive (Mair 1997, 2006b). 
Whether a party system is to be considered as open or closed is, according to Mair, depending on 
three factors (ibid.): patterns of government alternation (i.e. whether a government is fully or 
partly replaced by opposition parties), the degree of innovation (i.e. whether the party 
constellation of a government is innovative or known from before), and individual parties’ access 
to government (i.e. whether access to office in principle is open to all parties or whether some are 
excluded). According to these criteria, the Austrian party system has undergone significant 
changes (Müller 2006b):
36
 After the consolidation of the party system after the end of World War 
II, the party system was highly cartelized—hence: closed—with one ‘grand coalition’ between 
ÖVP and SPÖ following the other without alternation, innovation or access for another party. 
This changed in 1966 with the alternating single-party governments of the ÖVP and then SPÖ, 
and the formation of the SPÖ-FPÖ coalition government (1983-1987). In this period, the 
                                                 
36
 For a summary of the government constellations see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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Austrian party system can be described as highly competitive, with both government alternation 
and innovation and all three parties represented in parliament at that time having access to 
government. This changed again in 1987 with the return of a series of ‘grand coalitions’ between 
the SPÖ and the ÖVP until 1999. Important to note, the FPÖ’s exclusion from government was 
not only the logical by-product of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalitions: At least on behalf of the SPÖ, a 
coalition with the FPÖ was ruled out prior to each election because of the FPÖ’s radicalization 
under party leader Jörg Haider; though an explicit exclusionary strategy was absent on the ÖVP’s 
part (except for the 1994 elections under party leader Erhard Busek), the party did not make use 
of its arithmetical majority with the FPÖ before 1999.
37
 The Greens and the Liberals lacked the 
size to be considered a majority provider, making them de facto excluded from office. The 1999 
election then marked a watershed in Austrian politics in several aspects: Due to the building of a 
minimum-winning coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ under ÖVP-Chancellor Wolfgang 
Schüssel, the FPÖ’s formal exclusion from government office came to an end and a new 
government constellation was established. The FPÖ’s entry into federal government reflected the 
breaking of a taboo: Though the FPÖ shared with other successful populist right parties its anti-
immigrant and anti-establishment rhetoric, it significantly differed—and still differs—from other 
successful radical right and populist right parties due to its problematic positioning towards and 
the relativization of National Socialism (cf. Pelinka 2002; Wodak/Pelinka 2002). Hence despite 
the party’s mainstream character when it comes to its size, the FPÖ is to be considered as an 
extreme party outside the European democratic consensus and therefore not able to govern 
(Pelinka 2002). Not least due to these circumstances, the formation of the ÖVP-FPÖ government 
in 2000 led to widespread public protest both within and outside the country. In Austria, the 
inauguration (4 February 2000) was accompanied by huge protests that lasted for several months. 
Internationally, it led to the measures from the other 14 EU member states lasting from February 
until September 2000 (cf. Merlingen et al. 2001; Karlhofer/Sickinger 2001; see also 5.3.2 in this 
chapter). The FPÖ’s inability to govern became obvious in 2002. The coalition collapsed after 
serious protest within the FPÖ against the government policy—stimulated by Jörg Haider (who 
was not part of the FPÖ’s governing team) and his confidants. The snap elections resulted in a 
disaster for the FPÖ (see Table 5.1). Though the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was finally rebuilt after the 
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 For an illuminating summary of the absent (in case of the ÖVP) or incomplete (in case of the SPÖ) efforts to 
politically exclude the FPÖ cf. Art (2007). 
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2002 election, at a certain point in time another innovative coalition seemed possible: For the first 
time in their party history, the Greens took part in coalition negotiations (with the ÖVP). Though 
the negotiations finally failed, they are to be seen as another indicator for the opening of the 
Austrian party system. During the revived ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, the FPÖ’s inability to govern 
became evident again: In April 2005, all FPÖ-members of government left the party and founded 
the BZÖ in order to escape increasing intra-party conflict and objection against the government 
policy. Jörg Haider was again the leading figure in this conflict. However, while he was in the 
oppositional camp within the party organizing protest against the governing team in 2002, the 
opposite was the case in 2005: Under the lead of Haider, the FPÖ governing elite founded a new 
party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ). The BZÖ was 
founded explicitly to the purpose of staying in government and proceeding with the government 
policy. Different from the first temporarily successful split-off of the FPÖ—the Liberals—, the 
BZÖ’s policy program hardly differed from the FPÖ’s, in particular with regard to the issues of 
immigration and European integration (cf. Luther 2006). The BZÖ was successful in exceeding 
the 4 per cent threshold to be represented in the Nationalrat in the 2006 and 2008 elections. With 
the death of founding father and party leader Jörg Haider in a car crash in October 2008 (i.e. after 
the elections) and the return of the biggest regional party to the FPÖ in June 2010, the political 
survival of the BZÖ remains insecure, whereas the FPÖ seems to live up to its earlier success in 
the late 1990s—at least according to polls.38 
These developments indicate that from 1999 onwards, the Austrian party system again and even 
more reflected a highly competitive system. This assessment holds despite the return of the 
‘grand coalition’ after the 2006 and the 2008 elections. The ‘grand coalition’ meanwhile lacks its 
defining feature, i.e. size: The SPÖ and ÖVP’s added vote share has reached a low in 2008 with 
55.2 per cent and the return of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition after the 2006 and the 2008 elections was 
due to the lack of alternatives: Neither of the two parties had a majority with either the FPÖ, the 
Greens or the BZÖ, and cooperation between either of these parties was virtually impossible due 
to political reason: While the Greens and the FPÖ, respectively the BZÖ are political foes due to 
their completely different worldviews, cooperation between the FPÖ and the BZÖ was 
unthinkable at that time because of personal hostility among the former party fellows. 
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 See e.g. http://derstandard.at/1313024449318/IMAS-Umfrage-SPOe-OeVP-und-FPOe-in-Sonntagsfrage-nahezu-
gleichauf, accessed 30/11/2011. 
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5.2 Austria’s way towards Europe: the pre-accession period 
5.2.1 Applying for EC membership—finally 
Among the prosperous liberal democracies in Europe, Austria was one of the latecomers to 
joining the EC/EU. When the ECSC was founded in 1951, Austria had not yet regained full 
independence after World War II, thus precluding membership in the ECSC from the outset. 
After the regaining of full independence with the State Treaty in 1955, the country’s neutrality 
status was the main reason for reluctance towards membership in the European Communities, 
though membership would have been beneficial in economic terms. In that sense, the Austrian 
situation resembled the one of the other neutral countries, like Switzerland, Ireland, Finland and 
Sweden. Only the gradual reinterpretation of neutrality over the course of time eventually 
smoothed the way towards EU membership (cf. Pelinka et al. 1994). Together with Finland and 
Sweden, Austria joined the EU in 1995.  
However, attempts towards stronger ties with the EC started much earlier, even though until the 
late 1980s the ultimate objective was not full membership. This was due to the country’s specific 
geopolitical position during the Cold War and its neutrality status, both constraining efforts to 
fully participate in the supranational EC (cf. Luif 2007). As a consequence, thus, Austria opted 
for the “‘soft’ versions of Western European integration” (Pelinka 2004: 211) by co-founding the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 and seeking closer association with the EC.
39
 
However, the growing economic importance of the EC, the joining of the EC by two founding 
members of the EFTA in 1973 (the UK and Denmark), and increasing political attempts to 
strengthen the country’s economic competitiveness led to more explicit efforts for becoming a 
full member of the EC in the late 1980s (cf. Luif 2007). This was accompanied by a gradual 
reinterpretation of neutrality: While previously there had been consensus among the political elite 
of the two major parties, the center-left SPÖ and the center-right ÖVP, that neutrality and EC 
membership were incompatible, this view gradually changed over time, and finally, the two 
parties agreed upon applying for full EC membership and in 1989 handed over the application to 
the Council for accession to the European Community. Accession negotiations were completed in 
March 1994, and the referendum on accession—obligatory according to the Austrian 
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 For a detailed summary of these efforts cf. Schaller (1994a) and Luif (1995, 2007). 
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constitution—was held in June 1994. Due to its positive outcome, Austria became a full member 
of the European Union on 1 January 1995.  
  
The driving forces seeking full membership in the EC were the Austrian business organizations 
(cf. Schaller 1994a, b; Luif 1995, 2007). Representing large parts of the ÖVP clientele, the ÖVP 
then was also the party most consequently pushing for membership since early 1988, thus 
continuing its previous support for stronger cooperation or association with the EC in order to 
fully benefit from European market integration. After initial reluctance, in April 1989 the SPÖ 
(and also the trade unions) finally proclaimed support for membership under the condition that 
Austria would keep its permanent neutrality, high social welfare standards, and strict 
environmental protection laws. The FPÖ, which had actually been the first party to speak out for 
EC membership already in the 1960s, supported the government’s efforts seeking membership. 
However, the party underwent a policy-shift over the course of time and later become one of the 
most fundamental critics against EU accession and European integration (see 5.2.2 and 5.4.1).
40
 
The Greens, represented in the Nationalrat only since 1986, opposed EC and later EU 
membership (cf. Heschl 2002).  
 
 
5.2.2 The pre-accession debate 
The Austrian referendum on EU accession was held in June 1994. The public debate, however, 
started much earlier and was very intense (cf. Schaller 1994a, b). There was a broad consensus 
among political and societal elites in support for accession. Still, there were also powerful voices 
against EU membership and important actors changed sides between the application for accession 
in 1989 and the completion of the accession negotiations in March 1994 (cf. Schaller 1994a, b; 
Heschl 2002). Among the camp of supporters were the two largest and governing parties (the 
SPÖ and the ÖVP), Federal Presidents Mr. Waldheim and, later, Mr. Klestil, the Conference of 
Governors (Landeshauptleutekonferenz), and, quite important, the corporatist interest 
organizations. After their split-off from the FPÖ in 1993, the Liberals supported the pro-
accession camp—as the only opposition party. A majority of media also supported accession, 
though with important exceptions: Two large tabloids—the daily newspaper täglich alles and the 
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 For a summary of intra-party dissent on the question of EU accession cf. Luif (1995) and Heschl (2002). 
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weekly paper Ganze Woche—opposed accession and heavily campaigned against the EU and 
Austria’s accession. Quite importantly, Austria’s biggest daily tabloid, the Krone, changed sides 
in early 1994. Though the paper had kept a low profile on the question of accession before, 
commentaries repeatedly had reflected an oppositional stance (Heschl 2002). However, from 
January 1994 onwards, the Krone actively campaigned for Austria’s EU accession. This started 
with an editorial article by Krone editor Hans Dichand, whose position was then followed even 
by those commentators who had formerly argued quite explicitly against EU membership (ibid.). 
The Krone’s support for accession was interpreted by scholars as an important factor in the 
surprisingly large majority in support for accession at the referendum (ibid.). The Krone, 
however, was not the only actor changing sides: The FPÖ, which had actually been the first party 
to raise claims for EC membership and consequently had supported Austria’s application for 
accession in 1989, gradually repositioned itself in the early 1990s and finally became one of the 
most critical actors in their campaigning against accession, revitalizing its well-tried slogan 
“Austria first” and claiming to be the sustainer of Austrian interests and identity (Schaller 1994b: 
80f). The Greens also opposed EU accession, but tried to distinguish themselves from the FPÖ 
campaign. After heated conflict among several representatives about the ‘scope’ of the party’s 
No, the Greens argued to support European unification in principle, but to reject its 
implementation in the shape of the Maastricht-EU (ibid.). Among representatives of both the FPÖ 
and the Greens, however, there were also supporters of EU membership, resulting in continuous 
intra-party conflict that weakened the no-accession camp (Schaller 1994b; Heschl 2002).  
Following Schaller (1994b: 51), the main arguments put forward by EU supporters can be 
clustered in four groups: economic benefits, security aspects, participation in EU decision-
making as a factual increase in sovereignty, and an increase in problem-solving capacity. Similar, 
though with reversed sign, these aspects were also quite important in the argumentation of the 
contra-accession camp. In addition, critique was raised with a view to ecological concerns 
(including the question of transit traffic and EURATOM), democratic deficit claims, and more 
general opposition to the Maastricht-EU.
41
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 Heschl (2002) provides a different systematization of the pre-accession debate by summarizing different myths 
established by both camps in the run-up to the referendum, five in support of and three in opposition to EU accession 
(ibid. 193-266): Among the former are (1) the myth of accession as seminal and a chance for the youth and the hard-
working, (2) accession as a question of being part or being excluded, (3) accession for lack of alternatives, (4) the 
Europe myth reflecting a spirit of optimism, and (5) the nemesis myth outlining nightmare scenarios if the country 
would not join the EU; the contra-accession myths are (1) the converse nemesis myth emphasizing negative 
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5.2.3 The referendum on EU accession 
The Austrian referendum about EU accession, held on 12 June 1994, resulted in a two-third 
majority in support for membership: 66.6 per cent of the voters opted in favor of accession at a 
turnout rate of 82.4 per cent (cf. Pelinka 1994a). Despite a clear majority in favor of accession 
among almost all societal groups, survey data indicate differences in particular according to 
gender, education, socio-economic status, party affiliation, and media consumption 
(Plasser/Ulram 1994: 96ff): Whereas 70 per cent of the male voters voted in favor of accession, 
support was lower among women (62 per cent); support for accession was higher among the 
better educated and wealthier as well as those with an optimistic evaluation of the general 
economic situation—and considerably lower among voters aged 30 years or younger and those 
who distrust the government and members of the parliament. Significant differences also occur 
when considering voter’s party affiliation (ibid): Not surprisingly, voters of the SPÖ, the ÖVP, 
and the Liberals by large majority supported accession, whereas FPÖ- and Green-voters by 
majority opposed accession. Distinguishing between readers of different newspapers, the voting 
behavior by trend followed the tone of coverage towards EU accession in the run-up to the 
referendum: With 75 per cent, support for accession was disproportionately high among readers 
of the quality papers Die Presse and Der Standard, as well as the Kurier that is to be qualified a 
mixture of quality paper and tabloid; it reflected the referendum outcome among readers of the 
Krone (65 per cent), and was significantly lower among consumers of täglich alles (45 per cent), 
the paper that had heavily campaigned against accession (see above). 
When focusing on voters’ motives for supporting or opposing accession, a striking difference 
emerges between the primarily economy- and prosperity-focused motives in the supporters’ camp 
on the one hand, and the highly diffuse and strongly emotionalized fears of opponents on the 
other hand, including concerns about disadvantages for agriculture, a worsening in the quality of 
products and the environmental situation, an increase in unemployment, and a loss of sovereignty 
and neutrality (Plasser/Ulram 1994: 109f). Besides economic motives, another reason for support 
of accession was to hinder Austria’s isolation not only economically but also politically (ibid.). 
As scholars argue, the high level of support thus was rather attributed to expectations about the 
                                                                                                                                                              
consequences from accession, (2) the annexation myth (accession as abandoning sovereignty and autonomy), and (3) 
the prosperity myth suggesting that there was no demand for EU accession. 
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country’s economic improvement and the strong pro-accession consensus among a variety of 
important political and societal actors than to a generally notable Europhile Austrian public 
(Fallend 2008). This may be one reason why support for EU membership among Austrians 
significantly declined after accession and remains to be comparatively low in Austria, as 
demonstrated in the following section. 
 
 
5.3 Europe in Austrian public discourse: the post-accession period 
5.3.1 Public and published opinion towards European integration 
Despite the comparatively high level of support for EU membership expressed in the accession 
referendum, public Euroskepticism since then is relatively high and stable in Austria. As 
Eurobarometer data show, support for membership is constantly below the EU average (see 
Figure 5.1), with the Austrians even undercutting the notoriously Euroskeptic British in several 
years.  
 
Figure 5.1: Support for EU membership in Austria and the EU 
Source: Eurobarometer 70 (National Report Austria, p. 24) 
 
Opposition among the public to certain steps of integration, especially enlargement, is also 
comparatively high in Austrian. Between 2000 and 2003, i.e. prior to the 2004 enlargement 
round, the majority of EU-15 member states showed higher support than opposition rates to 
enlargement, reflected in a majority in favor of enlargement on average throughout the whole 
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period. This is different in Austria, where the number of opponents outperforms the one of 
supporters at several points in time (see Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2: Support and opposition to enlargement in Austria and the EU 
 Support Opposition 
 Austria EU-15 Austria EU-15 
EB54 32 44 50 35 
EB55 33 43 49 35 
EB56 46 51 38 30 
EB57 45 50 36 30 
EB58 51 52 31 30 
EB59 43 46 44 35 
EB60 41 47 42 36 
Notes: Questionnaire slightly changes; bold numbers 
indicate majority. 
Source: Eurobarometer 54-60 
 
A number of scholars argue that conflict over European integration reflects a divide between 
winners and losers of modernization, internationalization and globalization, whereof European 
integration is an important component (cf. Kriesi 2007; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). Simplifying the 
argument, those belonging to or perceiving themselves as losers of these processes will be less 
supportive to European integration than those feeling that these provide them with opportunities. 
Typically, this distinction is associated with people’s educational background and socio-
economic status. In Austria, there is strong evidence for such a pattern in public opinion towards 
European integration (cf. Pelinka 2004). This is reflected in EES survey data: Respondents from 
the upper (middle) classes (self-perception) reflect considerably higher levels of support for 
further integration, whereas the lower (middle) classes support the view that European integration 
has already gone too far—a polarization that seems to have increased over time.42 Hence different 
from the pre-accession period, the pro-European political elites seem to fail in mobilizing support 
for the European integration project among all groups of society. An important factor to be 
considered in this respect is the media debate about European integration and EU politics, which 
will briefly be discussed in the remainder of this section. 
 
Though Austrian media show considerable variation in their reflection of European integration, 
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 For more details on these survey results see Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix. 
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one actor clearly stands out with explicit anti-EU coverage, namely the politically influential 
Krone. This may be striking at first glance, given that the paper actively supported EU 
membership in the run-up to the Austrian accession referendum, as outlined previously. Still, the 
paper changed sides (again) and turned to continuous anti-EU campaigning.
43
 As argued by Cécil 
Leconte (2010: 201-206), Euroskeptic tabloids play a significant role in fostering public 
Euroskepticism due to their creation of negative “‘Euro-myths’” (ibid. 204) that often dominant 
much of the public debate about Europe beyond the respective paper.
44
  Hence, they seem to 
function effectively as agenda setters on European integration issues. This is clearly the case for 
the Austrian Krone. The paper is well-known for repeatedly making use of ‘campaign 
journalism’ (cf. Boenisch 2007, cited in Plasser/Seeber 2010), meaning that the paper has an 
agenda towards which the coverage is oriented. The Krone takes up a clear-anti EU position and 
is quite active in campaigning against the EU and further integration.
45
 Due to its market-
dominating position on the Austrian print media sector and its unique distribution range of more 
than 40 per cent, the anti-EU position of the Krone accounts for a strong intensity of Euroskeptic 
news coverage in the Austrian public sphere. The following example related to the Krone’s 
coverage of the Lisbon treaty shall illustrate how the strategy of campaign journalism makes the 
paper a powerful agenda setter and “the informal center of gravity of Austrian domestic 
politics”46 (Plasser/Seeber 2010: 274): After continuous and intense campaigning in the Krone 
against the Lisbon treaty (cf. Arendt 2008), the SPÖ repositioned itself on the question of 
national referenda on EU treaties that it had previously rejected: On 28 June 2008, then-SPÖ-
Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer and recently elected party leader Werner Faymann wrote a letter 
to the editor of the Krone announcing to hold national referenda on future EU treaties: 
“(...) we hold the opinion that future treaty amendments, which concern Austrian interests, 
shall be decided about by a referendum in Austria. If a modified reform treaty has to be 
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 Täglich alles, the daily tabloid heavily campaigning against accession previously to the referendum, only existed 
until August 2000. 
44
 An interesting empirical approach in that context can be found in Saurwein (2006). Comparing the news coverage 
about the 2004 EU enlargement in different media, Saurwein and his colleagues examine different ‘rationality levels’ 
in arguments about enlargement. They find that articles in the Krone reveal much lower levels of rationality 
compared to coverage in the quality paper Der Standard (ibid. 165ff). 
45
 Evidence for the Krone’s anti-EU campaigning is documented in a number of studies: Saurwein (2006) and his 
colleagues show that the Krone refers to EU enlargement more negatively compared to Der Standard; Lengauer and 
Vorhofer (2010: 160, Table 2) find that EU politics is among the top-ten topics in the Krone while significantly less 
salient in other media during the 2008 general election campaign; in her master’s thesis about Euroskepticism in the 
Austrian media, Carmen Valero Gomez (2010) shows that the Krone significantly stands out in the Austrian media 
landscape with its negative mentions of European integration. 
46
 Translation by SM. 
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ratified by Austria again, thus, we want to persuade our coalition partner of this approach. 
This also applies in the case of a potential accession of Turkey that, in our opinion, would 
overburden the EU’s current structure”47 (Letter to the editor 2008). 
 
The SPÖ’s repositioning earned lots of criticism, not least due to the fact that the party 
announced it via a letter to the editor of Austria’s most Euroskeptic newspaper. It also had far-
reaching political consequences: Not much more than a week later, ÖVP-Vice-Chancellor and 
party leader Wilhelm Molterer announced to end the coalition with the SPÖ, arguing that “the 
SPÖ has left the joint basis, including the basis of the government program, and the red-white-red 
[i.e. Austrian; SM] common ground in the European perspective for our country”48 
(Announcement of new elections 2008). It is an open secret that the repositioning of the SPÖ on 
the question of EU referenda was part of a deal with Krone-editor Hans Dichand, providing SPÖ 
party leader Werner Faymann with complaisant coverage in the influential paper. This is 
substantiated by a content analysis of the Krone coverage during the 2008 election campaign (cf. 
Lengauer/Vorhofer 2010): Mr. Faymann was the only candidate portrayed positively, while direct 
competitor and ÖVP candidate Mr. Molterer was portrayed most negatively. This applied to 
news-based articles, commentaries, and—of large quantitative importance in the Krone—letters 
to the editor (Leserbriefe). Lengauer and Vorhofer (2010: 182) thus speak of a “Faymann-Bias” 
in the Krone’s campaign coverage. This bias was not only reflected in evaluations of the 
candidates, but also in political topics the paper reported about: The two most emphasized topics 
were Mr. Faymann’s ‘5-point-program against price increase’ and EU-issues, including the 
question of national referenda, summing up to 42 per cent of all articles focusing on policy issues 
(ibid. 183).  
Empirical studies also reveal that reading the Krone has a significant effect on people’s attitudes 
towards issues the paper heavily campaigns on (cf. Arendt 2008, 2009) as well as on their voting 
behavior (cf. Plasser/Seeber 2010). Therefore, it does not come as a large surprise that opposition 
to European integration is much higher among readers of the Krone compared to other people 
(see Figures A4-A6 in the Appendix). 
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5.3.2 A period of irritation: the EU-14 measures against the Austrian ÖVP-FPÖ government 
The year 2000 marked a cut in Austria’s relations to the EU. After the FPÖ’s entry into a 
coalition government with the ÖVP in February 2000, the other 14 EU member states’ 
governments decided to take bilateral measures against Austria, broadly referred to as the ‘EU 
sanctions against Austria’ both in public and scholarly debate (cf. Merlingen et al. 2001; 
Karlhofer et al. 2001; Hummer/Pelinka 2002; Busek/Schauer 2003). Formally, however, the 
measures were bilateral in nature and were not based on decisions agreed upon within the EU 
institutions (Merlingen et al. 2001). Still, they were announced by the Portuguese Council 
Presidency at the end of January in response to the negotiations between the ÖVP and the FPÖ, 
and both the European Commission and the European Parliament expressed support to this 
action. Substantively, the measures consisted of three points: (1) there would be no bilateral 
official contacts at the political level with the new government, (2) Austrian ambassadors would 
only be received on a technical level in the other 14 member states, and (3) Austrian candidates 
for positions in international organizations would not be supported (ibid.).  
The measures turned out to put the EU-14 in a difficult position, and over the course of time 
critique against the initiation of the measures became louder. In June 2000 Portuguese EU 
President Antonio Guterres announced the mandating of a ‘wise men’ report to evaluate the state 
of affairs in Austria since the establishing the ÖVP-FPÖ government and the political nature of 
the FPÖ. The three ‘wise men’ (Maarti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein, and Marcelino Oreja) were 
singled out by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, Luzius Wildhaber, on 
behalf of the EU-14 (ibid.). After a series of talks with Austrian representatives in July and 
August (including Federal President Mr. Klestil, members of the government, party leaders, and 
representatives from other political institutions and civil society organizations), the ‘wise men’ 
handed their report over to the French EU Council President Jacque Chirac in early September, 
recommending the termination of the measures against Austria. Following the report’s 
recommendation, Mr. Chirac declared the end of the measures on 12 September 2000.  
 
Much scholarly work has focused on the EU-14 measures against Austria, discussing both the 
reasons for and the effectiveness of a step that is referred to in the literature an “unprecedented 
move in the history of European integration” (Merlingen et al. 2001: 60). In Austrian public 
discourse, however, the measures were largely viewed as illegitimate EU sanctions and resulted 
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in a huge debate on principle about the relationship to the EU. The government called for a 
national closing of ranks and supporters of the measures, in particular the SPÖ, were accused of 
unpatriotic behavior (Karlhofer/Sickinger 2001). This was also registered by the ‘wise men’, who 
stated in their report that the “measures have already stirred up nationalist feelings in the country, 
as they have in some cases been wrongly understood as sanctions directed against Austrian 
citizens” (‘Wise men’ report 2000: 33). 
 
 
5.3.3 Popular initiatives 
A repeatedly used instrument in Austria to attract public and political attention to a particular 
issue is the Volksbegehren or popular initiative. It is one of the few direct democratic instruments 
available in Austria (cf. Pelinka/Rosenberger 2007). In the Second Republic, a total of 35 such 
initiatives have been conducted so far.
49
 A Volksbegehren can either be citizen-initiated or 
supported by a minimum number of MPs. Once proposed, voters can support the initiative during 
a one-week period by subscribing at a municipal office. The Nationalrat is forced to discuss the 
proposal in case it has been supported by a minimum of 100,000 voters. The parliament, 
however, is only obliged to discuss the matter of an initiative, but not to implement or actually 
decide upon any of its claims. Hence the primary goal of an initiative is to start a public debate 
and to pressurize political actors on a certain issue.  
Eight popular initiatives have been related to European integration issues. This is equivalent to 
more than a fifth (22.9 per cent) of the total number of initiatives in the Second Republic and 
38.1 per cent when considering only the period since 1990. Three of them were disposed by the 
FPÖ, who claimed for referenda on the question of accessing the EMU (1997) and on the EU 
constitution and Turkey’s accession to the EU (2006) and for a veto against the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the EU (2002). Though traditionally used by opposition parties, the FPÖ’s 2002 
initiative is an indicator for the party’s ambivalent strategy on EU questions during its 
government participation (see Chapter 6.3 for more details). The Greens initiated a 
Volksbegehren in 1991 (i.e. before Austria’s EU accession) demanding a referendum about 
joining the EEA (European Economic Area). Parties also supported citizen-initiated 
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 The full list is available on http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/volksbegehren/Alle_Volksbegehren.aspx, 
accessed 20/12/2011. 
85 
 
Volksbegehren related to EU questions: The 1996 initiative on keeping Austria’s neutrality was 
supported by the Greens; the 2003 initiative on nuclear phase-out within the EU was supported 
by the SPÖ, the Greens, and the FPÖ; and most recently, the 2011 initiative for an Austrian 
referendum to withdraw from the EURATOM treaty was supported by the Greens and several 
parties at the regional level.  
 
Table 5.3: Support rates for EU related public initiatives (Volksbegehren) in Austria 
Year German short title Purpose Supporters Rank 
1991 Volksabstimmung zu EWR-
Beitritt 
Referendum accession EEA 126.834 29 
1996 Neutralitäts-Volksbegehren Keeping perpetual neutrality 358.156 16 
1997 Schilling-Volksabstimmung Referendum EMU 253.949 20 
2000 Neue EU-Abstimmung Referendum EU membership 193.901 25 
2002 Veto gegen Temelín Veto against EU accession of the 
Czech Republic 
914.973 6 
2003 Atomfreies Europa EU-wide nuclear phase-out 131.772 30 
2006 Österreich bleib frei Keeping neutrality; against Turkey’s 
EU accession & the EU Constitution 
258.281 22 
2011 Raus aus EURATOM Referendum about withdrawal from 
EURATOM 
98.678 34 
Notes: The total number of public initiatives since 1945 is 35. 
Source: Official records, cf. http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/volksbegehren/Alle_Volksbegehren.aspx, 
accessed 20/12/2011. 
 
Though the EU related initiatives are not among the most successful ones with regard to the 
number of supporters (see Table 5.3), only the most recent one failed to achieve the required 
threshold for a debate in the Nationalrat. Furthermore, the large number of initiatives clearly 
indicates that questions about European integration and the EU—both its constitution and 
policies—are subject to public and political controversy in Austria.  
 
 
5.4 Austrian political parties and the issue of Europe 
5.4.1 State of the art 
Even though a multitude of studies deal with the changes and challenges Austria has faced due to 
European integration (e.g. Gerlich/Neisser 1994; Falkner/Müller 1998; Neisser/Puntscher-
Riekmann 2002; Höll et al. 2003), research on Austrian political parties and the issue of Europe 
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for the post-accession period is more infrequent and less systematic. Furthermore, it is mostly 
focused on the question of party positioning and rarely offers systematic insight to the question of 
the politicization of the European issue.
50
 An exception is Kriesi (2007), who focuses on party 
positioning and issue salience of European integration in six countries using media data prior to 
national elections.
51
 Kriesi (2007: 88f) underscores the importance of country-specific conditions 
for mobilization against European integration, therefore presenting the UK and Switzerland as 
exemplary cases with high potential for such mobilization. What is striking, however, is that 
Austria is not among the cases where he expects mobilization on the issue of Europe. While 
Kriesi finds support for his hypotheses, however, he points out that Austria shares some 
similarities with these two cases: It does not only show increasing public Euroskepticism, but 
similar to the UK and Switzerland, the issue of Europe is articulated in cultural terms, which is 
not the case in the other countries considered in the study (France, the Netherlands, and 
Germany
52
). Regarding the saliency of the issue, however, Kriesi finds that Austria is not in line 
with the UK and Switzerland, which reflect much higher levels of issue salience. Kriesi’s study, 
however, does not include the latest two general election campaigns, the 2006 and 2008 
campaign, and the first one after Austria’s accession, the 1995 campaign.  
Another cross-national comparison can be found in the study of Europeanization of national 
parties in Austria, Finland, and Sweden by Kritzinger/Michalowitz (2005). The authors focus on 
European Parliament elections and find that compared to the other two countries, EU-issues 
reveal high salience and parties do differ significantly in their positioning towards them as well as 
modify their EU-stances over the years (especially the FPÖ and the Greens). Kritzinger an 
Michalowitz (ibid.) further show that party positioning on the EU-dimension follows parties’ 
location on the new politics dimension rather than the left-right (see again the FPÖ and the 
Greens). The results, however, provide limited information on politicization, since the fact that an 
issue is included in a manifesto does not mean that parties actively mobilize on it during the 
campaign, as argued in this dissertation. Furthermore, the study focuses on EP elections—where 
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 There are also studies focusing on the organizational adaption as a response to European integration by Austrian 
political parties (see Luther 2007) and party change more generally (Mokre/Pollak 2002). 
51
 Kriesi’s study is based on the data of a larger project on National political change in a globalizing world (Kriesi et 
al. 2006, 2008). 
52
 To be precise, the issue is also related to the cultural dimension in Germany, but on different grounds than in the 
Euroskeptic countries (Kriesi 2007). 
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emphasis on European question is not necessarily and indication for politicization in non-
explicitly European events—and is limited to two time points (1996 and 1999). 
The literature focusing exclusively on Austrian political parties and European integration is easily 
manageable, because there is few. Anton Pelinka (2004) and Franz Fallend (2008) concentrate on 
party Euroskepticism in Austria. Pelinka (2004) highlights the shifts in the dynamic of opposition 
to European integration: Up to the 1980s, Austrian parties’ stances towards European integration 
(more precisely, towards Austrian accession) followed a clear left-right pattern, with opposition 
coming from the left (SPÖ). In contrast, the FPÖ (at least initially) supported EEC membership. 
This picture changed on the eve of accession, when opposition was structured along the 
differentiation between moderate and more extreme parties, with the latter (FPÖ, Greens) 
opposing European integration. Thus, opposition to European integration came from both the 
right and the left of the ideological spectrum. After accession (and with the Greens moving 
towards a more supportive stance), another shift occurred: Eurskepticism became a phenomenon 
of the extreme right, “with the FPÖ acquiring a monopoly” (Pelinka 2004: 215). Fallend (2008) 
also provides an overview of Austrian parties’ EU-positions and presents an in-depth analysis of 
two salient issues within the domestic discourse over European integration: Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (strongly related to the question of neutrality) and EU enlargement towards the 
Central Eastern European countries. He argues that public opinion plays a significant role in 
Austrian parties’ positioning towards European integration issues. Fallend’s findings for the FPÖ 
are of particular interest. First, he outlines that on the issue of neutrality, the party “has not acted 
in accordance with the will of the majority” (ibid. 219) when claiming for participation in the 
NATO. Second, Fallend refrains from classifying the FPÖ as a party of ‘hard Euroskepticism’ by 
pointing to the fact that it “does not demand a withdrawal from the EU” (ibid. 213).53 
Considering also the period since the FPÖ is back in opposition, the present study will provide a 
different picture both on the question of neutrality and with a view to the FPÖ’s general 
Euroskepticism. 
Finally, Johannes Pollak and Peter Slominski (2002) present an overview of Austrian party 
positions to European integration based on an analysis of manifestos, interviews, official 
statements and a fistful of selected newspaper articles. They start with parties’ stances towards 
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 The Introduction to the edited volume (cf. Szczerbiak/Taggart 2008) in which Fallend’s chapter on Austria is 
included puts the FPÖ in the category of ‘soft Euroskepticism’ (Taggart/Szczerbiak 2008: 11, Table 1.1). 
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Austria’s accession to the EU and then analyze positioning during the post-Nizza process, 
including the beginning of the discussion about a future EU constitution. The authors conclude 
that Austria’s party landscape has faced changes through EU accession (programmatic as well as 
organizational), but, picking up a statement from one of their interviewees, diagnose that Europe 
is still a “‘Ghettothema’” within Austrian politics (Pollak/Slominski 2002: 194). By focusing on 
general election campaigns, the empirical chapters of this dissertation will systematically explore 
whether this conclusion (still) holds. 
 
 
5.4.2 Expectations for the party politicization of Europe in Austria 
This section takes up the theoretical expectations for the content and emphasis of party 
politicization of European integration derived from the relevant literature (see Chapter 3). It starts 
with a focus on content before turning to emphasis, in both cases summarizing expectations for 
each Austrian party and for the party system level. 
 
5.4.2.1 The content of EU issue-politicization: expectations for Austrian political parties 
Building on the cleavage theory of party positioning, party family has been identified as the 
decisive explanatory factor for the way parties will politicize the issue of Europe in substantive 
terms, with some parties focusing on economic integration and others on political integration (see 
3.5.1). This can both take the form of evaluative statements—supportive or adverse—or claims-
making related to either of the two aspects of integration. As outlined in 5.1.2, Austrian political 
parties can—despite certain inconsistencies over the course of time—broadly be associated to the 
following party families: The SPÖ belongs to the family of social democrats (cf. Ucakar 2006), 
the ÖVP to the Christian democrats (cf. Müller 2006a), the FPÖ and the BZÖ are radical right 
parties (cf. Luther 2006), the Greens belong to the green party family (cf. Dachs 2006), and the 
Liberals to the liberal family in its more radical (as opposed to conservative) variant (cf. Liegl 
2006).
54
 Considering the party family factor, the following pattern can thus be expected for 
Austrian parties’ EU issue-politicization as regards content: 
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 This classification is also in line with the one applied in the CHES Codebook (cf. CHES 2008). 
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 The SPÖ can be expected to express strong demands for the deepening of integration in 
order to establish a social Union that may facilitate efforts for stronger economic 
regulation at the supranational level; at the same time (and related to the previous point), 
the party will most likely claim for different policy priorities to correct for the EU’s 
policy bias towards monetary stability and market liberalism. 
 The ÖVP will be supportive to both further economic and political integration. However, 
claims for the deepening of integration will focus less on questions of employment and 
social security, but on economic competitiveness. The ÖVP can be expected to be most 
enthusiastic in its evaluations of European integration, for it combines economic 
liberalism with a supranational political order. 
 The FPÖ and the BZÖ are expected to put strong emphasis on political integration as a 
threat to national sovereignty and identity, since this very well fits the overall policy 
program of both parties. To the extent that they depart from favoring market liberalism 
towards expressing concerns about the negative impact of globalization, they may also 
increasingly criticize the EU’s policy direction from a distributive perspective. The main 
focus, however, will be on sovereignty and identity, thus expressing concerns along the 
cultural rather than the economic dimension structuring political conflict. 
 The Greens can be expected to emphasize claims-making for policy alternatives (in 
particular regarding environmental issues and questions of social security) and the 
democratization of the EU polity. To the extent that they become more supportive to 
European integration, they will also more explicitly point to benefits from integration in 
evaluative statements. 
 The Liberals can be expected to express their support to both economic and political 
integration—the former as a means for market liberalization, the latter as a project against 
nationalism.  
 
Scholars expect EU politicization to be driven by Euroskeptic parties (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; 
Kriesi 2007). Given the lack of a radical left party in the Austrian party system and the fact that 
party Euroskepticism in the post-accession period comes exclusively from the radical right of the 
party spectrum, the content of the debate at the party system level can be expected to be largely 
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biased towards questions of sovereignty and identity, therefore evoking conflict on the cultural 
rather than the economic dimension (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; Bartolini 2006). 
 
5.4.2.2 Issue-emphasis in EU politicization: expectations for Austrian political parties 
Applying the salience theory of party competition to party politicization, a number of explanatory 
factors accounting for parties’ emphasis in the politicization of the EU issue have been derived 
from the literature (see 3.5.2). Each of these factors shall now be illuminated with specific focus 
on Austrian political parties. Combining these factors then demonstrates that the politicization of 
Europe provides an advantageous opportunity to some parties, but not to others. 
 
Party position vis-à-vis voter position: 
Since Austria joined the EU in 1995, party Euroskepticism has become a radical right 
phenomenon in Austrian politics, whereas all other parties are very supportive to European 
integration and the EU (cf. Pelinka 2004). This even holds true for the Greens despite their initial 
rejection of EU accession. Figure 5.2 summarizes Austrian parties’ general EU stance since the 
late 1990s according to expert judgments derived from the CHES: Except for the FPÖ (and since 
2006 the BZÖ), all parties are clearly located on the upper range of the seven point scale; 
significant changes can be observed for the Greens (moving towards a more supportive stance) 
and the FPÖ (moving even closer to the lower limit of the scale). 
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Figure 5.2: Austrian parties EU position according to expert judgments (1999-2006) 
Source: CHES 1999-2006 (cf. Hooghe et al. 2010, Steenbergen/Marks 2007) 
 
How do these party positions correspond with the preferences of Austrian voters? Public opinion 
data derived from the European Election Study (EES) reveal that since the late 1990s a majority 
of voters from all parties except the Greens think that European integration—or European 
unification, as it is also labeled in the questionnaire—has already gone too far.55 However, while 
FPÖ and also BZÖ voters generally tend to agree in their rejection of further integration, this is 
different for the SPÖ and the ÖVP: Among their voters, there are also a number of supporters for 
further integration (ranging between one quarter and more than a third at the different points in 
time). Green voters are the only ones with a majority in favor of European integration.
56
 
However, considering the proportion of Green voters thinking integration has already gone too 
far—which reflects at least a quarter and often much more—, the issue seems to divide Green 
voters not much less than those of the SPÖ and the ÖVP. Combining party and voter position 
towards European integration, it is evident that nothing is to be gained from actively politicizing 
the issue of Europe for the SPÖ, the ÖVP, and also—though to a lesser extent—for the Greens, 
while party and voter position match quite well for the FPÖ and the BZÖ. 
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 For a more detailed presentation of the results derived from EES data see Figures A1-A9 in the Appendix. Austria 
was not included in previous EES rounds. The Liberals have been excluded here for reasons of data availability. 
56
 Except for the EES 2004 data. It is also important to note that the number of observations for Green voters is very 
low for some of the surveys (e.g. EES 1999). 
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Internal dissent: 
Quite important for parties’ efforts to politicize or deemphasize the issue of Europe is whether 
parties are internally united or divided on the issue. The CHES provides information on intra-
party dissent from 1999 onwards, summarized in Table 5.4. Important to note when comparing 
the values over time, these are based on different scales used in the questionnaire for the different 
years.  According to experts, the ÖVP is strongly united on the issue—and constantly so over 
time. By and large, this also holds true for the Liberals. The SPÖ and the Greens are less united, 
but both parties are still on the united-side of the scale. Most variation over time can be found for 
the FPÖ: Being moderately united on the issue of Europe in the late 1990s, Europe constitutes a 
highly conflictive issue internally during the FPÖ’s government participation; back in opposition, 
party unity leaps in 2006, making the FPÖ the party strongest united on its EU position for that 
year. The BZÖ is also largely united according to experts. In a nutshell, the politicization of 
European integration is least threatening for the ÖVP, the Liberals, and the FPÖ—for the latter 
except during its government participation.  
 
Table 5.4: Internal dissent on Europe according to expert judgments (1999-2006) 
Party 1999 2002 2006 
SPO                      2.00 4.25 4.00 
OVP                      1.40 1.88 1.86 
FPO                      2.00 7.75 1.29 
GA                       2.40 3.88 4.00 
LF                       1.40 3.00 1.67 
BZO                        2.57 
 
Note: Varying scales (1999: 1=complete unity, 5= leadership position opposed; 2002: 1=completely 
united, 10=extremely divided; 2006: 0=completely united, 10=extremely divided). 
Source: CHES 1999-2006 (cf. Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen/Marks 2007). 
 
Location in the policy space: 
As outlined previously, the politicization of European integration by individual parties can be 
expected to be influenced by parties’ location in the policy space: Parties at the ideological 
margins of the space will tend to benefit more from emphasizing the issue, as it cuts across the 
dimensions structuring that space. Relying again on CHES data, Table 5.5 summarizes Austrian 
parties’ location in the policy space along three dimensions: the general left-right dimension (i.e. 
without further specification of the meaning of left and right), the economic left-right dimension, 
and the new politics dimension (in the gal-tan version developed by Hooghe et al. 2002). 
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Considering party location at the margins versus in the center on all these three dimensions, we 
would expect the following behavior for party politicization of European integration: The SPÖ 
and the ÖVP can be expected to depoliticize the issue, as they are, relative to the other parties, 
located closest to the center on each of the dimensions (despite certain shifts over time and 
variation on the three dimensions
57
). Looking only at the general left-right dimension, the 
Liberals would have to be considered a party in the center. However, considering the more 
substantive economic left-right and the gal-tan dimension, the liberals are clearly located closer 
to the margins—to the right on the economic and to the left on the non-material dimension, which 
makes them more likely to politicize European integration. The Greens are closest to the left on 
each of the three dimensions compared to the other parties.
58
 Hence according to the party’s 
location in the policy space, they could be expected to politicize European integration. The FPÖ 
is clearly located on the right side of the general left-right and the gal-tan dimension—and 
increasingly so over time: With 9.67 in 2006, it is only slightly away from the maximum 10 
indicating an extreme right/tan position. On the economic left-right, the temporal trends are 
inconsistent, indicating movement towards the right from 1999 to 2002, but a strong shift to the 
left in 2006. Still, the party’s radical right status is not challenged by this movement, which even 
seems to make a politicization of the European integration issue more likely. Though the BZÖ’s 
general positioning is less coherent due to its recency and the problem of distinguishing itself 
from the FPÖ (cf. Luther 2006), it is also located at the right margins and therefore in a position 
likely to politicize European integration.  
 
Table 5.5: Party location in the policy space according to expert judgments (1999-2006) 
Party 1999 2002 2006 
 lrgen lrecon galtan lrgen lrecon galtan lrgen lrecon galtan 
SPÖ 4.00 4.20 4.00 3.75 3.44 3.38 3.38 2.83 3.50 
ÖVP 6.20 6.20 6.50 7.00 7.56 8.25 7.00 6.83 7.76 
FPÖ 7.90 6.40 7.10 8.63 7.31 9.00 9.67 4.83 9.67 
Greens 2.90 3.00 2.00 2.83 2.83 1.38 2.17 2.60 0.83 
Liberals 4.60 7.60 1.80 4.60 7.0 2.40 4.40 7.50 1.40 
BZÖ - - - - - - 8.83 6.00 8.83 
Notes: lrgen=general left-right dimension; lrecon=economic left-right dimension; galtan=non-material gal-tan 
dimension; each scale ranging from 0 (extreme left/gal) to 10 (extreme right/tan). 
Source: CHES 1999-2006 (cf. Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen/Marks 2007). 
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 The SPÖ overall moved towards the left, whereas the ÖVP shifted rightwards. 
58
 Except for the Liberals in 1999 on the gal-tan dimension, when experts place the Liberals 0.2 points closer to the 
left than the Greens. 
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Government/opposition status: 
Considering whether a party holds office or not, expectations vary for the different election 
campaigns depending on the constellation of parties in power. The ÖVP is in power for the whole 
period, meaning that it would be expected to depoliticize the issue of Europe according to this 
explanatory factor. The Greens, on the other hand, have permanently been in opposition, making 
them more likely to politicizing Europe. This also applies to the Liberals for the time they were 
still represented in the Nationalrat. The SPÖ can be expected to deemphasize the issue in the 
1995, 1999, and 2008 campaigns, and the FPÖ in 2002. The BZÖ can be expected to downplay 
the issue in the 2006 campaign due to its government participation prior to the election. 
However, whether parties are really as flexible in shifting their issue focus as expected according 
to the literature (Netjes/Binnema 2007) is to be doubted (cf. de Vries/van de Wardt 2011). This 
can be illustrated by reference to the SPÖ: The party is one of the two traditional governing 
parties in Austria, permanently in power from 1970 until 2000. As a governing party and together 
with the ÖVP it led Austria into the EU and supported all major steps towards further integration. 
It is not very convincing to expect that there is no ‘path dependency’ with a view to the party’s 
governing past. This explanatory factor thus has to be considered with caution.  
 
Table 5.6: Government/opposition status prior to election 
Year Governing parties Opposition parties 
1995 SPÖ, ÖVP FPÖ, Greens, Liberals 
1999 SPÖ, ÖVP FPÖ, Greens, Liberals 
2002 ÖVP, FPÖ SPÖ, Greens 
2006 ÖVP, BZÖ SPÖ, FPÖ, Greens 
2008 SPÖ, ÖVP FPÖ, Greens, BZÖ 
Notes: Reflects the situation during the respective election 
campaign. 
 
 
Party family: 
Party family not only plays a role for the content of EU issue-politicization, but also for parties’ 
emphasis on the issue. The argument behind this hypothesis is that the issue of Europe better fits 
in with the programmatic profile of some parties compared to others (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; 
Edwards 2009). As outlined in 5.3.1, European integration is most compatible to the program of 
95 
 
the ÖVP, the Liberals, and the FPÖ/BZÖ, whereas constituting more of a challenge to the SPÖ 
and the Greens.  
 
 
Taking all these factors together and also considering widespread public and media 
Euroskepticism in Austria, the politicization of European integration can be expected to be most 
beneficial for the Euroskeptic FPÖ and BZÖ. These two parties share an advantageous starting 
position for the politicization of European integration compared to the other parties: They share 
their Euroskepticism with their voters, are strongly united on their EU position, and are located 
on the fringes of the left-right and, in particular, the new politics dimension. The EU issue 
furthermore very well fits with these parties’ overall policy program and clearly distinguishes 
them from the mainstream left and right parties. Thus the only constraint for these parties’ efforts 
to politicize European integration is government participation, which might cause intra-party 
conflict because of the necessity to come to terms with the coalition partner’s EU position. 
Contrariwise, the politicization of European integration provides less or no advantage in electoral 
terms to the SPÖ, the ÖVP, the Greens, and the Liberals. For the latter, there is few to win, given 
that the Liberals are in line with the mainstream parties in their supportive stance towards 
European integration. For the other three parties, there is not only few to win, but also much to 
lose, since their voters are divided over the issue, with considerable parts of their constituency 
holding a different position towards the EU issue compared to the party’s, thus making the 
politicization of European integration a bold venture on the part of the pro-European parties in 
Austria.  
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6. European integration in Austrian general election campaigns 
Chapter 6 focuses on the EU issue in the Austrian electoral arena and represents the main 
empirical part of the dissertation. It explores in detail how and why Austrian political parties 
politicize European integration in general election campaigns between 1995 und 2008. The 
chapter is organized in three sub-chapters. Each of these sub-chapters concentrates on a specific 
aspect of party politicization and develops a discrete argument that will then be explored 
empirically. Chapters 6.1 to 6.3 are thus organized as coherent sub-chapters, each including a 
theoretical argument, information on research strategy, and an individual conclusion and can 
therefore be read separately. Chapter 6.1 focuses on individual parties and analyzes how Austrian 
parties refer to European integration in their election manifestos. The core objective is to 
disentangle the general pro-anti European integration category by considering different facets of 
integration. It will be argued that the European integration issue is more challenging to the some 
parties compared to others, which is due to its multi-faceted nature. This will be dependent on a 
party’ ideological profile and reflected in its positioning towards different facets of EU 
integration. Chapters 6.2 and 6.3 more explicitly address party politicization of Europe during the 
campaigns by focusing on confrontations between rival candidates broadcasted on TV. Chapter 
6.2 explores parties’ emphasis on the EU issue during election campaigns. Building on the 
salience theory of party competition, it will be argued that party politicization of European 
integration is dependent on the particular opportunity structure the EU issue provides for 
individual parties’ vote-seeking attempts. Chapter 6.3 concentrates on the substantive character of 
the debate in the politicization of the EU issue. It argues that the debate will be biased towards 
the concerns of those parties actively engaging in EU politicization. These concerns, in turn, can 
be connected to the broader ideological profile of a party. This chapter is theoretically embedded 
in the cleavage theory of party positioning and explicitly considers the distinct sources of conflict 
intrinsic to the multi-faceted nature of the European integration issue.  
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6.1 Party positioning in response to European integration: a cleavage perspective 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Previous research has shown that party positioning towards European integration is related to 
party location in the policy space: Parties at the fringes overall tend to reject European 
integration, whereas parties in the center take a supportive stance. Depicting parties’ EU position 
vis-à-vis their left-right position as a two-dimensional space, we thus arrive at the well-
established figure of the inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al. 2002). Though very illuminating, the 
inverted U-curve only displays parties’ EU position on a general pro-anti European integration 
dimension, meaning that parties can either be more or less supportive towards European 
integration in total.
59
 However, given the multi-faceted nature of integration—including political 
and economic integration as well as EU policy output in an increasing number of policy 
domains—, parties are likely to differ in their evaluation regarding these different facets. Hence 
they may support certain aspects of integration while being reluctant towards others. As argued in 
Chapter 3, this will be dependent on parties’ overall ideological profile that serves as a ‘prism’ 
through which parties respond to the issue of Europe (Marks et al. 2002: 586). Employing a 
cleavage perspective thus allows for a more detailed understanding of party positioning towards 
European integration. In two respects, this is of particular relevance with a view to the study of 
politicization. First, it elucidates why—and in what way—the issue of Europe constitutes a 
challenge to some parties but less so to other. This is an important component in parties’ strategic 
considerations as to whether politicizing the issue in the first place (see Chapter 6.2). Second, 
party positioning can reasonably be expected to be reflected in the content of politicization (see 
Chapter 6.3). Hence a detailed analysis of parties’ response towards different facets of integration 
will give a first indication of what aspects parties are concerned with and will therefore most 
likely address when engaging in the politicization of the issue. This chapter therefore explores 
how Austrian political parties position themselves towards European integration. The focus is on 
individual parties and the core objective is to disentangle the general pro-anti European 
integration category by considering different facets of integration. The empirical findings are 
based on a detailed analysis of parties’ election manifestos. The latter constitute a suitable source 
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 Different from many other studies on EU party positioning, Hooghe et al. (2002) make an explicit attempt to 
consider different aspects of EU integration. 
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for studying parties’ views towards different facets of European integration, since manifestos 
typically provide a—more or less comprehensive—overview of a party’s policy program on a 
variety of different issues, including European integration. The analysis not only distinguishes 
between different facets of integration, but also between evaluative statements and claims-
making in parties’ reference towards the issue of Europe. The empirical findings largely confirm 
expectations based on the cleavage theory of party positioning: Parties emphasize different facets 
of integration and party family serves as the decisive explanatory factor in this respect. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Building on the cleavage theory of party positioning, the next 
section will briefly summarize expectations for how Austrian political parties will respond to the 
issue of Europe. This is followed by a section on data and methods, providing information on 
how the analysis of manifestos has been conducted. The next section presents the empirical 
findings, focusing on each party separately and linking the findings to the hypotheses derived 
from the cleavage theory of party positioning. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and 
discusses their relevance for the study of party politicization of European integration. 
 
 
6.1.2 Party response towards Europe from a cleavage perspective 
Building on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal work on party system development in Europe as 
a manifestation of social and cultural cleavages, scholars have applied the cleavage perspective to 
parties’ response towards the issue of European integration (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Marks et al. 
2002; Edwards 2009; Hix/Lord 1997). The core argument put forward in this strand of research is 
that party positioning towards European integration will be determined by the broader ideological 
and programmatic profile of a party, which constrains a party in its response to the issue. While 
some parties will be able to easily incorporate European integration into their overall policy 
program, this will be more difficult for other parties. This is due to the multi-faceted nature of 
European integration that cuts across the cleavages constitutive to parties’ historic origins. 
European economic integration and market liberalism, for instance, are at odds with the program 
of parties located on the left side of the class cleavage; European political integration challenges 
the nationalist orientation of radical right parties; and the EU’s architecture and decision-making 
procedures are highly incompatible with green parties’ ambitious understanding of democracy 
resulting from their roots in the new social movements (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Edwards 2009; 
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Hix/Lord 1997). Cleavage theory thus provides us with the theoretical framework for 
understanding why parties respond to the issue of Europe in the way they do, making party 
family the decisive factor for party positioning towards European integration. For Austrian 
political parties, we would therefore expect the following pattern in their positioning towards 
different facets of European integration: 
 SPÖ: Together with the ÖVP, the SPÖ shaped Austria’s way into the EU, acting as the 
leading governing party in that period. With this step the party thus expressed its general 
support to European integration. However, given the EC/EU’s free market bias, which is 
at odds with the ideological profile of socialist and social democratic parties, the SPÖ can 
be expected to claim for different policy priorities that focus on employment and social 
balance to correct for the EU’s policy bias towards monetary stability and market 
liberalism. At the same time, and related to the previous point, the party will most likely 
express strong demands for the deepening of integration with the aim of establishing a 
social Union that may facilitate efforts for stronger economic regulation at the 
supranational level. 
 ÖVP: As part of the Christian democratic party family, the ÖVP is expected to be most 
enthusiastic in its evaluation of European integration, for it combines economic liberalism 
with a supranational political order. Hence the ÖVP will be supportive to both further 
economic and political integration. Different from the SPÖ, however, claims for the 
deepening of integration will focus less on questions of employment and social security 
but on economic competitiveness.  
 FPÖ/BZÖ: Despite the FPÖ’s support to European integration in earlier periods of the 
party’s history, both the FPÖ and the BZÖ are the strongest opponents to the EU and 
integration in the Austrian party system. As radical right parties, they are expected to 
emphasize their rejection of political integration, which is viewed by them as a threat to 
national sovereignty and identity. To the extent that they depart from favoring market 
liberalism towards expressing concerns about the negative impact of globalization
60
, they 
may also increasingly criticize the EU’s policy direction from a distributive perspective. 
The main focus, however, will be on sovereignty and identity, thus expressing concerns 
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 Recall the FPÖ’s shift towards the left on the economic left-right dimension in 2006 presented in Table 5.5 in 
5.4.2. 
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along the cultural rather than the economic dimension structuring political conflict, which 
very well fits radical right parties’ policy program. 
 Greens: The Greens initially opposed Austria’s accession to the EU, viewing the latter as 
a technocratic and centralist project with a democratic deficit and criticizing its focus on 
economic growth at the expanse of ecological sustainability and social compatibility 
(Schaller 1996). Though they changed opinions after the referendum outcome, the initial 
points of criticism can still be assumed to be reflected in the party’s reference to 
integration. The Greens can thus be expected to raise strong claims for a democratization 
of the EU and to emphasize policy alternatives—in particular regarding environmental 
issues and social justice. To the extent that they become more supportive to European 
integration, they will also more explicitly point to benefits from integration in evaluative 
statements. 
 Liberals: Having supported EU accession (as the only opposition party) and considering 
the fact that European integration is well compatible with their overall policy program, the 
Liberals can be anticipated to express support to both economic and political 
integration—the former as a means for market liberalization, the latter as a project against 
nationalism. 
 
 
6.1.3 Data and methods 
For analyzing Austrian parties’ response to the European integration issue, this chapter will draw 
on parties’ election manifestos. Manifestos are official documents, produced by parties 
themselves and outlining their stated policy preferences. Though manifestos give not direct 
information on whether a party actually mobilizes on an issue during the campaign (see Chapter 
4), they provide a good overview of parties’ policy program on a variety of issues, including 
European integration. By now, Austrian parties’ manifestos mostly include a chapter dedicated to 
European integration, Europe, or EU politics. Information on parties’ preferences for or against 
further integration and EU policy priorities can also be found in the other parts of manifestos, 
which are typically structured along policy fields or broader issue-categories (e.g. economy, 
environmental protection, immigration, education). 
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In research on EU party positioning, scholars often use manifestos or other political texts to 
translate party statements into numerical data, often along a single dimension ranging from pro- 
to anti-European integration (cf. Pennings 2006; Gabel/Hix 2004; Kleinnijenhuis/Pennings 2001; 
Ray 2007; Marks et al. 2007).
61
 Though suitable for statistical testing, the drawback is that a lot 
of information gets lost through this procedure. Given the complexity of the European integration 
issue, however, this information is needed for assessing how parties respond to the different 
facets of European integration outlined previously. This limitation also applies to the most widely 
used source of manifesto data, the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, see Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP coding schema collects information on parties’ EU position 
in two categories, one covering positive reference towards European integration, the other 
negative ones. These two categories, however, only consider European integration at a very 
general level. Hence they not only leave much scope for subjective interpretation to coders 
(Marks et al. 2007: 30f), but also subsume different facets of integration within a single 
category.
62
 Interestingly, the positive category only refers to expanding the EU, increasing its 
competences, and the value of membership, while the negative category, in addition, includes 
mentions of “opposition to European policies which are preferred by European authorities” 
(Klingemann et al. 2006: 155). This is problematic insofar, as it mixes parties’ stances towards 
the process of integration with policies that might be rejected on the grounds of their policy 
direction. In any case, these two categories do not provide us with precise information on how 
party positioning might differ for the various facets of European integration.
63
  
Considering these limitations, this chapter builds on the original textual sources instead of relying 
on the CMP measures for parties’ EU positioning. Manifestos will be analyzed following a more 
nuanced approach that enables us to take into account the different facets of European 
integration, on which positioning may vary not only between but also within parties: As 
                                                 
61
 For a summary of other data types used in the study of EU party positioning see Chapter 4. 
62
 The description of the categories in the coding instructions reads as follows: “[Code] per108: Favourable mention 
of European integration in general; desirability of expanding the European Union and/or of increasing its 
competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member)”, respectively “[Code] per110: 
Hostile mention of the European Union; opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European 
authorities; otherwise as 108, but negative” (Klingemann et al. 2006: 154-155, emphasis added).  
63
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described in more detail in Chapter 4, the qualitative analysis of manifestos is employed in two 
stages. First, I will distinguish between evaluative statements and claims for change or reform. 
Taking both into account is of utmost importance. Evaluative statements provide information 
about whether parties consider European integration as an opportunity or threat. However, parties 
supportive to European integration may be reluctant to explicitly expressing critique in order not 
to undermine the EU’s already weak legitimacy. Still, to the extent they are dissatisfied with 
certain facets of integration, they will make use of claims-making in order to outline their 
political priorities for Europe. Including parties’ EU related claims therefore is necessary for 
learning about parties views towards different facets of European integration. 
Second, instead of using one general dimension for capturing all EU related references, I 
distinguish between three substantive categories (building on Bartolini 2005, 2006): general 
statements about European integration (e.g. ‘we’ve always been supportive of the EU project’); 
constitutive statements referring to the EU’s institutional architecture, its functional and 
geographical boundaries, competences and decision-making rules; and statements related to the 
direction of policy, including e.g. different views towards EU agricultural policy or different 
policy priorities for economic development. This approach will provide us with a much more 
detailed picture of parties’ concerns related to European integration that allows for disentangling 
party positioning towards different aspects of the multi-faceted EU issue. 
 
 
6.1.4 Empirical findings 
This section presents the findings for Austrian parties’ response to the European integration issue 
based on the analysis of election manifestos. Structured along parties, the following sub-sections 
will provide a summary for each party’s response to the issue of Europe, based on the analysis of 
parties’ 1995-2008 election manifestos. Each summary considers the distinction between 
evaluative statements and claims-making on the one hand, and between general, constitutive, or 
statements related to the direction of policy on the other hand. It will also point to changes in 
parties’ views towards certain facets of EU integration over the course of time that may have 
appeared in the comparison of different manifestos. The results will finally be linked to the 
hypothesis developed for the respective party, assessing whether parties respond to the issue of 
Europe accordingly. 
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6.1.4.1 SPÖ: EU polity and policy reform as a means to establish a social Union 
In all manifestos between 1995 and 2008, the SPÖ evaluates European integration mainly 
positively, whereas clearly negative evaluations are rarely present or mentioned only indirectly 
either by pointing to the necessity of reform or by bringing into play citizens’ concerns about the 
EU and integration—without the party explicitly supporting (or denying) the substance of such 
critique. Hence a recurring pattern in the SPÖ’s manifestos is the combination of positive 
reference to European integration with strong claims for reform. Such claims first and foremost 
concern the EU’s policy direction, though there are also a number of claims addressing 
constitutive aspects. The latter, however, mostly appear in connection with claims for different 
political priorities, in particular claims related to the establishing of a social union.  
 
Evaluating European integration: Evaluative statements about European integration and the EU 
predominantly are of supportive character. In the 1990s’ manifestos, the SPÖ primarily highlights 
benefits for Austria resulting from EU membership, like a positive economic development, price 
stability, safeness of jobs etc. From 2002 onwards, the EU is first and foremost referred to as a 
project of peace and unification in Europe. Critique is expressed very carefully and rather framed 
as claims for change or reform than as explicit critique. Through this framing strategy, however, 
the party still makes very clear that further efforts are necessary, in particular in order to establish 
a social Union, which the SPÖ strongly advances. However, neither implicit critique nor claims 
for reform ever challenge the project of European integration and most often concern the 
direction of EU policy rather than the EU as a political project. Still, over the course of time we 
can observe a tendency towards more explicit mentions of deficits in EU policy-making. This in 
particular applies to the 2008 manifesto, in which the SPÖ repeatedly expresses worries about the 
EU’s current development that would not go into the desired direction. The party also states that 
the EU would have departed from its citizens and demands to take warning signals seriously in 
order not to threaten the project of integration. This is how the SPÖ substantiates and justifies 
its—sudden—support for national referenda on future treaty amendments: The consequential 
involvement of citizens and more direct democratic participation in EU policy-making are, 
according to the SPÖ, required for regaining citizens’ confidence.  
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A careful reframing over time can also be observed for EU enlargement: While mostly referred to 
in a positive vein from 1995 to 2002 (i.e. before the 2004 enlargement round came into effect)
64
, 
this is slightly different afterwards. Though the SPÖ still expresses its support for prior 
enlargement, it strongly questions the EU’s future expandability and accuses supporters of a rapid 
enlargement of striving for a weak union in terms of a free trade area. In the 2008 manifesto, the 
SPÖ is very concrete regarding future EU accession of particular countries: While explicitly 
valuing an accession of Croatia and also other—not specified—countries from the Western 
Balkans as an important contribution to prosperity and stability in Austria’s next-door 
neighborhood, the party declares that an accession of Turkey would challenge the EU’s 
economic, social and political capacities as well as its structure. In case of Turkey’s accession, 
the SPÖ promises a referendum on that question in in Austria.  
 
Claims for reform: The SPÖ expresses strong claims for EU polity reform and, in particular, a 
realignment of policy at the European level. The former are always connected to the party’s 
policy priorities and first and foremost concern economic and social policy. I.e. claims for the 
deepening of integration and EU democratization are accompanied by claims for policy change. 
The SPÖ calls for additional objectives equal to the goals of economic integration and monetary 
stability, like economic growth, employment, social security, and the protection of public 
services. The party wants the EU to be the instrument for “humanization and domestication of the 
globalized economy”65 and argues for coordinated tax policies in order to prevent for tax and 
wage dumping, the implementation of a financial transaction tax at the European level, and rights 
of co-determination in a European social partnership. Hence among the variety of claims 
mentioned in the manifestos, demands for a strong Europe and the establishing of a social union 
in response to negative consequences of globalization clearly stand out. This is a recurring pattern 
over time, and particularly so since 1999.  
Another priority in the SPÖ’s claims-making relates to the establishing/strengthening of the 
CFSP, for which the party expresses strong support, while at the same time emphasizing that 
Austria’s neutrality and European solidarity would not contradict each other, which would allow 
the country to actively and equally participate in the European security architecture as a neutral 
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state. Though this partly reflects a claim in constitutive terms (thus related to the transfer of 
competences towards the EU level and/or communitarization and democratization), the SPÖ also 
clearly outlines its political priorities regarding the CFSP, which are conflict prevention and crisis 
management, and the party makes clear not to want the EU to evolve into a military pact.  
Other domains where the SPÖ repeatedly raises claims for EU policy change concern European-
wide nuclear phase-out and a reform of the EURATOM treaty (from a “funding treaty” towards a 
“security [meaning: nuclear safety, SM] treaty”66), a reform of agricultural policy (to make sure 
that funding would not be distributed irrespective of ecological and other criteria anymore), 
and—prior to the 2004 enlargement round—claims related to the implementation of enlargement 
(e.g. transitory provisions for access to the Austrian labor market and candidate countries’ 
compliance to high safety standards for nuclear power plants). 
In different variants over the course of time, the SPÖ’s manifestos also repeatedly address 
Austria’s EU contributions, e.g. demanding more efficiency and transparency in their usage. 
From 2006 onwards, the SPÖ suggests a financial transaction tax as a means to strengthen the 
EU’s proprietorial financing, while at the same time reducing member states’ EU contributions. 
 
As indicated by this summary, the SPÖ expresses a strong commitment towards European 
integration in all its manifestos, while at the same time strongly claiming for reform and for 
different EU policy priorities in order to establish a social union. This is in line with our 
expectation on the basis of cleavage theory, suggesting that social democratic parties will seek to 
correct for the EU’s bias towards market integration by urging further political integration and 
policy reorientation. The strong focus on CFSP and repeated mentions of other issues (like 
nuclear power policy/EURATOM, agricultural policy, EU contributions) are most likely due to 
their particular relevance in Austrian public and political discourse about European integration 
(cf. Fallend 2008). As we will see below, these issues also frequently appear in other parties’ 
manifestos, indicating their significance in Austria. Despite careful reframing over time 
(concerning enlargement but also mentions of EU deficits), the SPÖ’s manifestos reflect a 
recurring pattern in valuing European integration and claiming for reform to further develop the 
EU.  
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6.1.4.2 ÖVP: European integration as a guarantor of economic prosperity and security 
Compared to other parties’ manifestos, the ÖVP’s manifestos include the most enthusiastic 
evaluations of European integration, first and foremost pointing to economic benefits for Austria. 
There is also a stronger focus on evaluative statements compared to the SPÖ and the Greens (for 
the latter see below). However, also the ÖVP raises claims, though these are predominantly of 
constitutive character. Only regarding security policy, on which ÖVP-manifestos put much 
emphasis in connection with European integration, claims additionally outline the policy 
direction for which the ÖVP strives in this domain.  
 
Evaluating European integration: The ÖVP expresses strong support for European integration 
and the EU project in its manifestos. The party points to the EU’s genesis as a project of peace 
and an economic union and emphasizes that economic cooperation has proven to be the most 
effective motor for intensified integration and thus peacekeeping that left European citizens with 
prosperity and must therefore be pursued. The EU is described as a community of values and 
interests, and Europe as “a common destiny of which Austria is part”67. In the view of the ÖVP, 
Austria’s EU membership is an economic and political advantage for the country beyond 
question. Repeatedly, the party points to economic benefits resulting from EU membership, like 
creating economic growth, prosperity, and jobs; it would therefore serve the interest of both 
consumers and businesses. Different from the SPÖ and the Greens, which strongly claim for the 
EU to become a firewall against negative consequences of globalization, the ÖVP depicts the EU 
as an expression against “unleashed turbo-globalization” and states that “anyone questioning our 
membership in the European Union endangers the wealth of the country”68. The ÖVP repeatedly 
portrays itself as the ‘Europapartei’ in Austria, engaging actively in European affairs, most 
credible in representing Austrian interests in Europe, and having supported the idea of Europe 
and the way towards deeper integration from the outset. In the ÖVP’s view, the ÖVP is the only 
party standing for a pragmatic and positive Europe and a guarantor for taking responsibility for 
both Europe and Austria. Beyond these general appreciations of European integration, evaluative 
statements also more specifically point to EU enlargement and the CFSP (though not with equal 
weight in each manifesto):  
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EU enlargement: Prior to the 2004 enlargement (i.e. in the 1999 and the 2002 manifestos), the 
ÖVP highlights the importance of enlargement as a historical step to overcome the divide of the 
continent and emphasizes that enlargement would strongly benefit the Austrian economy and 
businesses, both having been the main beneficiaries from the opening of the East so far. The costs 
of enlargement would thus be an investment in the country’s future. From 2006 onwards, 
however, the ÖVP’s support for enlargement becomes more selective: Similar to the SPÖ, the 
ÖVP expresses support for a clear prospect of accession for the Balkan (and support to Croatia’s 
EU accession in particular), while at the same time demanding that the EU’s capacity for 
enlargement must become a criterion in the future. Like the SPÖ, the ÖVP promises a 
referendum in Austria on Turkey’s accession in case the latter would ever be at sight. 
CFSP: From 1999 onwards, the CFSP is a core issue in the ÖVP’s EU-related manifesto 
statements. It is viewed as a crucial component of a Europe of peace in which Austria should 
fully participate, since the way towards a united Union could not be achieved solely by economic 
and legal integration but must include concrete steps towards a common European structure for 
conflict resolution, ultimately resulting in a European defense system. In the 1999 manifesto, the 
ÖVP devotes much space to outlining its understanding of different phases of Austria’s neutrality 
status that, according to the ÖVP, has changed over time and would thus not contradict the 
principle of solidarity within a European defense structure.  
 
Claims for reform: Claims for reform predominantly address the EU’s competences and 
architecture rather than the direction of policy. Only in the field of security policy, the ÖVP 
repeatedly raises a number of claims directed also at desired policy outcome in different 
manifestos. Starting, however, with constitutive claims, the focus is on further integration and/or 
communitarization in various policy fields, the allocation of competences between the EU and 
member states, and the balance of power between large and small member states. Further 
integration is demanded in the CFSP, including the claim for a “Europeanization of national 
defense”69. Further claims concern the representation of each member state in every EU 
institution, clear and transparent task sharing between the EU and member states based on the 
principle of subsidiarity, and the removal of obstructive EU regulations. The ÖVP expresses 
strong demands for further integration in security policy. On this point, claims for stronger 
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cooperation are substantiated by concrete measures aiming at strengthening security and stability 
in the EU (emphasized in particular in the 1999 and the 2002 manifestos). These include e.g. the 
creation of a European visa-identification system, standardized scanners for biometrical data, 
initiatives for transport safety, the tightening of EU border protection against illegal immigration 
and organized people smugglers, and common EU standards for immigration policy (based on the 
Austrian system of quota).  
 
As we expected on the grounds of cleavage theory, the ÖVP is very supportive towards the EU 
project and emphasizes economic benefits resulting from European integration. The party 
highlights that being part of the EU has made the country a winner of processes of 
internationalization and globalization and points to the EU as a shield against turbo-globalization 
without restraint. Thus the ÖVP is much less concerned with EU policy reform regarding 
economic and social policy compared to both the SPÖ and the Greens; the focus is rather on 
security policy, where the ÖVP expresses strong demands for the deepening of integration. The 
ÖVP also attempts to gain ownership over the EU issue by repeatedly presenting itself as the 
Austrian ‘Europapartei’. 
 
6.1.4.3 FPÖ: shifting towards ‘hard’ Euroskepticim70 
Without one single exception, the FPÖ’s manifestos contain no general commitment to European 
integration. Rather, the EU and integration are referred to in a negative vein as the cause of a 
number of problems, though this tendency is not reflected in all manifestos with the same clarity. 
Critique or opposition towards European integration is also often framed as claims against 
something to take place, while in 2006 and 2008 explicit negative evaluations clearly become 
predominant. Over time we can also observe a much stronger focus on constitutive statements 
related to the EU architecture, the allocation of competences, and the EU’s functional and 
geographical boundaries as distinct from a focus on EU policy direction.  
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Evaluating European integration: In the 1990’s manifestos, the FPÖ primarily points to negative 
effects of European integration for economy and employment in Austria. In 1995 critique is first 
and foremost directed at the Austrian government (for reneging on its promises before the 
country’s EU accession) rather than focusing on EU deficits or the integration process as such. In 
1999 negative consequences are primarily mentioned in connection with EU enlargement (see 
below). From 2006 onwards, however, the focus clearly shifts towards European integration as a 
threat to Austria’s sovereignty. The FPÖ states that “freedom and independence of our homeland 
Austria is increasingly limited” while evermore “rights are delegated towards an anonymous 
bureaucratic apparatus in Brussels, whereas citizens’ democratic rights are limited step by 
step”71. The FPÖ regards the EU as striving for a central state trampling on the principles of 
subsidiarity and democracy. According to the party, a discussion about leaving the EU must not 
be a taboo, because in its current state, the EU would reveal anti-democratic tendencies, 
regulating frenzy, too much bureaucracy, and would set the wrong political priorities. In 
opposition to this development, the FPÖ argues for an “Europa der Vaterländer” and a “core 
Europe” of net contributors with re-weighed votes in the Council according to the principle “who 
pays the piper calls the tune”72. 
A problem-focuses perspective is taken also on questions of EU enlargement. In the 1999 and the 
2002 manifestos (i.e. before the 2004 enlargement round came into effect), the party strongly 
emphasizes (alleged) drawbacks for Austria resulting from enlargement. The 1999 manifesto 
states that “presently, Eastern enlargement is out of question”73 because it would lead to 
migration and commuter flows, pressure to the labor market and therefore increasing 
unemployment among Austrian employees, stock removals in production and investments, drain 
of purchasing power etc. In 2002, evaluative statements towards enlargement are more 
ambivalent—which is to be viewed in connection with the FPÖ’s government participation at that 
time: Though valued as a change to overcome an almost 60 year period of a divided Europe, 
enlargement is also labeled the greatest challenge for the EU and its members since the 
foundation of the union, and the FPÖ highlights not to support an enlargement with no strings 
attached. Similar to the ÖVP, the FPÖ underscores that no other country will be as affected by 
EU enlargement as Austria will. Unlike the ÖVP, however, the FPÖ does not perceive this an 
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advantage by all means. The FPÖ therefore sets a number of conditions to EU enlargement. Next 
to conditions concerning economic development, two other conditions are mentioned as 
requirements for candidate countries’ EU accession, namely a binding promise for nuclear phase-
out and the disposal of the Beneš and Avnoy decrees. In 2006 and 2008, mentions of enlargement 
are strongly related to the Turkey case: The FPÖ states to “refuse steadfastly an EU membership 
of Turkey”74 because, according to the FPÖ, Turkey is not a European country in geographical, 
religious, and ethnic terms and EU accession of Turkey must lead to a referendum in Austria 
about leaving the EU. In 2008 the party generally calls for an end of further EU enlargement, 
with the exception of the Balkan states.  
Against the overall tendency of reluctance towards further integration, the 2002 manifesto 
includes a strong appreciation of a European security and defense system, explicitly demanding 
the development towards a defense union and Austria’s participation therein. However, this is 
clearly at odds with the later manifestos, in which the FPÖ opposes the establishing of a 
European army, stating that the Austrian army must remain exclusively in Austria’s sovereignty.   
 
Claims for reform: Different especially from the SPÖ and the Greens, which are very constant in 
their claims-making over the course of time, FPÖ-claims-making in the different manifestos is 
much more fragmented. In 1999 and 2002 most claims are related to enlargement and concern 
accession criteria for candidate countries (like nuclear phase-out and the disposal of the Beneš 
decrees), EU reform (like a reform of EU competences and of the Common Agricultural Policy) 
or transitory provisions for Austria (in particular for access to the labor market) as preconditions 
for enlargement. Again different from the other parties, the FPÖ does not claim for further 
integration but for renationalization in certain policy fields (e.g. agricultural policy), with the sole 
exception of security (and in 2002 also defense) policy, where the FPÖ expresses demands for 
further integration. In addition a number of rather narrow claims for the implementation of 
certain measures can be found (e.g. related to subsidies for SMEs, environmental and animal 
protection standards). 
 
Despite certain inconsistencies, the comparison of the FPÖ’s manifestos clearly reveals two 
patterns: First, European integration is generally referred to as a threat; second, whereas 
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described as a threat for economy and employment in the 1990s, the framing later shifts towards 
question of sovereignty and identity, which the FPÖ views as strongly threatened by the 
“anonymous bureaucratic apparatus in Brussels”75 that would hollow out Austrians’ democratic 
rights. This shift in the framing of the ‘EU threat’ is very well in line with expectations from 
cleavage theory stating that radical right parties are strongly adverse towards political integration 
and express concerns about a loss of identity as part of the cultural dimension of conflict. The 
latter is also indicated in the FPÖ’s strong rejection of Turkey’s EU accession. 
The temporal trend also clearly indicates a shift towards hard—as distinct from soft—
Euroskepticism, to apply the typology developed by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008). 
Hard Euroskepticism consists of “principled opposition to the EU and European integration” and 
is found in parties seeking the withdrawal from membership and/or parties “whose policies 
towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as 
it is currently conceived” (ibid. 7, emphasis in original). However, the FPÖ instead is considered 
by the authors a party reflecting soft Euroskepticism
76
 (ibid. 11), building on the country 
contribution by Fallend (2008) in their edited volume (cf. Szczerbiak/Taggart 2008). However, 
considering the 2006 and 2008 manifestos, the present analysis clearly reveals that the FPÖ’s 
Euroskepticism has further radicalized and that the party fits much better in the category of hard 
Euroskepticism since then: Though the FPÖ does not explicitly claim for withdrawal from the 
EU in its manifestos, it argues that this must not be a taboo and demands a variant of the EU that 
is clearly at odds with the current state of integration. 
 
6.1.4.4 Greens: further integration and democratization to fix EU polity and policy deficits 
The Greens point to both positive and negative implications of European integration in their 
1995-2008 manifestos and provide a quite precise conception of the party’s desired EU 
development, the issues it wants to be dealt with at the European level, and the measures to be 
taken accordingly. This concerns both EU polity and policy reform. Manifestos reflect a 
predominance of claims-making, though more explicit and general evaluations of European 
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integration are to be found in the 2006 and the 2008 manifestos (but still always in connection 
with concrete claims for reform).  
 
Evaluating European integration: In the 1990s’ manifestos, the Greens depict European 
integration more negatively—though critique mostly addresses government failure rather than the 
EU or the process of integration per se. In 1995 this concerns (alleged) negative consequences of 
EU accession for Austria, like unemployment, cuts in social welfare, and an increase in transit 
traffic. In 1999 negative evaluations concern the (alleged) hollowing out of neutrality, EU 
militarization, the failure of EU agricultural policy, and EU policy on genetic engineering. Still, 
European integration at the same time is viewed to offer opportunities for solving certain policy 
problems, which is why the party claims for more EU initiative. From 2002 onwards, the Greens 
consequently refer to the EU’s importance as a project of peace and its relevance for achieving 
certain policy goals. In the 2006 and the 2008 manifestos, however, the green party speaks of an 
EU developmental crisis and a crisis of confidence caused by a lack of political concepts and the 
government’s strategy to make the EU a scapegoat for its own political failure. Despite harsh 
critique on the EU’s current state, this is not translated into reluctance towards European 
integration on the part of the Greens, but understood to give rise to EU polity and policy reform. 
Thus the Greens announce to “give the EU a second go” and strongly emphasize that nationalism, 
provincialism, and economic liberalism are the wrong response to the challenges the EU faces 
because “Europe—that is not the others, but ourselves. We must change the European Union 
ourselves”77. Hence the Greens’ formula is more Europe instead of less and stronger regulation at 
the European level. In line with this, they argue for a more democratic, social, and ecological 
union (see below). 
Quite striking is the consistently positive appraisal of EU enlargement prior to the 2004 
enlargement round (whereas enlargement is a non-issue in later manifestos): The Greens express 
strong support for enlargement, which is valued as an important condition for peace and security 
in Europe and a step forward to vanquish the separation of Europe. Green arguments in support 
of enlargement both point to the EU’s joint responsibility vis-à-vis candidate countries and to 
benefits enlargement would bring for Austria. The 2006 and 2008 manifestos do not contain any 
reference to either the previous or further enlargement. 
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Over the course of time, a slight reframing can be observed with regard to the Greens’ view 
towards the establishing/strengthening of the CFSP: In the 1990s, the Greens are much more 
concerned about Austria’s neutrality status and the military components of the CFSP, arguing 
that neutral states would be the guarantors that the EU won’t become an “armed single market”78. 
This reads differently later: Though still mentioning a number of conditions, fears of losing 
neutrality and joining a military pact do not appear in the same intensity as in the 1990s, if 
present at all in the recent past. Moreover, support by the Greens to the CFSP is much more 
enthusiastic and encompasses support to the buildup of a European security union.   
 
Claims for reform: In the whole period of investigation, green party manifestos strongly 
emphasize claims for EU polity reform and policy change. These basically concern four domains: 
EU democracy, social policy, environmental policy, and foreign and security policy: 
EU democratization: Starting from the diagnosis of an EU democratic deficit, the Greens 
repeatedly demand a democratization of the EU—though in slightly different facets in the 
different manifestos. In 1995, claims for a democratization of the EU (including a European 
constitution) are combined with rejection of a centralistic federal state. Over the course of time, 
suggestions for the strengthening of EU democracy as represented in manifestos become more 
concrete and comprehensive: An EU constitution should constrain national governments’ 
influence and strengthen the role of the European parliament (i.e. full codetermination for the 
latter), include legally binding basic rights, foster transparency of legislation in the Council, and 
strengthen participatory rights for citizens and civil society. In response to the failure of the EU 
Constitutional and the Lisbon treaties, the 2008 manifesto demands the implementation of a 
“European Act for Democracy” that only includes those parts of the Constitutional treaty that 
strengthen citizens’ rights, enhance democracy, and describe the EU’s values and objectives. 
Social union: The Greens express strong claims for the establishing of a social union in response 
to unemployment and the threats of globalization; the EU should become a common space of 
justice, social security and solidarity, which is seen as the only way to defend the European social 
model against the overly powerful and globally acting financial and economic interests. 
According to the Greens, economic and social policy must be devoted to the fight against 
unemployment and poverty and the EU growth and stability pact should be adjusted and 
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expanded towards quantifiable objectives for employment (meaning full employment should 
become a general EU objective). A number of claims refer to social policy that should be the 
most important duty of the EU (establishing a social safety net and homogeneous minimum 
standards in labor and social legislation against wage dumping). Claims in this domain thus also 
concern constitutive aspects of integration, like further integration towards or the deepening of 
integration in employment and social policy, and harmonization of tax policies.   
Environmental union: As with full employment, the Greens want environmental criteria and 
sustainability to become part of the EU growth and stability pact. The goal of changing the EU 
into an ‘Eco-union’ is substantiated by a number of very concrete claims, like the establishing of 
high environmental standards, changes in agricultural policies, animal protection, EU-wide 
nuclear phase-out (including a reform/cancellation of the EURATOM treaty and the stop of 
subsidies for the nuclear power industry) and instead the fostering of alternative energies, the 
redirection of traffic from roads to rails, a moratorium for the release of genetically modified 
organisms etc. According to the Greens, the fight against climate change must be a community 
task and should include a harmonization of energy taxes and a European wide tax on kerosene, 
and the protection of genetically unmodified regions in agriculture. In order to strive towards an 
environmental union and to realize a substantial European strategy for sustainability, the Greens 
want the EU to “get free from the paralyzing influence of lobbies and big companies”79. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy: Claims related to the establishing or strengthening of the 
CFSP appear in almost all manifestos, though the Greens’ evaluation of the CFSP slightly 
changes over time (see above). Consistency, however, can be observed on the claim of a clear 
priority in the configuration of the CFSP towards peace, stability, and a civil (as opposed to 
military) focus.  
 
Confirming expectations derived from the cleavage theory of party positioning, the Greens 
express strong claims for both EU polity and policy reform aiming at achieving social justice, 
sustainability, peace, and democracy. The analysis of manifestos further shows that initial 
reference to negative effects of European integration over time is replaced by emphasis on the EU 
as a project of peace and a means to solve policy problems. Though harsh critique on the EU’s 
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current state lasts, the Greens’ conclusion is to claim for further integration and stronger 
regulation at the EU level.  
 
6.1.4.5 Liberals: valuing European integration 
The following summary for the Liberals is narrowed to the 1995 and the 1999 election 
manifestos. Though the Liberals also contested later elections, their failure to remain a seat in 
parliament from the 1999 election onwards make them a party not to be considered as relevant 
for competition in later elections (cf. Sartori 1976), which justifies the neglecting of their later 
manifestos. As expected, the Liberals refer to European integration very positively, though with 
varying intensity in their 1995 and 1999 election manifestos.  
 
Evaluating European integration: In 1995, we can find implicit positive evaluations in reference 
to the European economic and monetary union and mentions valuing Austria’s way towards 
Europe (both in the context of claiming for consolidating the Austrian budget). The 1999 
manifesto emphasizes the Liberals perspective of a united Europe as key to a peaceful future and 
contains strong claims for the establishing of a European foreign, security, and peace policy as an 
alternative to neutrality and NATO membership (see below). Indirect positive reference towards 
European integration can also be found in the context of EU-induced liberalizations in Austria, 
which are viewed to benefit consumers. 
 
Claims for reform: The 1995 manifesto, which does not put much emphasis on European 
integration, includes one claim for further integration, which both reflects a constitutive statement 
and at the same time concerns policy direction: The Liberals argue for a common European 
asylum law that should strengthen legal rights and the protection of asylum seekers. In 1999 the 
focus on reform explicitly concerns foreign and security policy. From the perspective of the 
Liberals, Austria should convert its neutrality into European solidarity, and the party claims for 
the establishing of a European foreign, security, and peace policy. They state to be “committed to 
this option and willing to effectuate it” and argue that “in the final analysis this also includes a 
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European defense”80, i.e. a European army with a separate chain of command. According to the 
party, the legal base for this conception has to be a new European constitution. 
 
In a nutshell, the Liberals’ positive evaluation of both economic and political integration is 
confirmed by the analysis of election manifestos from 1995 and 1999, though there is less focus 
on economic benefits than expected. 
 
6.1.4.6 BZÖ: European integration as a threat 
Given the fact that the BZÖ was founded only in 2005, only two manifestos produced by the 
party for general election campaigns can be considered in the analysis, namely the 2006 and the 
2008 manifestos. In 2006 the focus is more on constitutive questions to European integration and 
the EU, whereas in 2008 there is slightly more focus on EU policy direction. 
 
Evaluating European integration: In the two manifestos, European integration or the EU are first 
and foremost referred to with a problem-focused perspective, focusing on specific facets of 
integration rather than any general evaluations—with the exception of a single positive reference 
to the EU as project of peace in the 2006 manifesto. Evaluations often appear indirectly, for 
instance when referring to the misuse and waste of EU funds, to enlargement as having increased 
feelings of insecurity among citizens, or to the “unjustified […] and ineffable EU sanctions”81 
against Austria in 2000. Still, there is one area where the BZÖ explicitly values integration as a 
necessity, namely security policy. In security questions, the party states, pursuing national 
interests would have no future, since “Europe’s and therefore Austria’s security in the long run 
depend on threats from Europe’s periphery, from establishing the common European security and 
defense policy as well as from the capacity to further development and integration”82. This view 
is substantiated by a number of concrete claims (see below). In 2008, evaluations mostly concern 
EU policy direction, in particular critique on the Basel II Directive (that would hinder 
investments and destroy economy) and agricultural funds (that would betray small farmers and, 
as a consequence, put Austrian peasantry at risk).  
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 1999 manifesto, translation by SM. 
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 2006 manifesto, translation by SM. 
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 2006 manifesto, translation by SM. 
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Claims for reform: The BZÖ claims for a clear definition of the EU’s spatial and cultural 
boundaries and of its financial possibilities; at the same time, member states’ sovereignty must be 
safeguarded according to the principle of subsidiarity. The party demands more participation of 
citizens in the EU through direct democratic instruments, a strengthening of the principle of 
subsidiarity, fight against the misuse of EU funds, and the introduction of an exit clause for 
leaving the EU. In terms of EU finality, the BZÖ states to strive for a European federation 
(Staatenbund) with Austria as a confident and sovereign member and with European solidarity 
and cooperation. In 2006, a number of claims refer to the use of EU funds and financial control 
(like efficient control measures, reduction of funding in case of misuse, and an upgrading of 
controls by the European Court of Auditors) and to security issues (e.g. more cooperation in 
fighting crime and people smuggling). In the 2008 manifesto, the BZÖ demands a reintroduction 
of border control at Austrian borders (because Schengen failed) and wants the BASEL II 
Directive to immediately be repealed (to give investment incentives to medium-sized businesses). 
If further argues for more activities against genetically modified organisms and for nuclear phase-
out. In both manifestos, the BZÖ claims for a referendum of the question of Turkey’s accession 
to the EU. However, while speaking of European (!) citizens’ participation in the 2006 manifesto, 
in 2008 the BZÖ demands a compulsory referendum on that question in Austria. This is clearly to 
be viewed in connection with the BZÖ’s government participation in 2006 that constrained the 
party in its claims-making for national referenda. 
 
In conclusion, the BZÖ primarily focuses on European integration as a threat. Still, the focus on 
concerns about sovereignty and identity is less consistent in manifestos than we would have 
expected based on the cleavage theory of party positioning. However, looking for a clear-cut 
empirical pattern might be expecting too much given the limitation to two manifestos, the change 
from being a party in power in 2006 to being in opposition in 2008, and the youngness of the 
party.  
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6.1.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to study party positioning towards European integration in Austria. 
In particular, the chapter sought to consider parties’ distinct response to different facets immanent 
to the issue of Europe. Building on the cleavage theory of party positioning towards European 
integration (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Edwards 2009; Hix/Lord 1997), it argued that a party’s 
response to the EU issue will be related to the ideological profile of the party. Accordingly, a 
party’s perspective towards European integration may vary for different facets of integration, 
depending on how well the latter fit with the party’s overall policy program.  
The empirical analysis focused on parties’ manifestos prepared for general election campaigns 
between 1995 and 2008. The in-depth qualitative text analysis of these documents proved to be 
illuminating in two respects. First, the distinction between evaluations and claims-making 
regarding European integration allowed for identifying parties’ concerns about integration even if 
a party might refrain from explicit criticism given its general commitment to the project of EU 
integration. Second, the substantive distinction between general statements, constitutive 
statements, and those related to the direction of policy shed light on the different facets of 
integration that parties emphasize in their positioning towards European integration, which 
clearly varies for different parties.  
The empirical findings demonstrate that Austrian political parties very much confirm to 
expectations based on cleavage theory in their response to the European integration issue: The 
SPÖ and the Greens express their demands for EU polity and policy change in a strong emphasis 
on claims-making. Both claim for further integration aimed at the establishing of a social union 
and accordingly emphasize their wish for change in the EU’s policy priorities. The Greens in 
addition focus strongly on EU democratization and the establishing of an “Eco-union”. The ÖVP 
is most enthusiastic in its evaluation of European integration and primarily highlights economic 
benefits for the country. Claims-making is less pronounced compared to the SPÖ and Greens’ 
manifestos, except for security policy, on which the ÖVP puts much emphasis (both focusing on 
external and internal security). Similar to the ÖVP, the Liberals strongly value European 
integration and also put much emphasis on the CFSP. A clear focus on economic integration does 
not appear in their manifestos, which is at odds with theoretical expectations. The FPÖ and the 
BZÖ refer to European integration from a problem-driven perspective. The FPÖ interprets 
integration as a threat for the country’s economy and employment in the 1990s, while clearly 
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focusing on question of sovereignty and identity later on. The temporal trend for the BZÖ is 
reverse. However, the findings for the BZÖ have to be read with caution, given the party’s recent 
foundation and alternation from a party in power to a party in opposition.  
Though there is some evidence for careful reframing on evaluations of European integration and 
varying emphasis on different facets of integration over time, the overall temporal pattern 
suggests that party positioning is rather stable. This is in line with a cleavage perspective on party 
positioning that understands party response to the issue of Europe as a product of parties’ 
ideological commitments.  
Beyond variation in party positioning towards European integration according to party family, the 
analysis of manifestos also reveals that some issues repeatedly appear in manifestos of all 
Austrian parties, like EU enlargement, CFSP, nuclear safety and EURATOM, agricultural policy 
etc. This can be traced back to their importance in Austrian public and political discourse 
resulting from their (alleged) stronger impact on Austria compared to other countries (e.g. 
enlargement) or their contradiction to the (minimum) policy consensus reached in Austria (e.g. 
anti-nuclear power policy and neutrality). 
 
How does the analysis of party positioning presented in this chapter relate to the study of party 
politicization of European integration? First, the cleavage perspective elucidates that the issue of 
Europe constitutes a challenge to some parties but not to others, which is due to their different 
ideological profile. This is important for the study of politicization, since parties will most likely 
refrain from politicizing issues that threaten core principles of their overall policy program. 
Second, to the extent that a party politicizes European integration, it can be expected to do so 
according to its issue-positioning. The detailed analysis of parties’ response to different facets of 
integration thus provides a foundation for expectations regarding the content of the debate in the 
politicization of European integration. The party family factor, which points to the ideological or 
programmatic embedding of political parties, will thus reappear in the following two chapters. 
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6.2 Who drives EU politicization in Austrian general election campaigns? 
6.2.1 Introduction 
European integration for a long time was considered a non-issue for domestic party competition: 
Political parties depoliticized the issue, and citizens did not care much about it (cf. 
Hooghe/Marks 2009; Mair 2000; Lindberg/Scheingold 1970). In the post-Maastricht era, 
however, this view became increasingly challenged: Public support for European integration 
declined and the issue of Europe appeared on the agenda of radical parties opposing European 
integration and seeking to mobilize Euroskeptic votes (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; de 
Vries/Edwards 2009). This development caused the interest of EU and party scholars, who started 
to pay attention to party politicization of European integration. 
Building on theories of party competition, in particular salience theory (cf. Budge/Farlie 1983; 
Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), scholars argue that parties will politicize the issue of 
Europe—like any other issue—when they expect to gain electoral advantage from doing so (cf. 
Steenbergen/Scott 2004; Netjes/Binnema 2007). Much of this scholarly work arrives at the 
conclusion that the politicization of European integration will therefore be driven by Euroskeptic 
parties, which seem to share a structural advantage on the issue compared to their competitors (cf. 
Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vries/Edwards 2009; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004; but see Steen-
bergen/Scott 2004; Green-Pedersen 2011). However, when looking at available data for Austrian 
political parties derived from comparative data sets, we would not arrive at that conclusion: 
Depending on the data source, it is the pro-European mainstream parties, the increasingly pro-
European Greens, or alternately the pro-European ÖVP and the anti-EU FPÖ putting most 
emphasis on the issue of Europe.
83
 On the one hand, these divergent results may not come as a 
surprise, since the findings are based on different sources, namely expert judgments, parties’ 
election manifestos, and media coverage. On the other hand, scholars using any of these sources 
for exploring parties’ issue-emphasis on European integration all claim to make a contribution to 
the salience or politicization of the EU issue in domestic party contestation (cf. de Vries/van de 
Wardt 2011; Netjes/Binnema 2007; Ray 1999; Steenbergen/Scott 2004; Kriesi 2007). Insofar we 
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 These findings are based (in this order) on the Chapel Hill Expert survey estimating party positioning on European 
integration (CHES, cf. Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen/Marks 2007), the Comparative Manifesto Project analyzing 
parties’ election manifestos (CMP, cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), and the data derived from the 
media analysis conducted as part of the project National Political Change in a Globalizing World (NPCGW, cf. 
Kriesi et al. 2008). For more details see 6.2.3. 
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would expect them to come to similar conclusions about different parties’ emphasis on European 
integration. However, the comparison of different data sources for the Austrian case reveals an 
inconsistent picture and therefore leaves us with uncertainty about party politicization of 
European integration in Austria. 
Starting from these puzzling findings, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of party 
politicization of European integration in Austrian general election campaigns. It seeks to (1) 
identify which parties drive the politicization of Europe in Austrian domestic contestation and (2) 
explain differences in the politicization of the issue between individual parties as well as different 
election campaigns. A core argument put forward in this chapter is that the selection of data 
should be carefully considered in the study of issue-politicization. Otherwise we might end up 
with contradictory findings leading to different conclusions, as revealed by the comparison of 
different data mentioned above. This claim is taken seriously in the present study, which 
complements quantitative measures for party politicization derived from TV debates between 
rival candidates with qualitative indicators. The empirical findings reveal that this is 
indispensable for arriving at definite and convincing conclusions: Different from previous 
findings for Austrian parties derived from available sources, the in-depth analysis largely 
confirms expectations derived from theory suggesting that Euroskeptic parties will more actively 
engage in the politicization of European integration: The anti-EU FPÖ actively politicizes the 
issue of Europe, and increasingly so over the course of time. However, the findings for the pro-
European mainstream-right ÖVP partly contradict expectations from salience theory, since the 
party actively politicizes the issue despite the lack of a clear electoral incentive for doing so. 
Comparing different election campaigns, the results suggest that certain events (such as EU 
enlargement) can boost the politicization of Europe. Above all, however, the politicization at the 
party system level seems to be driven by party competition dynamics.  
The findings of this chapter make an important contribution to the study of party politicization of 
European integration. With a view to research strategy, the findings point to the added value of 
complementing quantitative data with qualitative indicators. In terms of empirical conclusions, 
the results reveal that despite a structural disadvantage, pro-European mainstream parties may 
actively politicize the issue of Europe if they consider it a key issue of their party profile. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section embeds party politicization in the salience 
theory of party competition and summarizes expectations for the Austrian case based on the 
hypotheses derived from salience theory. This is followed by a brief review and comparison of 
available data on Austrian parties’ EU issue-emphasis from large-scale cross-national research 
projects, before describing the data and methods selected for the present study. The empirical 
findings will be presented in two steps. Section 6.2.6 first summarizes the findings according to 
the quantitative measures and then introduces the qualitative indicators, discussing each 
campaign separately; 6.2.7 then discusses the findings against the hypothesis derived from 
salience theory. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and arguments put forward in this 
chapter. 
 
 
6.2.2 Party politicization and salience theory 
From the numerous issues competing for public attention, only few are taken up by political 
actors and thus actually arrive on the public agenda for domestic contestation (Carmines/Stimson 
1986, 1989), i.e. become politicized by parties. This section will outline the conditions for party 
politicization of European integration. Building on salience theory, it first develops hypotheses 
for the politicization of Europe focusing on individual parties (party level). Second, it refers to 
additional conditions that may boost or decrease the overall politicization of Europe in specific 
campaigns (party system level). For both levels, each section also summarizes the expectations 
for the Austrian case according to the hypotheses. 
 
6.2.2.1 Politicization at the party level 
The politicization of an issue—defined here as a party’s attempt to publicly emphasize the issue 
in domestic contestation (cf. de Wilde 2011)—is strongly related to the concept of salience. The 
latter’s main notion is that political actors (and citizens likewise) not only differ in their positions 
towards an issue, but also in how important, i.e. salient, they feel the respective issue is (cf. Laver 
2001). For political parties, ‘importance’ in this context is strongly related to vote-seeking as a 
crucial goal of any party. Parties’ issue-salience can thus be defined “as the extent to which the 
party leadership considers an issue as vital for its electoral appeal” (Netjes/Binnema 2007: 40). 
123 
 
This definition emanates from salience theory, which argues that political parties compete by 
manipulating the salience of issues in order to win votes (cf. Budge/Farlie 1983, Budge et al. 
2001, Klingemann et al. 2006). This means that parties will emphasize an issue when they expect 
to gain electoral advantage through it. That could be issues a party already is strongly associated 
with in the perception of the public—i.e. issues ‘owned’ by the party—or issues for which the 
party seeks ownership in order to strengthen its electoral position vis-à-vis its competitors. 
According to salience theory, competition between political parties thus is not merely 
competition about different positions towards the same issue, but is a contest about the different 
issues each party expects to electorally benefit from and thus emphasizes. This theory of party 
competition has been developed as an explicit critique of the Downsian model of competition, 
which holds that parties compete by shifting their locations in the policy space (Downs 1957), i.e. 
they simply change their policy positions according to strategic consideration (Ray 2007: 16). 
Contrariwise, salience theory acknowledges that parties might not be able to easily shift their 
position towards an issue in order to maximize votes. After all, “parties are not empty vessels into 
which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures” 
(Marks/Wilson 2000: 343). However, being rational actors that act strategically, parties will only 
publicly emphasize issues they expect to benefit from while trying to downplay others. 
When would a party assess the issue of European integration as being beneficial in electoral 
terms and thus emphasize it in domestic competition? Following salience theory—but not 
attributing ownership over the EU issue to any party a priori—scholars have developed a number 
of hypotheses for explaining variation in party politicization or salience ascribed to the European 
integration issue (cf. Steenbergen/Scott 2004; Netjes/Binnema 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2009; de 
Vries/van de Wardt 2011). From this literature, the following explanatory factors can be derived:  
 Party position vis-à-vis voter position: As parties attempt to win votes, a party will 
depoliticize issues on which its supporters hold different positions compared to the 
party’s. 
 Internal dissent: Parties will deemphasize European integration if the issue challenges 
internal party cohesion, as internal dissent could damage the party profile with regard to 
clarity and credibility. 
 Location in policy space: Distinguishing between parties located at the margins of the 
dominant left-right dimensions and those located in the mainstream, the former can be 
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expected to emphasize a new issue that does not fit into the left-right dimension—like 
European integration—, whereas the latter will most likely downplay the issue. This is 
because more extreme parties at the periphery of the party system are less successful in 
competing on left-right issues than mainstream parties and will therefore try to accentuate 
new issues in order to gain more votes.
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 Government/opposition status: Following a similar logic as location in the policy space, 
opposition parties might have an interest in restructuring contestation and are therefore 
more likely to politicize European integration. In addition, they do not have to take 
responsibility for EU policy outcomes and the course of integration, leaving them more 
room for promoting their ideas and criticizing the course of integration compared to 
government parties. 
 Systemic salience: Based on the assumption that a party cannot ignore other parties’ 
behavior, issue salience is expected to increase for any political party, the more the other 
parties emphasize the issue—even if a party actually has no incentive in politicizing the 
issue (Steenbergen/Scott 2004: 169). 
 
Expectations for Austrian political parties: 
Considering the above-mentioned explanatory factors for parties’ attempts to politicize the 
European integration issue, what pattern would we expect for the Austrian political parties? The 
following summary is based on the detailed exploration of explanatory factors presented in 
Chapter 5 (see in particular Tables 5.2-5.6 and Figures A1-A9). The left and right mainstream 
parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP, respectively, can be expected to be reluctant to actively 
politicizing Europe because the issue cuts across the left-right axis on which both of them 
compete. Though the party leadership of the SPÖ and the ÖVP, respectively, is largely united in 
its supportive stance towards integration, the party electorate is not. Furthermore, both parties are 
not in line with the majority opinion towards European integration amongst Austrians, which is 
by tendency rather Euroskeptical. While the SPÖ and the ÖVP jointly and successfully mobilized 
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 An additional factor would be party family, according to which the issue of Europe is more challenging to some 
parties compared to others, depending on each party’s ideological profile (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000). However, as this 
perspective leads to similar conclusions—namely that mainstream parties will deemphasize the issue whereas parties 
at the fringes may be inclined to politicize it—it can be subsumed under this factor despite the different underlying 
theoretical arguments.  
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their supporters in the accession referendum in 1994, disenchantment about EU membership 
emerged shortly afterwards and since the late 1990s a majority of Austrians think that European 
integration has already gone too far. This also accounts for SPÖ- and ÖVP-voters, meaning that 
both parties failed in maintaining support for European integration among their constituents. Thus 
the SPÖ and the ÖVP face the obstacle not to be in line with its voters on the question of Europe, 
making the active politicization of the issue a highly risky task for these two parties and thus 
quite unlikely.  
Different from the two traditional mainstream parties, Austria’s other parties are closer located to 
the margins of the policy space—the FPÖ and the BZÖ (since its foundation in 2005) to the right, 
the Greens to the left, and the Liberals (represented in parliament only between 1993 and 1999) 
clearly to left on the non-material or new politics dimension, while closer to the right on the 
economic left-right dimension. According to salience theory, these parties might have an interest 
in emphasizing the issue of Europe in order to challenge mainstream parties. Whether an electoral 
advantage can be expected from such a strategy, however, varies for each of the four parties 
depending not only on the position the party and its voters take on the issue of Europe, but also 
on whether or not it participated in federal government. For the Liberals, who have permanently 
been in opposition, there is not much to lose by politicizing the issue, since the party is united in 
its EU support and has to care less about the Euroskeptic majority opinion compared to the 
mainstream parties. However, there is neither much to win, given that the Liberals share their 
pro-European stance with the mainstream SPÖ and ÖVP, making the EU issue unfit for 
challenging the mainstream parties on the part of the Liberals. 
The Greens are the party that has undergone the most fundamental shift in its positioning towards 
European integration since Austria joined the EU: They initially opposed and mobilized against 
EU accession but shifted towards a more supportive stance and over the course of time have 
become strong advocates of both the deepening of European integration and enlargement of the 
EU (see Chapters 6.1 and 7). Different from the pre-accession period, Green voters meanwhile 
have become the most supportive to further integration among all voters. Hence while the issue 
was suitable to challenge the mainstream governing parties prior to Austria’s EU accession, when 
the Greens still held a skeptical position towards the EU, it is less so since the party joined the 
camp of the supporters to further European integration in line with the two mainstream parties, 
the SPÖ and the ÖVP. This applies despite the fact that the Greens have been in opposition ever 
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since their foundation in the mid-1980s.  
Finally, Austria’s strong radical right parties, the FPÖ and its split-off, the BZÖ, can be expected 
to actively politicize European integration: They share a clear anti-EU profile distinguishing 
themselves from the mainstream parties and have an electorate strongly united in its opposition to 
the EU and to further integration. Considering that public Euroskepticism in Austria goes well 
beyond the supporters of the FPÖ/BZÖ as well as the fact that the country’s biggest and highly 
influential tabloid, the Krone, actively campaigns against the EU and European integration, the 
issue of Europe can thus be expected to be particularly suitable for politicization by the radical 
right parties—with one limitation, and that is government participation. If a radical right, anti-EU 
party enters government in a coalition with a pro-European mainstream party—as was the case 
for the FPÖ (2000-2002, 2002-2005) and the BZÖ (2005-2006)—it will most likely be 
constrained in its attempts to publicly emphasize its rejection of the EU and integration (cf. 
Green-Peedersen 2011). Otherwise the party would risk conflict within the coalition, which could 
ultimately even lead to the termination of the coalition government. Furthermore, once in 
government anti-EU parties are suddenly confronted with the difficulties of limited room of 
maneuver within the complex processes of EU decision-making requiring the willingness to 
compromise from all actors involved in order to come to workable solutions. This makes it harder 
to credibly and effectively mobilize Euroskeptic sentiments. In summary, one can therefore 
expect the radical right FPÖ and BZÖ to actively politicize European integration, but to do less 
so when in power.  
To sum up, according to salience theory the following pattern can be expected for Austrian 
political parties as regards the politicization of European integration: The pro-European SPÖ, 
ÖVP, and Liberals will refrain from politicizing the issue—either because they would risk losing 
votes (SPÖ, ÖVP) or because there is nothing to win for them (Liberals). For the very same 
reasons, the Greens can be expected to equally deemphasize the issue the more they move 
towards an explicitly supportive position towards integration over the course of time. Finally, the 
radical right FPÖ and BZÖ will most likely politicize European integration actively, though less 
so when in power. This expectable pattern reflects the advantageous opportunity structure for EU 
politicization that Euroskeptic parties face in Austria, which might be less the case in countries 
with higher levels of public support for integration, fewer anti-EU campaigning in the media, or 
stronger overlap of pro-European parties’ position with the EU position of the party electorate. 
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6.2.2.2 Politicization at the party system level 
Variation in the politicization of European integration may not only occur between different 
parties, but also between different campaigns, labeled here as variation at the party system in 
distinction from the party level. Such different degrees in the overall politicization of the issue at 
the party system level—i.e. systemic salience in Steenbergen and Scott’s (2004) terms—will 
mostly result from the dynamics of the factors described previously. Still, certain conditions 
related to specific events or party competition dynamics may further boost or decrease the 
salience of the issue of Europe at certain points in time. The following factors can be considered 
in that respect: 
 Date of EU accession: The more recently a country joined the EU, the higher will be the 
degree of politicization, because the EU issue is higher in public focus shortly after 
accession, when the country must adopt the aquis communautaire and the public 
attentively monitors whether membership has brought the benefits forecasted previously 
to accession (cf. Tillmann 2004). 
 Party repositioning: If a party alters its EU position, this can be expected to increase the 
politicization of the issue, since those parties formerly ‘on the same side’ will criticize the 
positional shift whereas the other parties will question the party’s credibility on the issue, 
thus boosting the politicization of Europe at the party system level (cf. Meguid 2005). 
 Government participation of Euroskeptic parties: As outlined previously, government 
participation of Euroskeptic or anti-EU parties will most likely constrain these parties’ in 
their ability to emphasize and criticize European integration. Given that Euroskeptic 
parties are seen as the driving forces for the politicization of Europe in much of the 
literature (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vries/Edwards 2009; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004), 
their government participation is likely to decrease the overall politicization of the issue. 
However, in case there are two Euroskeptic parties—one in power and one in 
opposition—we would expect the contrary, i.e. an increase in the politicization of the 
issue, since the opposition party is likely to actively challenge its Euroskeptic counterpart. 
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Expectations for the party system level: 
The empirical analysis focuses on the five general election campaigns after Austria joined the EU 
as a member on 1 January 1995. The 1995 election was held early due to conflict about the 
budget between the then coalition partners, the SPÖ and the ÖVP (Müller 1996).
85
 After the 
election, the coalition was rebuilt and lasted for the whole four-year legislative period. The 
following election in 1999 has been called “momentous” (Müller 2000a: 191): For the first time 
in Austria’s history, the radical right FPÖ became second strongest party behind the SPÖ. More 
importantly, however, the ÖVP and the FPÖ built a coalition after a series of ‘grand coalitions’ 
between the SPÖ and the ÖVP. The building of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government raised 
enormous criticism internationally and among the other EU member states because of the FPÖ’s 
specific nature as a radical right party (cf. Pelinka 2002). The EU-14 agreed on bilateral measures 
against the new Austrian government that lasted until September 2000 (cf. Merlingen et al. 2001; 
Karlhofer/Sickinger 2001). Increasing intra-party conflict within the FPÖ led to the resignation of 
FPÖ-party leader and Vice Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer and several FPÖ members of 
government in 2002, resulting in snap elections. After the election, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was 
rebuilt, though with enormous change regarding the strength of the two partners: While the FPÖ 
lost almost 17 percentage points, the ÖVP won more than 15 points and became the strongest 
party (cf. Müller 2004). However, intra-party dissent within the FPÖ again was not long in 
coming and the FPÖ-governing team decided to found a new party to maintain the coalition with 
the ÖVP: the BZÖ. The re-named coalition finished the term until 2006. After the 2006 elections, 
the SPÖ and the ÖVP built a coalition, lasting for less than two years: After SPÖ-Chancellor 
Alfred Gusenbauer and newly elected party leader Werner Faymann repositioned the party on the 
question of national referenda on EU treaties, the ÖVP called for reelection. After the 2008 
election, the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition was rebuilt and continues to be in power to date (December 
2011). Against this background, the following pattern can be expected regarding the 
politicization of European integration: A higher degree of politicization can be expected for the 
1995 election campaign (which is the first campaign after EU accession), the 2006 campaign 
(when the Euroskeptic FPÖ was back in opposition and the similarly Euroskeptic BZÖ in power 
previously to the campaign), and in 2008 (when the snap election was caused by party 
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repositioning on the part of the SPÖ). Finally, a lower degree of politicization can be expected in 
2002, when the only challenger to European integration at that time was in power and thus 
constrained on the issue. 
 
 
6.2.3 Puzzling findings: Comparing available measures for Austrian parties’ EU issue-salience 
Scholars interested in the politicization of issues can make use of a variety of data sources for 
identifying the emphasis political parties put on particular issues in the domestic sphere of 
contestation. As regards the European integration issue, three large-scale data sets providing 
relevant information for Austrian political parties can be consulted. These are the Chapel Hill 
expert survey (CHES, Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen/Marks 2007), the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (CMP, Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), and the media data from the research 
project National Political Change in a Globalizing World (NPCGW, Kriesi et al. 2006). They all 
include a variable for parties’ issue-salience towards European integration applicable for the 
study of party politicization. Though covering slightly different time periods and applying 
different measuring techniques, they all share at least two data points and can thus be used for 
comparing the order of parties as well as overall trends of increase or decrease in the 
politicization of European integration over the course of time. Such a comparison is quite 
illuminating for the case under study, as it demonstrates that different research strategies 
regarding data selection indeed lead to different empirical findings and, consequently, 
contradictory conclusions (see Figures 6.1-6.3).  
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Figure 6.1: EU issue-salience for Austrian parties according to CHES data 
Source: CHES 1999-2006 (cf. Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen/Marks 2007). 
 
Figure 6.2: EU issue-salience for Austrian parties according to NPCGW data 
Source: NPCGW data (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). 
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Figure 6.3: EU issue-salience for Austrian parties according to CMP data 
Source: CMP (cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann 2006). 
 
 
Differences can be identified both for temporal trends as well as the order of parties, as shall be 
illustrated on the salience measures for 2002—a point of time included in all three data sets: 
Whereas the CMP data indicate a decrease in the salience of Europe for all except one party (the 
Greens) compared to 1999, the CHES and NPCGW data both reflect a clear increase for all 
parties. The measures also differ with a view to the order of parties: The CMP data rank the 
Greens on top, the CHES data the ÖVP, and the NPCGW data the FPÖ. The findings moreover 
seem to contradict expectations derived from salience theory: The CMP data suggest that 
European integration is most salient for the Greens at two of the three data points; the CHES data 
indicate more issue salience for the pro-European mainstream parties compared to the anti-EU 
radical right at two out of three data points; the NPCGW data, finally, suggest that European 
integration is most salient for the ÖVP and the FPÖ. 
Salience measures derived from established data sources thus provide a rather fuzzy and 
inconsistent picture of Austrian parties’ emphasis on the issue of Europe, making it difficult to 
come to any conclusion about who actually drives the politicization of European integration in 
Austria.  
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6.2.4 Data and methods 
The previous section showed that salience measures derived from available data sources yield to 
different findings for Austrian political parties’ emphasis on the issue of Europe. This 
substantiates the need for carefully considered data selection, making sure that the data used and 
the information derived from them can accurately capture the concept empirically, i.e. measure 
what they are supposed to measure (Bollen 1989: 184, cited in Ray 2007: 12). To recall, party 
politicization of European integration has been defined in this dissertation as parties’ attempts to 
publicly emphasize the issue of Europe. This will be explored by focusing on general election 
campaigns, which serve as an eminently suitable setting for party politicization (cf. Kriesi 2007; 
Netjes/Binnema 2007). In order to capture parties’ attempts for publicly emphasizing European 
integration, this study first and foremost focuses on TV debates between rival candidates 
broadcasted during the campaigns. These data have several advantages for the study of parties’ 
issue-politicization compared to other sources. They reach a broad audience and today often 
represent the highlight of a campaign (Plasser/Lengauer 2010b). Given that such debates also 
attract print media attention, they serve as a good representation of the overall campaign 
dynamics. Candidates can direct attention to issues they want to highlight, and their interactive 
element makes them eminently suitable to study politicization as part of domestic contestation 
between political parties. From 1994 onwards, the Austrian public broadcast station ORF has 
regularly broadcasted debates between party candidates during the campaign. The debates 
include separate two-party debates between candidates of all parties represented in the Austrian 
parliament as well as a joint final debate between figureheads of all these parties.  
Parties’ issue-emphasis on European integration will be measured as the proportion of words 
devoted to references related to European integration relative to the total number of words for 
each speaker in each debate. The relevant text passages were previously identified as part of the 
qualitative text analysis of TV debates (see Chapter 6.3). A party’s EU issue-emphasis or salience 
for a given campaign is then calculated using the values appraised on the basis of all two-party 
debates each party participated in
86
, thus reflecting an average value. Unfortunately, literal 
transcripts are not available for all the debates. Full transcripts are lacking for the 1999 and the 
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 The final TV debate of each campaign—where leading representatives of all parties meet for a final debate shortly 
before election day—will not be considered for parties’ salience measures, because it follows a different dynamic 
compared to the two-party debates. 
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2002 debates, for which literal transcriptions compiled by the author only include statements 
related to European integration but not the whole debate. Party averages for these two years are 
therefore calculated on the average total number of words received from the other debates, for 
which full transcripts are available (2006, 2008) or have been compiled by the author (1995).
87
 
 
The interactive component of TV debates not only constitutes strength of these data, but at the 
same time weakness: The salience value for a given party does not necessarily reflect this party’s 
own attempt to politicize the issue of Europe, but is the product of interaction between the two 
competitors plus the anchorperson represented in a particular debate. Each party’s emphasis on 
the issue of Europe is therefore also dependent on whether the party is forced to respond to 
another party’s claims or critique and questions raised by the anchorperson during the debate, 
even if the party may have preferred to neglect the issue. This certainly affects the average 
salience measure for a given party in a particular campaign. In order to overcome this weakness, 
the quantitative salience measures derived from TV debates will be complemented with 
additional qualitative indicators providing information on how active parties are in politicizing 
the EU issue during a campaign: 
 Agenda setting dynamic in TV debates: Considering the interactive element of TV 
debates, attention to agenda setting dynamics concerning the issue of Europe helps 
identifying which parties behave proactively by putting the issue on the agenda of a 
debate and who only responds to questions or critique raised by the anchorperson or their 
direct competitor in the debate. This serves as a very illuminating indication of parties’ 
EU issue-politicization. 
 Most-important-issue question in final TV debate: The final TV debate between the 
leading representatives of all parties contesting the election often starts with an 
introductory round: The anchorperson asks each party speaker to briefly outline its policy 
priorities in response to the so called most-important-issue question. Though only 
available for three of the five election campaigns (because not asked in the other 
campaigns), this indicator reveals whether European integration is seen as a top-priority 
issue by parties when competing for votes. 
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 Election posters: Though placards are denied to have any impact on voters’ party choice 
or voting intention, they serve as a good indicator for the overall direction of a party’s 
campaign and the issues the party prioritizes (cf. Lederer 2007; 2010). Compared to other 
countries, posters still play an important role in Austrian election campaigns (ibid.). In 
both design and content, they often equal advertisements in newspapers, on which 
Austrian parties spend most of their campaign budget (Lederer 2007). Whether or not 
parties’ posters contain mentions of European integration suggests if a party actively 
mobilizes on the EU issue, thus serving as strong evidence for issue-politicization.  
 
The detailed analysis of election campaigns, considering both quantitative salience measures and 
qualitative indicators for active issue-politicization, will provide more valid information for party 
politicization of Europe compared to large-scale comparative data sources that have been used in 
previous studies (cf. Netjes/Binnema 2007; Kriesi 2007; Steenbergen/Scott 2004). 
 
 
6.2.5 Empirical findings 
Do Austrian parties pick up the European integration issue when competing for votes in general 
election campaigns? Is there any variation in parties’ emphasis on the issue over time? And, 
finally, who drives the politicization of European integration in Austria? This section presents the 
empirical findings from the analysis of general election campaigns between 1995 and 2008. It is 
structured in two sub-sections: 6.2.5.1 summarizes the quantitative findings derived from TV 
debates; 6.2.5.2 discusses each election campaign separately by including qualitative indicators 
for issue-politicization. 
  
6.2.5.1 Issue-emphasis according to quantitative salience measures 
Looking at the quantitative salience measures derived from the analysis of TV debates between 
rival candidates, one can observe differences between parties and campaigns. Table 6.1 and 
Figure 6.4 summarize EU issue-emphasis for each party in each campaign.  
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Table 6.1: EU issue-emphasis in TV debates (1995-2008) 
Party 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008 95-08 
SPÖ 10.32 9.93 9.25 4.24 10.47 8.84 
ÖVP 4.75 12.98 27.36 8.30 10.48 12.77 
FPÖ 5.51 10.05 15.66 14.07 10.13 11.08 
Greens 10.90 17.07 15.87 6.30 9.73 11.98 
Liberals 0.09 6.87 - - - 3.48 
BZÖ - - - 1.17 6.75 3.96 
Average 6.31 11.38 17.04 6.82 9.51 10.21 
       
 
Figure 6.4: EU issue-emphasis in TV debates (1995-2008) 
 
 
 
Summarizing the time-frame from 1995 until 2008 along parties (see final column Table 6.1), the 
ÖVP devoted most space to EU related questions, closely followed by the FPÖ and the Greens. 
However, this is due to the ÖVP’s extremely high salience value in the 2002 debates, which 
clearly represents an outlier. As revealed in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.4, the ÖVP is not the party 
devoting most attention to European integration issues in the other campaigns: In 1995, the 
Greens reveal the highest salience measures, closely followed by the SPÖ. In 1999, it is again the 
Greens, with the other parties by far behind them. As just mentioned, the ÖVP’s salience 
measures climb upwards in 2002, boosting the party’s average for the whole period. The picture 
changes again in 2006, when the FPÖ by far reflects the highest salience on EU issues. Finally, in 
2008 parties are much closer with only the BZÖ lagging behind. 
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Drawing an interim conclusion from this overview, the ÖVP and the Greens are the parties 
reflecting the highest EU issue-salience over time and also with a view to individual campaigns 
(with both parties being on top in two of the five campaigns). This is certainly not what one 
might expect from salience theory, where it should above all be the radical right and anti-EU FPÖ 
(and later also the BZÖ) that actively politicize Europe. Should we thus abandon salience theory 
as an explanatory framework for the politicization of European integration? Before leaping to that 
conclusion, the next section takes a closer look at each election campaign, first by focusing on the 
composition of party averages derived from TV debates and second by considering the qualitative 
indicators for issue-politicization introduced in the previous section. This will provide us with 
additional information on how active parties are in politicizing European integration, thus helping 
to contextualize and interpret the salience measures presented in Table 6.1 and Figures 6.4-6.9.  
 
6.2.5.2 Adding qualitative indicators: Parties’ issue-emphasis in individual campaigns 
This section discusses each election campaign separately, including a more detailed analysis of 
TV debates and the introduction of the qualitative indicators for party politicization of European 
integration. For TV debates, first, party averages will be disentangled in order to examine 
whether European integration appears in several debates and party constellations or is limited to 
the encounter of particular parties (see Figures 6.5-6.9). Second, we will explore whether parties’ 
actively refer to European integration (or only respond) during TV debates by examining the 
agenda setting dynamic regarding the issue of Europe. Furthermore, we will consider whether 
European integration represents a top-priority issue for a party in the campaign, indicated by, 
first, its mentioning in response to the ‘most-important-issue’ question asked in the final TV 
debate of a campaign (Elefantenrunde) and, second, its representation on parties’ election 
placards. 
 
The 1995 election campaign: This is the first general election campaign after Austria’s EU 
accession. The election took place in December, merely a year after Austria joined the EU on 1 
January 1995. Figure 6.5 presents parties’ emphasis on the European integration issue in TV 
debates. The vertical category axis distinguishes the debates; the horizontal value axis reflects 
parties’ relative emphasis on European integration during a debate, with parties distinguished by 
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the different colors. To give an example, the green bars reflect the emphasis the Greens put on the 
issue of Europe in the individual debates with a different competitor: The Greens devote about 37 
per cent of their speaking time/words in their debate with the SPÖ to questions of European 
integration, seven per cent in their debate with the ÖVP, approximately two in their debate with 
the FPÖ, and less than one per cent in the debate with the Liberals, resulting in an average of 
about 11 per cent for the Greens.
88
  
 
Figure 6.5: Parties EU emphasis in TV debates 1995 
 
 
Looking at the party averages, the Greens and the SPÖ put most emphasis to the issue of Europe. 
These averages, however, are largely boost by the debate between the two, which clearly 
represents an outlier. Considerable, though much less, emphasis on European integration is also 
present in the debate between the ÖVP and the FPÖ, with around 13 per cent for each of them. In 
all other debates, parties’ EU salience values do not exceed the ten per cent threshold—mostly 
even remaining below five per cent. However, while each party puts some emphasis on the issue 
in one or the other debate, this is different for the Liberals, for whom European integration seems 
to be a non-issue in the 1995 TV debates. 
The overall picture partly changes once considering which parties actually bring up the matter of 
Europe during the debates (agenda setting). In 1995 it is the FPÖ and the Greens who put Europe 
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on the agenda in debates with other parties—though they do not do so in all debates they 
participate in. However, this at least puts into perspective the SPÖ’s salience measures compared 
to the Greens’: While the two parties reach almost equal salience values on average, the SPÖ 
primarily reacts, whereas the Greens actively raise the issue. Given the latter’s more critical 
stance towards European integration in 1995 compared to later years (see Chapters 6.1 and 6.3), 
the focus on parties’ agenda setting on TV also leads to the—cautious—conclusion that in 1995 it 
is the Euroskeptic parties—the Greens and the FPÖ—who raise the issue of Europe actively in 
the 1995 campaign. The Greens also refer to European integration on one of their election 
posters, claiming “for an ecological and social alliance in Europe”, “against the Europe of 
technocrats”, and for neutrality instead of NATO accession.89 Finally, and just for completing the 
indicators, the most-important-issue question is not available for this campaign. 
 
The 1999 election campaign: The salience of European integration in TV debates increases in 
1999—and notably so—for all parties except the SPÖ. The Liberals put least emphasis on the EU 
issue (about seven per cent), while all other parties devote at least about a tenth to it, and the 
Greens more than 17 per cent (see Figure 6.6). The Greens’ significantly higher EU emphasis is 
also reflected in the fact that the other parties also put more emphasis on the issue in their debates 
with the Greens. This is clearly the case for the SPÖ and the Liberals, each devoting more than a 
quarter of their speaking time to European questions in their debate with a rival candidate from 
the Greens. Similar to 1995, the ÖVP and the FPÖ emphasize the issue most in the debate with 
one another (each close to a quarter of their speaking time in this debate).  
There is no systematic pattern with a view to parties’ agenda setting regarding the issue of 
Europe on TV: Each party raises the issue in one or the other debate and EU related topics are 
also introduced by the anchorperson in two of the ten debates. This reflects very well the fact that 
the issue of Europe has become more important in a larger number of debates and thus various 
party constellations. Still, the Greens’ notable higher issue emphasis stands out in the 1999 
campaign and though not explicitly naming European integration on election posters, the party 
also refers to EU-related topics in its placard slogans (mentioning transit traffic, genetically 
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 Translation by SM. The original slogan reads as follows: “Unsere Brüsseler Spitze. Für eine ökologische und 
soziale Allianz in Europa. Gegen das Europa der Technokraten. Für die Neutralität. Gegen NATO-Beitritt.” 
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modified organisms, agricultural factories, and neutrality
90
). The ÖVP in turn is the only party 
mentioning European integration in response to the most-important-issue question raised by the 
anchorperson in the very final TV debate.  
 
Figure 6.6: Parties EU emphasis in TV debates 1999 
 
 
 
The 2002 election campaign: In several aspects, this campaign represents a special case. First of 
all, it is the only campaign in our period of examination in which only four parties participated in 
the TV debates.
91
 Second, the 2002 snap election was the first election to follow the FPÖ’s 
controversial government participation (in a coalition with the ÖVP) and was caused by huge 
intra-party conflict about government policy in the FPÖ that finally resulted in the resignation of 
several highly ranked FPÖ-officials. Finally, the campaign took place in October/November 
(election date: 24 November), only a few weeks prior to the finalization of the accession 
negotiations for the EU’s to date largest enlargement round.  
Though the coalition agreement between the ÖVP and the FPÖ included an unmistakable 
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acknowledgement towards European integration and EU enlargement (see Chapter 7), the FPÖ 
repeatedly questioned enlargement while still in government and heavily campaigned for a public 
initiative that claimed for a veto against EU accession of the Czech Republic (because of the 
nuclear power plant Temelín) (Fallend 2008). This context explains the extremely high EU 
salience value for the ÖVP in the debate with its former coalition partner, the FPÖ (see Figure 
6.7). This debate, where the ÖVP spends almost half of its speaking time to EU questions, is also 
the reason for the ÖVP’s overall high salience value in 2002 that—with 27 per cent—clearly 
represents an outlier: Though even when excluding the ÖVP-FPÖ debate, the ÖVP would be the 
party with the highest salience on the EU issue in 2002, it would be much closer to the other 
parties—first and foremost the Greens and the FPÖ (each about 16 per cent). Not reaching the ten 
per cent mark, the SPÖ puts least emphasis on European integration questions. 
Different from 1999, when parties put most emphasis on EU issues in their debate with the 
Greens, they now do so in the debates with the ÖVP: For all three other parties, salience 
measures are highest in their debate with the ÖVP. The ÖVP is also the party most actively 
mentioning the issue in debates: In all debates the party participated in, it is always the ÖVP 
raising the issue, while the other parties do so only sporadically (Greens, FPÖ) or not at all 
(SPÖ). In 2002, therefore, the ÖVP seems to be the driving force in politicizing European 
integration during TV confrontations. Still, the issue of Europe is also present in other debates 
and emphasized by other parties. The FPÖ even refers to it on one of its election posters, saying 
those who are critical to the EU should vote for the FPÖ.
92
 As in 1995, the most-important-issue 
question is not available for this campaign. 
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 The slogan reads as follows: “Wer EU-kritisch ist, wählt blau”. 
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Figure 6.7: Parties EU emphasis in TV debates 2002 
 
 
 
The 2006 election campaign: This is the first general election campaign in which the BZÖ 
participated in, resulting again in a five-party competition at the ballot box and on TV. After the 
split-off from the FPÖ in 2005, the BZÖ maintained the coalition government with the ÖVP until 
the 2006 regular election and announced its readiness to govern for the period afterwards. 
Compared to the previous campaigns, the 2006 TV salience measures reflect a particularly 
interesting empirical pattern. Looking at the overall decline of EU emphasis to 6.82 per cent 
(recall Table 6.1) and the fact that no party except for the anti-EU FPÖ actively emphasizes the 
issue, the campaign is a perfect representation of the sleeping giant diagnosis (van der 
Eijk/Franklin 2004): While the mainstream (SPÖ, ÖVP), pro-EU (SPÖ, ÖVP, Greens), and 
governing parties (ÖVP, BZÖ) downplay the issue of Europe, the radical right, oppositional FPÖ 
actively tries to mobilize anti-EU sentiments. The other parties’ depoliticization strategy becomes 
evident when looking at individual debates (see Figure 6.8): In 2006 EU issues are predominantly 
present in debates including the FPÖ, while hardly ever mentioned in debates between candidates 
from other parties. Excluding each party’s debate with the FPÖ, the average proportion of EU 
issues relative to a party’s total word score in each party’s remaining three two-party debates is 
close to zero (1.04 for both the SPÖ and the Greens, 0.33 for the ÖVP, and zero for the BZÖ). 
This is a big difference to the previous campaigns, where issue-emphasis is much more spread 
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among different parties, even if one party outperforms the others with a higher salience level (as 
the Greens do in 1999 and the ÖVP in 2002). Hence, despite the FPÖ’s attempts to politicize 
Europe, the issue remains highly insignificant for the other parties, which make no efforts in 
competing over this particular issue—a matter that also finds its expression in the content of the 
debate, as will be shown in Chapter 6.3. The FPÖ not only actively and repeatedly challenges the 
other parties on the issue of Europe during TV debates; it also mentions European integration in 
response to the most-important-issue question in the final TV debate with leading representatives 
from all parties and refers to it on election placards (referring to Brussels as antipode to homeland 
and claiming against EU accession of Turkey
93
). 
The other parties’ non-emphasis on the issue of Europe, which accounts for the overall decrease 
in the 2006 TV salience measure, is particularly interesting against the background that Austria 
hold the Chair of the rotating EU Presidency in the very same year and until only a few weeks 
before the election campaign started. While this could have been expected to increase the salience 
of EU issues, in fact the opposite happened and the FPÖ remained the only party politicizing the 
issue.  
 
Figure 6.8: Parties EU emphasis in TV debates 2006 
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Schüssel & SPÖ-Gusenbauer: […] Türkei zur EU. FPÖ-HC Strache: […] EU-Beitritt verhindern. Sie haben die 
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The 2008 election campaign: The 2008 snap election was due to the collapse of the government 
coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP. The collapse was not least caused by a repositioning of 
the SPÖ on the controversial question of national referenda on EU treaties: In a letter to the editor 
of Austria’s biggest and anti-EU tabloid, the Krone, SPÖ-Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer and 
newly elected party leader Werner Faymann had announced the SPÖ’s support for national 
referenda on future EU treaties, which clearly reflected a repositioning on that question. Against 
this background, it does not come as a surprise that the issue of Europe ranks more prominently 
in TV debates compared to the previous campaign: Parties again seem to put notable and—except 
for the BZÖ—equal weight to EU questions. Consistently, we find an increase in the total EU 
salience average (TV) in 2008 compared to 2006, though still below the levels of 1999 and 2002 
(recall Table 6.1). Looking at individual debates (see Figure 6.9), we find that emphasis on EU 
issues is more equally distributed among different parties and debates. Hence the 2008 campaign 
reveals similar patterns to the 1999 and (to a lesser extent) the 2002 campaign, whilst the issue 
was much more concentrated on the FPÖ in 2006. However, considering parties agenda setting 
efforts, the pattern is similar to 2006 (and different from the other campaigns): Again the FPÖ is 
most active and perseverant in discussing European integration issues, while the other parties 
only occasionally do so and mostly without insisting on a substantive debate. What is different, 
however, is that the anchorperson puts much more emphasis on the issue of Europe. While this 
was the exception before
94
, the issue is introduced by the anchorperson in five of the ten two-
party debates in 2008. The increase in the importance of the EU issue on the media agenda can be 
explained by the repositioning of the SPÖ on the question of national referenda on EU treaties, 
which was decisive for the snap elections.
95
 The anchorperson’s stronger emphasis on EU 
questions then also affects all parties’ salience measures or, to be precise, boosts them, since 
parties are expected to respond to questions raised by the anchorperson. The SPÖ itself indeed 
illustrates the reasons for its positional shift when asked on TV, but is not proactive in 
mentioning European integration. However, other parties and the anchorperson confront the SPÖ 
with this shift, resulting in more issue emphasis on European integration for all parties and issue-
emphasis spread across more debates. In conclusion, the FPÖ is again most active in politicizing 
Europe, refers to integration when asked about the most important issues, and includes the issue 
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 It happened twice in 1999 and in one debate in 2006. 
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 Since the 2006 and the 2008 TV debates were moderated by the very same person, we can rule out that the 
stronger emphasis on the part of the media is due to a different anchorperson. 
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in its placard campaign (stating to be “representatives of the people instead of EU-traitors”96). 
However, different from 2006, European integration also plays more prominently on TV in 
debates excluding the FPÖ. 
 
Figure 6.9: Parties EU emphasis in TV debates 2008 
 
 
 
 
The detailed analysis of campaigns with a focus on individual TV debates and complementary 
qualitative indicators is clearly worth the effort, since it puts into perspective some of the results 
coming from the quantitative salience measures. Table 6.2 visualizes how active parties are in 
their EU politicization during election campaigns based on the qualitative indicators, namely EU 
agenda setting in two-party TV debates, mentions of European integration in response to the 
most-important-issue question in the final TV debate, and reference to European integration on 
election posters.  
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Table 6.2: Active EU politicization during election campaigns (1995-2008) 
Party 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008 
SPÖ  +    
ÖVP  ++ ++ +  
FPÖ + + ++ +++ +++ 
Greens ++ ++ +   
Liberals   / / / 
BZÖ / /    
Note: Summary of qualitative indicators for active EU politicization; 
more + indicate more active, systematic politicization efforts. 
 
The analysis of the 1995 campaign on the one hand substantiates that the Greens put most 
emphasis on the issue of Europe; however, they clearly put into perspective the high salience 
measures for the SPÖ, while indicating more active politicization on the part of the FPÖ. For 
1999, the findings clearly show that parties politicize European integration more actively; though 
the Greens and ÖVP stand out with more active politicization, the issue is more emphasized by 
all parties. The 2002 analysis shows that it is first and foremost the ÖVP putting the issue on the 
agenda on TV. However, controlling for the outlier debate between the ÖVP and the FPÖ, the 
ÖVP is much closer to the FPÖ and the Greens. This is consistent with the fact that the Greens 
also actively raise the issue repeatedly, and the FPÖ even includes it in its placard campaign. The 
2006 and 2008 campaigns are probably the best evidence in support for a more comprehensive 
analysis of EU party politicization as conducted in this chapter: The findings for 2006 clearly 
demonstrate that Europe is only politicized by the FPÖ—and extensively so.97 Though the FPÖ 
also scores highest on the TV salience measures, the detailed analysis shows that other parties’ 
low, but existing emphasis according to the party averages is exclusively due to the FPÖ’s EU 
agenda setting. This is further strengthened by the other indicators, showing that European 
integration represents a top-priority issue for the FPÖ in 2006. In 2008, finally, TV salience 
measures suggest an increase for all parties except the FPÖ. However, the in-depth analysis 
shows that this is largely due to more emphasis on European integration by the anchorperson in 
TV debates, and that the FPÖ is again most active in politicizing the issue of Europe (both on TV 
and in its poster campaign). In a nutshell, the findings for individual campaigns demonstrated that 
a detailed analysis is indispensable for coming to any definite conclusions about party 
politicization of European integration. 
                                                 
97
 The ÖVP only actively mentions Europe in response to the most-important-issue question during the final TV 
debate. 
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6.2.6 Discussing empirical findings against hypotheses 
To what extent does the variation in the degree of politicization over European integration 
support our expectations derived from the literature? This section discusses the findings against 
the hypotheses presented in 6.2.2, at first focusing on individual parties and thereafter comparing 
the different campaigns. 
 
6.2.6.1 Party level 
This chapter started from the premise that a party’s attempt to politicize the issue of Europe will 
be dependent on strategic considerations for vote-maximizing (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; 
Netjes/Binnema 2007; Steenbergen/Scott 2004). These considerations are influenced by the 
specific opportunity structure each party is faced with regarding the issue of Europe. Whether the 
politicization of European integration constitutes an opportunity or is likely to bring about 
damage will be dependent on whether a party concurs with its voters’ EU position, is united on 
the issue, is located in the center or at the margins of the policy space, and whether it is a 
governing or opposition party. In the following, the findings will be discussed for each party 
separately. 
 
SPÖ (social democrats): The SPÖ is one of Austria’s traditional mainstream governing parties. 
Since the party in the 1980s finally opted to strive for Austria’s EU membership (Schaller 
1994a), it has supported all major steps of European integration and continuously claims for more 
integration and the establishing of a real political and social union (see Chapter 6.1). According 
to expert judgments, the party is largely united in its supportive position towards European 
integration (see Table 5.4). Despite certain critique after the party leadership in 2008 announced 
to support national referenda on EU treaties, intra-party dissent held off—at least in public—and 
the new position on the question of referenda did not lead to a fundamental repositioning towards 
European integration. In its support for integration, however, the SPÖ differs from a majority of 
its voters, who thinks that integration has already gone too far (see Figures A7-A9, see 
Appendix). Considering all these factors, the SPÖ can be expected to be reluctant to actively 
politicizing European integration, since the party cannot expect to reap electoral advantage from 
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doing so. This expectation is supported by the findings for TV debates and the qualitative 
indicators presented above: Overall, and except for the two youngest parties (the Liberals and the 
BZÖ), the SPÖ reflects the lowest salience values and is not active in politicizing the issue of 
Europe. Decomposing the TV party averages of individual campaigns further substantiates this 
result: In the two campaigns where the SPÖ exceeds the ten per cent mark (1995 and 2008), the 
salience is increased by the party responding to other parties rather than the SPÖ’s active 
politicization. This even holds true for 2008, when one could have expected more emphasis on 
European integration by the SPÖ given its repositioning on the referenda question shortly before 
the election campaign. The other qualitative indicators do not point to any active attempts to 
politicize the EU issue either: Neither does the SPÖ make any reference to it on its election 
placards nor in response to the most-important-issue question available for the 1999, the 2006, 
and the 2008 campaign. That the SPÖ had been in opposition between 2000 and 2007—for the 
first time since the 1970s—neither affected its attempts to politicize the EU issue. 
 
ÖVP (Christian democrats): The ÖVP to some extent behaves contradictory to expectations 
derived from salience theory. It is Austria’s second traditional mainstream governing party and 
had been the driving force for Austria’s way towards the EU (Schaller 1994a). The party 
constantly presents itself as the Austrian ‘Europapartei’ and publicly argues in support for 
European integration throughout the period of examination. It does so despite the fact that its 
voters are not as supportive towards integration anymore as the party is. In fact, according to 
European Election Study data (available from 1999 onwards), ÖVP voters do not differ 
fundamentally from SPÖ voters in their rejection of further integration (see Figures X-X).
98
 Still, 
the ÖVP reflects the highest average salience level compared to all other parties. Though the TV 
salience value is largely affected by the outlier of the 2002 campaign (when the ÖVP spent 
almost half of its speaking time in the debate with its former coalition partner FPÖ to European 
integration questions), the qualitative indicators also point to some activeness in politicizing the 
issue: The party is proactive on the issue in the 1999 and the 2002 TV debates and also mentions 
European integration in response to the most-important-issue question in two of the three 
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 It should be noted, though, that using the EES data I operationalized “party voters” as those stating to have voted 
for the party in the last election. The picture will most likely be different once applying a more narrow definition of 
party supporters. However, given that parties, and large mainstream parties in particular, not only seek for the votes 
of their traditionally loyal supporters, but address a broader electorate, it is reasonable to apply a less narrow 
definition. 
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campaigns for which this measure is available (in 1999 and in 2006). Thus despite salience 
theory suggesting a depoliticization strategy towards the EU issue by the ÖVP because of an 
absent electoral incentive, this is not supported by the empirical findings of this study. For those 
observing Austrian party politics, however, this will not come as a complete surprise and is 
related to the ÖVP’s history and self-portrayal as Austria’s ‘Europapartei’ (cf. Schaller 1994a). 
This could be seen as indications for issue ownership (at least self-perceived) on the EU issue, 
thus making the politicization of the issue more likely also from the perspective of salience 
theory. 
 
FPÖ (radical right party): The FPÖ is not only Europe’s most successful radical right party, but 
also one of its most successful anti-EU parties. Though certainly not a fringe or niche party 
anymore regarding its size, it is clearly located at the fringes of the policy space and has further 
radicalized in the last years (recall Table 5.5). The party opposed Austria’s EU accession and is 
very hostile towards the EU and integration, which is understood by the party as a threat to 
Austria’s sovereignty and identity (see Chapter 6.1). The party shares its hostility towards 
European integration with its voters, who by large majority evaluate the integration process as 
having already gone too far (see Figures A7-A9, see Appendix). Except for the period of its 
government participation (2000-2002 and 2002-2005), the party is to be seen as strongly united in 
its rejection of EU integration. The FPÖ thus represents a party par excellence for awakening the 
“sleeping giant” (Van der Eijk/Franklin 2004) by politicizing the issue of Europe in order to 
mobilize Euroskeptic voters. This expectation is supported by the empirical findings presented 
earlier. The party is most active in putting the issue on the agenda during TV debates throughout 
the whole period of examination—and in particular so since 2006. Moreover, once taking into 
account the other qualitative indicators for issue-politicization, the FPÖ represents the party most 
systematically mobilizing on European issues over time: It is the only party that, from 2002 
onwards, included EU related slogans into their nationwide placard campaigns in general election 
campaigns; and it mentioned the EU in response to the anchorperson’s most-important-issue 
question in the final TV debates in 2006 and 2008. 
The 2002 and the 2006 campaign are particularly interesting for the case of the FPÖ because of 
the party’s participation in government previously. While being in government, the FPÖ had to 
share responsibility for EU related decisions but at the same time tried to stick to its anti-EU 
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rhetoric in order not to disappoint Euroskeptic voters, often resulting in some confusion about the 
official party position and leading to conflict with the FPÖ’s coalition partner, the ÖVP. In 2002, 
one source for conflict was EU enlargement, in particular veto threats on the part of the FPÖ (cf. 
Fallend 2008). This also turned out on the agenda in the TV debate between the FPÖ and the 
ÖVP during the 2002 election campaign and explains the comparatively high salience of the EU 
issue in this debate. 
Though the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was rebuilt after the 2002 election, the situation was quite 
different for the FPÖ in the 2006 campaign. Whereas intra-party conflict over government policy 
within the FPÖ resulted in the collapse of the government in 2002 (after FPÖ-members of 
government had resigned), the FPÖ-governing team opted for a different strategy in 2005 and 
founded a new party in order to maintain the coalition: Under the lead of former FPÖ-party 
leader Jörg Haider, the BZÖ was founded in April 2005. Since almost all MPs and the whole 
governing team went with the BZÖ, the FPÖ was left without office and only two MPs in 
parliament. Though the split-off certainly marginalized the FPÖ and complicated its recovering in 
the first place, it also facilitated the party’s return to its radical right and populist roots and 
allowed the FPÖ to shift responsibility for unpopular government policy to the BZÖ. This turned 
out to be a particularly rewarding strategy with a view to the European integration issue: 
Opposition to the EU and integration became a unique feature distinguishing the FPÖ from all 
other parties in the 2006 campaign: While the SPÖ, the ÖVP, and the Greens held a supportive 
position towards integration anyway, the BZÖ did not seem to have a clear stance and, 
furthermore, had to take responsibility for EU related decisions as a governing party.
99
 
Furthermore, the confusing situation after the foundation of the BZÖ in April 2005—when party 
membership of individual MPs formerly associated with the FPÖ was largely unclear—
eventually turned out to be a window of opportunity for the FPÖ: A few weeks after the BZÖ had 
been founded, the parliament voted for the ratification of the EU Constitutional treaty. 
Ratification was supported by all MPs except one, Barbara Rosenkranz (one of the view MPs that 
had stayed with the FPÖ, see Chapter 7). This became an important point of reference in the 
FPÖ’s anti-EU campaigning that started in early 2006. Simultaneously to the beginning of 
Austria’s chairmanship of the rotating EU Presidency, the FPÖ launched a public initiative called 
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 Moreover, new FPÖ-party leader Heinz-Christian Strache had already criticized Jörg Haider’s EU position when 
both were still members of the FPÖ, which certainly strengthened the FPÖ’s credibility of the EU issue vis-à-vis the 
BZÖ. 
150 
 
“Austria stay free!” (Österreich bleib frei!). The initiative expressed rejection of the EU 
Constitutional treaty and Turkey’s EU membership and claimed for a referendum in Austria on 
both questions. The FPÖ continued its anti-EU mobilization during the 2006 election campaign, 
when the FPÖ positioned itself as the only true Euroskeptic party in Austria protecting the 
country from the ‘Brussels’ dictate’. To sum up, the FPÖ behaves pretty much as expected 
according to salience theory: It actively politicizes European integration and has stepped up 
efforts since back in opposition in 2005/2006. 
 
The Greens: The Greens are the Austrian party that has undergone the most fundamental change 
in its positioning towards European integration in the period examined in this study. While 
rejecting EU membership prior to the Austrian accession referendum, the party has become 
clearly supportive to European integration despite sharp critique of the current state. Similar 
shifts can be observed for the Green electorate: Having opposed EU accession by majority (cf. 
Plasser/Ulram 1994), Green voters have meanwhile become the most EU supportive voters 
(recall Figures A6-A9). Against this background, we would expect the Greens to politicize 
Europe more actively when still being more skeptical and less so once the party is in line with the 
center-left and -right mainstream parties in its EU support. Looking at the TV salience values, we 
indeed find that the Greens actively politicize European integration much more compared to the 
other parties in the 1990s—and that this politicization was expressed as EU critique (see Chapter 
6.3)—, while issue-emphasis notably decreased afterwards. This holds true despite the increase in 
2008, because much of the controversy in the debate with the SPÖ was more about the strategy 
the SPÖ had chosen to announce its new position—i.e. whether it was right or wrong to do so in 
a letter to the editor of Austria’s most Euroskeptic tabloid—rather than European integration as 
such. The findings for the Greens thus seem to support the assumption present in the literature 
“that there are more votes to be won in opposition to European integration than in support” 
(Tillmann 2004: 605)—or at least that parties share this assessment.  
 
The Liberals: The Liberals were only represented in the Nationalrat between 1993 and 1999. 
Dissent about the EU positioning of the FPÖ was part of the reason for the foundation of the 
Liberals by former FPÖ members (cf. Heschl 2002; Liegl 2006): Unlike the FPÖ, the Liberals 
supported Austria’s EU accession and the further deepening of European integration. At the time 
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of accession, the liberal party was the only opposition party supportive to EU membership. This 
might explain why the party did not politicize the issue of Europe in the 1995 campaign, whereas 
the other opposition parties (the FPÖ and the Greens) did, since the Liberals on that particular 
question were in line with the governing parties. While largely neglecting the issue in the 1995 
campaign, the Liberals put more emphasis on the issue in the 1999 campaign, in particular in 
their debate with the Greens. This is reasonable insofar as the two parties largely competed for 
the same group of voters and the Liberals could distinguish themselves from the Greens by 
referring to their continuous support for integration, while accusing the Greens of having been 
more reluctant on this question in the past. Altogether, the findings support expectations derived 
from salience theory, namely that there is neither much to be won nor much to lose from 
politicizing European integration on the part of the Liberals. This is reflected in the fact that 
Europe was no top-priority issue for the party in either of the campaigns and that the Liberals 
behaved differently in the two campaigns. 
 
BZÖ (radical right party): The BZÖ shares its rejection of European integration with its former 
party fellows from the FPÖ. However, it lacks the FPÖ’s credibility on that question, particular in 
the 2006 election campaign: The BZÖ was in power between 2005 and 2006, which was the time 
when the EU Constitutional treaty was ratified in the Nationalrat—with the support of the BZÖ. 
Hence it is not very surprising that the BZÖ refrained from actively politicizing Europe in the 
2006 campaign. Back in opposition, however, the BZÖ increased its Euroskeptic politicization, 
reflected in an increase of issue-emphasis on Europe in the 2008 campaign. These findings very 
well fit with hypotheses from salience theory: As an anti-EU party with a Euroskeptic voter base, 
the BZÖ can be expected to actively politicize European integration—if not in government, 
however. 
 
 
6.2.6.2 Party system level: 
For identifying the degree of EU politicization in each campaign, the previous analysis provides 
us with two indicators: Firstly, the average emphasis on Europe in all TV debates of a particular 
campaign and, second, the emphasis put on the issue of Europe by the media (in the case of this 
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study: the anchorperson of TV debates), which can be seen as an indication for the issue being 
more salient and politicized. For explaining variation in the degree of EU politicization at the 
party system level, we have hypothesized (1) that the politicization of the issue will be higher the 
closer a campaign is to Austria’s EU accession, (2) that party repositioning on the issue of Europe 
will increase the overall salience of the issue, and (3) that the government participation of 
Euroskeptic parties will decrease the politicization of European integration in case there is no 
other Euroskeptic competitor, and increase it in case there is. Whether this is supported by the 
findings presented in this chapter will be discussed in the following for each of these hypotheses. 
 
Date of EU accession: Different from our assumption, the degree of politicization is not higher 
for the first election campaign to follow EU accession according to the above-mentioned 
indicators—quite the contrary: TV salience measures even suggest that the issue is least 
politicized in the 1995 campaign. This is also supported when looking at EU agenda setting on 
the part of the anchorperson in TV debates, which is completely absent for the 1995 campaign, 
whereas occurring occasionally in other campaigns, and most extensively so in the most recent 
campaign in 2008. These temporal trends hence do not support the assumption that due to more 
active monitoring of the EU issue on the part of the public the degree of politicization is higher 
the closer to EU accession a campaign is (cf. Tillmann 2004). This could be related to the fact 
that EU accession was supported by a large majority of Austrians in the accession referendum, 
which could have made the issue less attractive for party politicization on the part of the 
oppositional EU critics. Another explanation might be that the 1995 election was held early after 
the coalition government between the SPÖ and the ÖVP had collapsed only a year after the 
previous election in 1994. The collapse was due to large conflict between the two parties about 
the budget for 1996 (cf. Müller 1996). Issues related to the consolidation of the budget as well as 
speculation about the ÖVP’s intention to build a government involving the FPÖ then dominated 
much of the campaign—leaving less room for other issues (ibid.). 
 
Party repositioning on Europe: For assessing whether party repositioning increases the overall 
politicization of Europe in a campaign, we need to identify party repositioning in the first place. 
Despite emphasis on different topics and different facets of integration for several parties over the 
course of time, only two parties clearly changed their views: the Greens and the SPÖ. However, 
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these two cases are quite different given the scope of change. Whereas party repositioning in the 
case of the Greens was more fundamental, as it concerned the general EU position, and emerged 
gradually over the course of time (see Chapters 6.1 and 7), the policy shift on the part of the SPÖ 
in 2008 regarding the question of national referenda on EU treaties was more narrow (thus not 
affecting the party’s general EU support) and more abrupt. It then also caused more reactions by 
other parties (and the media) compared to the gradual repositioning on the part of the Greens: 
The qualitative text analysis clearly shows that the other parties as well as the anchorperson in 
TV debates relate their issue-emphasis on European integration to the SPÖ’s alleged positional 
movement, resulting in higher salience levels for all parties (except for the FPÖ) compared to the 
previous campaign in 2006. However, much of the controversy that increased EU issue salience 
was not about the SPÖ’s repositioning per se, but caused by the strategy the SPÖ had chosen for 
its announcement in support of referenda, namely to publish a letter to the editor in Austria’s 
biggest and anti-EU tabloid (see Chapter 6.3). Altogether, we can cautiously conclude that abrupt 
repositioning, as in the SPÖ’s case, indeed increases the politicization of European integration. 
 
Government participation of Euroskeptic party: As discussed previously, the assumption that 
Euroskeptic government participation decreases the salience of the issue is based on the idea that 
a government coalition with a Euroskeptic party constrains this party’s room of maneuver on the 
issue of Europe. For the Austrian case, this would mean that the salience of the issue decreases in 
the 2002 campaign following the first ÖVP-FPÖ government. However, quite the contrary is 
actually the case, since this campaign reflects the highest salience level of all campaigns, which is 
to a large extent due to the highly controversial debate between the former coalition partners 
ÖVP and FPÖ. This is also to be seen in relation to the FPÖ’s mobilization against EU 
enlargement while the party was still in power. The party’s support for certain steps towards 
further integration, including EU enlargement, on the part of the FPÖ’s governing team hence did 
not seem to constrain the party in politicizing the issue of Europe during the election campaign. 
This interpretation is substantiated by an FPÖ slogan distributed via election posters during the 
2002 campaign, which states that those critical to the EU should vote for the FPÖ. The 2006 case 
is much more complicated: After the split-off from the FPÖ in 2005, the former FPÖ-members of 
government—now members of the newly founded BZÖ—maintained the coalition with the ÖVP, 
leaving the FPÖ without office and only a few MPs in the Nationalrat. Though both the FPÖ and 
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the BZÖ are to be classified as extremely Euroskeptic parties, the fact that the FPÖ was back in 
opposition more than a year before the election campaign started makes the 2006 campaign a 
somewhat curious case compared to the other campaign: With one Euroskeptical party in power 
(the BZÖ) and one back in opposition (FPÖ), one might expect the issue of Europe to be much 
more politicized in the 2006 campaign. As described above, however, all parties except for the 
FPÖ actually tried to depoliticize the issue. Overall it therefore seems that government 
participation of Euroskeptic parties does not serve as a good explanation for issue-salience—and 
certainly not in the direction assumed above, as the 2002 campaign demonstrates, when it was 
actually conflict between the former coalition partners, the ÖVP and FPÖ, as well as between the 
Greens and the ÖVP/FPÖ about a renewal of the coalition despite the FPÖ’s EU position that 
increases the politicization of European integration in the campaign. 
 
An alternative explanation for temporal trends in the overall degree of politicization would be 
that the politicization of Europe is somehow related to the course of integration. As described in 
more detail in Chapter 3, scholars argue that politicization is likely to increase the more the EU 
becomes a political union (see also the distinction between a pre- and a post-Maastricht era) and 
the more it is provided with competence in policy areas more directly and noticeably affecting 
citizens, since political actors have to consider public concerns about the pathway of integration 
and EU policies (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009). Though we cannot observe a continuous increase in 
the politicization of European integration over time according to TV salience measures, certain 
events related to the furthering of European integration indeed seem to stimulate politicization 
(e.g. EU enlargement, the deepening of the CFSP, the EU Constitutional treaty), indicated by the 
findings of the qualitative text analysis of TV debates presented in the next chapter. However, the 
politicization of European integration seems to be related above all to dynamics of party 
competition—even if they do not always manifest in a straightforward way. Such dynamics 
include competitive interaction between EU supporters and opponents, competition within the 
two camps, party repositioning, and questions about the formation of coalition governments—
each boosting the politicization of European integration in one or the other way during the 
different campaigns analyzed previously.  
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6.2.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to examine Austrian parties’ emphasis on European integration in 
general election campaign, i.e. the party politicization of European integration. In particular, it 
addressed the following questions: Which parties drive the politicization of European integration 
in Austria and how can we explain variation in the emphasis of Europe between parties as well as 
election campaigns? The chapter started from the premise that party politicization of European 
integration will be dependent on parties’ strategic considerations for vote-seeking (cf. 
Hooghe/Marks 2009; Netjes/Binnema 2007; Steenbergen/Scott 2004). This is based on an 
understanding of party competition as a contest about the different issues parties focus on rather 
than competition about divergent positions on the same issues (cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann 
et al. 2006; see also Steenbergen/Scott 2004; Ray 2007). Hence parties compete by emphasizing 
issues they consider to be beneficial in electoral terms while downplaying others—this is the core 
idea of salience theory.  
Puzzled by the findings for Austrian parties derived from available comparative data sets—which 
not only reflect contradictory patterns, but also are at odds with expectations from salience 
theory—, this chapter provided an in-depth analysis of EU party politicization in Austrian 
election campaigns. The analysis is based on a combination of quantitative salience measures and 
qualitative indicators for parties’ issue-politicization. The empirical analysis was carried out in 
several steps. First, quantitative salience measures were derived from the analysis of TV debates, 
providing an overview for trends in party politicization of Europe in Austrian general election 
campaigns. Second, each election campaign was analyzed separately, focusing on the dynamics 
in TV debates and considering the qualitative indicators. Finally, the empirical findings were 
assessed against the hypotheses derived for both individual parties and the party system level. 
The empirical conclusions presented in this chapter are thus based on a thorough examination. 
Starting with individual parties and then turning to the party system level, the findings can briefly 
be summarized as follows: From the four parties competing all elections from 1995 to 2008, the 
SPÖ puts least emphasis on the issue of Europe. This even holds true for the last campaign in 
2008, which was due to the ÖVP’s claim for reelections after the SPÖ had repositioned itself on 
the question of EU referenda. This is in line with the hypothesis derived from salience theory, 
suggesting no incentives for the SPÖ to actively politicize Europe. The anti-EU FPÖ politicized 
Europe most actively, and extensively so since back in opposition in 2005, which is also in line 
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with salience theory. The Greens actively politicized the issue in the 1990s, but less so 
afterwards, which also supports our expectations about a decrease in politicization the more 
supportive to European integration the party becomes. For the Liberals and the BZÖ, who only 
competed two of the five elections, long-term trends cannot be explored. Both parties put no 
emphasis on Europe in the first of the two campaigns they competed and engaged in the 
politicization of Europe more actively in the second campaign. Finally, the results for the ÖVP to 
some extent contradict our expectations from salience theory. Though a clear electoral advantage 
cannot be assessed for the ÖVP politicizing Europe, the party actively emphasizes the issue 
during election campaigns. However, given the ÖVP’s history as the driving force for Austria’s 
path towards the EU (cf. Schaller 1994a) and the party’s self-portrayal as Austria’s only 
‘Europapartei’, this finding does not come as a complete surprise and could also be seen as an 
indication of perceived issue-ownership on the part of the ÖVP: For the period of investigation, 
the ÖVP views European integration a key issue for its party profile, which is also expressed in 
the party’s attempts to politicize the issue—and to do so in a positive vein. Finally, comparing the 
overall degree of EU politicization in different election campaigns, the results suggest that certain 
events (such as EU enlargement) can indeed boost the politicization of Europe. Above all, 
however, the politicization at the party system level seems to be driven by party competition 
dynamics.  
A core argument put forward in this chapter is that the empirical analysis of party politicization 
requires a carefully considered research strategy with a view to data selection. The findings 
presented in this chapter substantiate this claim: Combining different data and introducing 
qualitative indicators for issue-politicization, the findings presented in this chapter are much more 
convincing compared to other available measures and support expectations from salience theory. 
This confirms the need for more detailed examination of issue-emphasis/salience as a constitutive 
element of issue-politicization taking into account the extent to which parties actively mobilize on 
the issue of Europe when competing for votes.
100
 This could be especially worthwhile for 
relatively new and crosscutting issues such as European integration that only recently found their 
way into mass politics. 
In conclusion, this chapter adds significantly to the study of issue-politicization, and EU party 
politicization, in particular. This contribution concerns both research strategy and empirical 
                                                 
100 For a similar claim see Netjes and Binnema (2007: 48) and Kriesi (2007: 92). 
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findings. Regarding the former, the chapter demonstrated the added value of complementing 
quantitative salience measures with qualitative indicators. Most importantly, however, the 
findings for the ÖVP show that despite a disadvantageous opportunity structure, a pro-European 
mainstream party may actively politicize the issue of Europe if it considers it a key issue for its 
party profile. In the case of the ÖVP, this is strongly related to the historical positioning of the 
party during Austria’s long way towards EU membership. 
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6.3 The content of the debate about Europe in Austrian general election campaigns 
6.3.1 Introduction 
When party contestation over the European integration issue finally appeared on the research 
agenda of EU and party scholars, the main interest was to explore whether and how parties’ 
positioning towards Europe relates to the dimensions of conflict structuring party systems at the 
domestic level, first and foremost the left-right dimension. The most important lesson to be 
drawn from research in this field is that party positioning and conflict over Europe are not 
random, but related to the left-right dimension in a non-linear fashion that takes the shape of an 
inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al. 2002): Mainstream parties, i.e. parties located in the center of the 
left-right dimension tend to support European integration, whereas parties at the margins, i.e. 
holding a more extreme position on either the left or the right side of the dimension, tend to 
oppose European integration. 
A serious drawback of this research, however, is that it largely failed to explore whether party 
conflict over Europe is actually expressed publicly in parties’ competitive interaction at the 
domestic level, i.e. the extent to which the issue of Europe becomes politicized. Only recently 
scholars started to focus more explicitly on this question, seeking, first, to understand when to 
expect the issue to emerge on the agenda for domestic competition, and, second, to learn about 
the substantive manifestation of conflict in the politicization of Europe (i.e. the content of the 
debate). The first of these two aspects has been explored in Chapter 6.2 of this dissertation; this 
chapter deals with the second aspect. The aim of this chapter thus is to explore the content and 
structure of the debate about Europe in Austrian general election campaigns.  
Based on the analysis of TV debates, the empirical analysis focuses on (a) the thematic priorities 
in the debate about Europe, (b) the party constellations (i.e. between whom conflict over Europe 
emerges), and (c) whether EU supporters or opponents are under pressure to justify their position 
towards European integration. Hence different from Chapter 6.1, the focus here is not on 
individual parties, but on the overall dynamics in the debate about Europe in different election 
campaigns, which will allow for identifying changes in the politicization of European integration 
in Austrian party contestation. The chapter will demonstrate that over the course of time (a) 
concerns about sovereignty/identity strongly gain in importance, (b) conflict shifts from within 
the left and the right block, respectively, towards conflict between EU supporters and opponents, 
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and (c) a reversal occurs regarding parties’ pressure to justify their overall EU position, with 
pressure shifting from Euroskeptic parties towards EU supporters.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Based on the literature on party conflict and the politicization of 
Europe, the next section will summarize different sources for conflict intrinsic to the European 
integration issue, presenting two dimensions on which conflict about Europe might occur. Based 
on this theoretical approach, the section then derives expectations for Austria regarding the 
content of the debate about Europe. This is followed by a section on data and methods, before 
turning to the empirical analysis. The findings will be presented for each election campaign 
separately, followed by a summary for patterns over time. The conclusion, finally, contrasts the 
empirical results to the assumptions derived from the literature and points to the chapter’s 
contribution for developing further the study of the politicization of European integration. 
 
 
6.3.2 Theorizing patterns of conflict in the politicization of European integration 
European integration is a complex, multi-faceted political phenomenon referring both to a 
process and a status. The process-like aspect concerns the establishing of an ever closer union, as 
stated in the preamble of the EU treaty. As such, European integration is related to the 
development and transformation of the EU polity, its institutions and competences as well as its 
scope regarding members. As a process, hence, European integration contains both a backwards 
and a prospective component, as it has no finality and is constantly developing. At the same time, 
European integration represents a status—though a currently transforming one: Through the 
process of integration, a system of governance meanwhile developed at the EU level, featured 
with competences in a growing number of policy fields formerly regulated independently by 
member states at the domestic level. This supranational political system—together with its 
member states—produces policy output affecting European citizens to a growing extent and in an 
increasing number of policy areas. 
 
The different facets of European integration constitute sources for political disagreement, with 
conflict arising not only about different policy alternatives, but also about any further transfer of 
competences and sovereignty, and about the very nature of the EU polity, its constitution and 
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functional and geographical boundaries. Accordingly, conflict over European integration 
manifests itself on two different dimensions that can be traced back to historical cleavages as 
introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Labeled slightly different in the literature, the first 
dimension reflects conflict about integration vis-à-vis sovereignty, i.e. about the shape and reach 
of the more and more institutionalized EU polity. It expresses disagreement about the creation 
and furthering of a European system of governance and potential policy constraints at the 
national level due to the penetration of EU norms, rules and practices into domestic policy-
making at the member state level. Thus, the central question here is about political integration 
and the EU as a polity, with all its implications for policy-making at the member state level. Hix 
and Lord (1997) refer to it as the integration-sovereignty dimension, Hooghe and Marks (1999) 
similarly speak of a national sovereignty dimension ranging from nationalism to 
supranationalsim, and Mair (2005) calls it the Europeanization dimension. Whatever the exact 
labeling, this dimension can be linked to the territorial cleavage developed by Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967), where conflict reflects concerns about self-ruling and group membership along the lines 
of territory, nationality, and collective identity (cf. Mair 2005; Bartolini 2005; Hooghe/Marks 
2009). The second dimension concerns policy areas already in the competence of the EU, but 
under contestation in terms of different approaches and priorities. Here, the question is not 
necessarily about Europe per se, but about EU policy priorities and the allocation of resources 
between functional—not territorial—groups. Sometimes also labeled the functional dimension 
(Mair 2005), this dimension resembles the economic left-right dimension emanating first and 
foremost from the class cleavages (cf. Hix/Lord 1997; Mair 2005; Bartolini 2005). 
Whether European integration is politicized along the integration-sovereignty or the functional 
left-right dimension—or both—will be dependent on the parties driving the politicization of 
European integration. As discussed in more detail previously in this dissertation, scholars argue 
that this will most likely be Euroskeptic parties, who are considered to have advantage over EU 
supporters in the politicization of Europe (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009; de Vriesb 2007; de 
Vries/Edwards 2009; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004; Tillman 2004).  
As previous research has shown, party Euroskepticism is concentrated at the fringes of the policy 
space, i.e. radical left and radical or populist right parties, and is related to these parties’ general 
policy program and ideological background: Radical left parties oppose European integration 
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because they reject market liberalism; radical or populist right parties oppose integration because 
they view it as threat to national sovereignty, self-rule, and identity (Hooghe/Marks 2009: 17). 
Hooghe and Marks (2009) advance theories of issue-politicization on European integration by 
bringing into focus the content of the debate. They combine Euroskeptic parties’ stronger 
incentives for politicizing the issue with characteristics of their EU-positioning, which, as 
outlined above, are dependent on party family. Following this idea, they hypothesize that to the 
extent that radical right Eurokeptics drive the politicization of European integration, “the debate 
is conducted in terms of identity” (ibid. 25). Contrariwise, if radical left parties dominate EU 
politicization, “the debate is about distribution” (ibid.). This is because of the former’s concerns 
about integration threatening sovereignty and identity, and the latter’s opposition of market 
liberalism and the primacy of market interests. As argued and demonstrated in Chapter 6.1, this is 
related to the cleavages from which parties historically emanated. Evidently, the politicization of 
Europe can thus evoke either of the two dimensions along which conflict over European 
integration is structured, i.e. the integration-sovereignty or the functional left-right dimension. 
 
What pattern can be expected for Austria regarding the content of the debate about Europe? As 
argued above, this will most likely be determined by (a) the opportunity structure Euroskeptic 
parties face, and (b) by the party family Euroskeptic parties belong to: 
(a) As outlined in more detail in Chapter 5, Euroskeptic parties indeed face an advantageous 
opportunity structure in Austria, since public Euroskepticism is relatively high and goes beyond 
the electorate of Euroskeptic parties, which is reflected in comparatively low support for EU 
membership among Austrians and the widespread perception that European integration has 
already gone too far. Public Euroskepticism is further strengthened by the anti-EU campaigning 
of Austria’s largest tabloid, the politically influential Krone. 
(b) Shortly after joining the EU as a member, party Euroskepticism in Austria has become a 
monopoly of the radical right (cf. Pelinka 2004), first and foremost the FPÖ, which has later been 
joined in its anti-EU attitude by its former party fellows from the BZÖ. Both parties are to be 
considered as both radical and populist right parties and share a clear anti-EU profile that very 
well fits these parties’ guiding principle, namely ‘Austria comes first’ (cf. Luther 2006). All other 
parties express strong support for European integration. This holds true for the mainstream left 
and right parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, respectively, as well as for the Liberals and the Greens, 
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representing fringe parties in the Austrian party system both due to their size and their location in 
the policy space. For the latter, however, EU support is a more recent phenomenon: Different 
from the SPÖ, the ÖVP, and the Liberals, who were also in favor of Austria’s EU accession, the 
Greens initially opposed accession and only altered their position after the positive outcome of 
the Austrian accession referendum. Meanwhile, however, they have become strong advocates of 
further integration and a strong EU.  
Due to the advantageous environment for Euroskeptic parties and the fact that the latter are 
represented by a strong radical right party firmly established in the Austrian party system, the 
debate about Europe in Austria can thus be expected to be biased towards questions of 
sovereignty/identity rather than left-right conflict about distribution. 
 
 
6.3.3 Data and methods 
Like Chapter 6.2, this sub-chapter will explicitly focus on TV debates while disregarding 
manifestos. This is a conscious decision that considers the different character of these two distinct 
types of data concerning their public visibility and reflection of party conflict. It shall briefly be 
justified, starting with the first criterion, i.e. public visibility: Manifestos typically provide a—
more or less comprehensive—overview of a party’s policy program including a variety of 
different issues; many of these issues, however, fail to appear on the public agenda (i.e. in the 
media) during a campaign, meaning that they go unnoticed by the vast majority of voters that 
scarcely ever consult manifestos. Conversely, issues not mentioned in parties’ manifestos might 
still appear on the public agenda during an election campaign (cf. Kleinnijenhuis/Pennings 2001; 
Pennings 2006; Dolezal 2008b). This can be illustrated with the following example: Though 
controversy over European integration during the 2006 election campaign was strongly shaped by 
the FPÖ’s repetitive focus and critique on the EU constitutional treaty, the party’s election 
manifesto did not contain a single reference to this topic (cf. Meyer/Rosenberger 2008). Thus 
election manifestos obviously constitute an unsuitable source for studying the politicization of 
European integration or any other issue. 
TV debates between candidates, on the other hand, typically reach a large audience and also 
receive media attention. Since they take place every few days during the weeks prior to Election 
Day, the serve as a good representation of the campaign dynamics and the issues contested.  
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Turning now to the second criterion for data selection, i.e. the reflection of party conflict in 
different data sources, manifesto data again perform poorly, since they merely reflect the 
potential for conflict between parties (derived from parties’ diverging issue-positions mentioned 
in the manifestos). Conflictive positions, however, do not necessarily find their expression in 
publicly decided controversies of a campaign (e.g. if the matter in question is not salient to voters 
or if none of the political actors has an interest to call voters’ attention to it). This is certainly 
different for TV debates. Their interactive element together with their public visibility allow for 
studying the actual expression of conflict between parties during a campaign,  making them an 
eminently suitable source for exploring not only the content, but the dynamics in parties’ issue-
politicization. 
Table 6.3 provides an overview of the individual speakers each party send for their representation 
in TV debates. Mostly, these are the party leaders or leaders of the parliamentary group. 
Governing parties, however, also tend to select members of government. 
 
As this chapter’s focus is on the content and dynamics of the debate in the politicization of 
European integration, the empirical analysis will consider thematic priorities related to European 
integration, constellations of party conflict, and parties’ pressure to justify their EU position. The 
analysis is conducted in two steps, which is necessary given the interactive element of TV 
debates. First, TV debates have been analyzed following the same procedure used for the analysis 
of manifestos described in Chapter 6.1 in order to identify the different facets of integration 
referred to by party speakers during the debates (namely general, constitutive, and policy 
alternatives). For identifying patters in the content of the overall debate of Europe, these findings, 
second, need to be ‘aggregated’, which will be done in the following way. For identifying the 
thematic priorities related to the EU issue in each campaign, topics related to European 
integration are considered if they appear in several debates and/or dominate large parts of a single 
debate. In addition, the analysis captures whether parties associate these topics to the integration-
sovereignty dimension (i.e. the nature and functioning of the EU/integration) or the functional 
left-right dimension (i.e. the direction of policies). The different constellations in which conflict 
over the issue of Europe appears will be examined by taking into account the party affiliation of 
individual speakers acting as representatives of their parties in TV debates.  
 
 Table 6.3: Party representatives in TV debates 
 
Party 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008 
SPÖ Brigitte Ederer  
Caspar Einem  
Viktor Klima  
Franz Vranitzky  
Barbara Prammer  
Rudolf Edlinger  
Viktor Klima 
Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer  
Alfred Gusenbauer Alfred Gusenbauer Werner Faymann 
ÖVP Wolfgang Schüssel Elisbath Gehrer  
Wilhelm Molterer  
Wolfgang Schüssel 
Wolfgang Schüssel Karl-Heinz Grasser  
Martin Bartenstein  
Josef Pröll  
Wolfgang Schüssel  
Wilhelm Molterer 
FPÖ Jörg Haider Thomas Prinzhorn  
Jörg Haider 
Herbert Haupt Heinz-Christian Strache Heinz-Christian Strache 
Greens Madeleine Petrovic Alexander. V.d.Bellen  
Madeleine Petrovic  
Alexander V.d.Bellen Alexander V.d. Bellen Alexander V.d. Bellen 
Liberals Heide Schmidt 
Voler Kier  
Heide Schmidt  
Hans Peter Haselsteiner  
Christian Köck  
- - - 
BZÖ - - - Peter Westenthaler Jörg Haider 
 
 
  
Finally, this chapter seeks to investigate whether EU supporters or opponents are under pressure 
to justify their overall stance towards European integration. This will be done by exploring in 
detail which parties explicitly challenge their competitors regarding the latters’ overall EU 
position and, equally important, the reactions of those parties having been attacked, i.e. whether 
they respond defensively, thus putting their own position into perspective, or adversarial by 
hitting back on the initial attacker in turn. Exploring party interactions in this way is quite 
illuminating, since it sheds light on whether or not parties assess their own EU position to sustain 
politicization. 
 
 
6.3.4 The content of the debate in Austrian parties’ EU politicization 
This section summarizes the empirical findings based on the analysis of Austrian general election 
campaigns between 1995 and 2008. Each campaign will first be discussed separately before 
summarizing changes and patterns resulting from a comparison over time and concluding about 
the substantive manifestation of the politicization of European integration as specific to the 
Austrian case.  
 
6.3.4.1 Facets of European integration in individual campaigns 
The 1995 election campaign: In this campaign—taking place merely a year after Austria joined 
the EU—reference to European integration first and foremost concerns consequences for the 
country resulting from EU accession. Whether these are viewed positively or negatively clearly 
depends on the party having the floor: The FPÖ and the Greens emphasize undesirable 
developments, accusing the governing parties (i.e. the SPÖ and the ÖVP) for false promises 
beforehand and/or failure in preparing the country for accession, which would have led to the loss 
of jobs and purchasing power, the movement of businesses, more truck traffic to the account of 
rail traffic, and, finally, higher costs for accession than announced previously. The Greens, in 
addition, raise concerns about the Austrian consensus against nuclear power and about the 
country’s neutrality101. Both the FPÖ and the Greens point to adverse effects of EU accession for 
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 Worries about Austria’s perpetual neutrality are not always explicitly associated to European integration, but also 
to some parties’ support for membership in the NATO. 
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employees and economically disadvantaged groups, who would have to carry the costs for 
accession despite the fact that they were the ones benefitting least from EU membership. Not 
surprisingly, the governing parties defend EU accession as the right decision and point to benefits 
it would have brought along, like the larger market advancing exportation, more competition 
resulting in lower prices, economic growth, and the creation and safeguarding of jobs. Though 
both parties also confess that some sectors faced difficulties (e.g. farmers or food industry), they 
point to affirmative actions implemented by the government. The SPÖ also underscores political 
reasons in support for EU membership, arguing that certain problems could not be dealt with in 
isolation anymore, and pointing to the country’s wider influence as an EU member, which would 
allow for achieving goals by joint activities. The ÖVP predominantly refers to the EU as an 
economic Union and a large market.  
Conflict over European integration thus reflects a clear government-opposition pattern, with the 
governing parties emphasizing benefits and opposition parties pointing to adverse effects of EU 
accession. The sole exception to this clear-cut pattern is the liberal party, at that time Austria’s 
third opposition party. Being in line with the governing parties in their support for EU accession 
and European integration, they do not engage in the debate about Europe as part of their TV 
appearance. In terms of party constellations, controversy primarily occurs between the SPÖ and 
the Greens as well as between the ÖVP and the FPÖ, whereas the EU issue is of low importance 
in other party constellations. Interestingly, this also accounts for the debate between the former 
party fellows, the FPÖ and the Liberals, despite the fact that conflict over the FPÖ’s position 
towards EU accession had been one of the reasons for the splitt-off and the foundation of the 
Liberals in early 1993 (cf. Heschl 2002; Liegl 2006). 
Another interesting pattern occurs once looking at parties’ attacks towards each other: Though 
the EU-critics quite actively point to adverse effects of EU membership, it is the pro-European 
governing parties who explicitly attack the former on their general EU position. 
An important characteristic distinguishing the 1995 campaign from the following campaigns is its 
evaluative focus, whereas claims-making is virtually absent in the debate about Europe. 
Evaluations mostly concern effects of EU accession—beneficial or adverse, depending on 
speakers’ party affiliation—for employment and the domestic industry, whereas questions of 
sovereignty or identity do not appear at all, not even on the part of EU critics. Critique, moreover, 
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exclusively addresses the governing parties, whereas the EU or Brussels are never approached, 
and neither are EU policies.  
In a nutshell, the debate about Europe in the 1995 election campaign is above all a debate about 
Austria’s EU accession and fall-outs on the country—basically concerning jobs and employment, 
the domestic industry, and economic growth—and not about different understandings of 
European integration, the EU’s constitution or the direction of EU policies. Applying Hooghe and 
Marks’ (2009) terminology, the debate in 1995 is thus about distribution rather than identity. 
Conflict is clearly structured along a government-opposition divide between parties located on 
the same side of the political spectrum, i.e. between left-wing governing and opposition parties 
(SPÖ, Greens) as well as between right-wing governing and opposition parties (ÖVP, FPÖ). 
 
The 1999 election campaign: Compared to the previous campaign, mentions of European 
integration in the 1999 campaign are much more diverse and include different aspects of 
integration, though EU accession again appears on the agenda. The governing parties (the SPÖ 
and the ÖVP) refer to it as a core achievement for the country, which would also account for 
participation in the monetary union. While this is doubted by the FPÖ, who sees its previous 
objections against accession confirmed, the Greens refrain from any fundamental objection, but 
harshly criticize the direction of particular EU policies or reform plans. Beyond backwards 
evaluations of the country’s EU accession, the debate about Europe centers on EU enlargement, 
the CFSP, nuclear power policy, and a number of environmental issues—each of them are briefly 
summarized below. 
EU enlargement is an issue above all in the debates between the SPÖ and the Greens as well as 
between the FPÖ and the Greens. The discussion about enlargement, however, differs 
fundamentally in the two debates. In the SPÖ-Greens debate, the focus is predominantly on 
nuclear power policy, in particular how to achieve the closing down of candidate countries’ 
nuclear power plants, whether to support nuclear phase-out financially, and the vision of a 
nonnuclear EU. The debate between the FPÖ and the Greens instead reflects a debate on 
principles regarding enlargement, with the Greens expressing their support based on economic, 
social, environmental and safety grounds. They put forward their understanding of enlargement 
as an act of solidarity and a historical necessity. The FPÖ, contrariwise, imposes a number of 
conditions that make candidate countries’ EU accession any time soon quite unrealistic. This 
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concerns wage levels approximating the standards in Austria—otherwise, the FPÖ argues, 
enlargement would be “inhuman” towards Austrian employees and enterprises because of wage 
pressure—and mandatory nuclear phase-out of candidate countries.  
The CFSP is an issue between the SPÖ and the ÖVP and, in particular, between the Greens and 
the Liberals. The SPÖ-ÖVP debate mostly centers on the question of whether or not the ÖVP 
supports membership in the NATO—a question ÖVP-speaker Schüssel avoids by talking instead 
of the establishing of a European peace and security system, in which Austria should fully 
participate. The debate between the Greens and the Liberals focuses on the two parties’ different 
interpretations of the desired direction of the CFSP (which the Greens rename “Common Foreign 
and Military Policy” in order to highlight their criticism towards an alledged bias towards a 
military component) and disagreement about keeping neutrality (Greens) versus full integration 
into a European defense system (Liberals). 
As mentioned above, nuclear power policy is explicitly related to the question of EU enlargement 
and accession negotiations with specific candidate countries. Thus diverging positions between 
parties do not primarily reflect different views about nuclear power policy—all Austrian parties 
in principle state to support nuclear phase-out—but rather towards enlargement. This can be 
illustrated in the comparison of the argumentation put forward by the FPÖ vis-à-vis the Greens: 
The former makes nuclear phase-out a precondition for EU accession, whereas the latter reject to 
impose such a condition and argue instead for financial support to facilitate nuclear phase-out in 
candidate countries. Other environmental questions appear in the debates with the Greens (ÖVP-
Greens, SPÖ-Greens, and—though only marginally—FPÖ-Greens), who criticize the government 
for its failure to foster a development towards higher standards at the EU level. 
Different from 1995, questions of sovereignty and different meanings ascribed to the EU project 
also appear in the debate. The FPÖ raises concerns about a loss of sovereignty and FPÖ-speaker 
Mr. Prinzhorn refers to himself as “a real Austrian”, who—different from other parties— would 
still believe in Austria’s independence. He moreover refers to the EU as a Europe of bureaucrats, 
whereas the FPÖ would strive for a Europe of the regions. The ÖVP and the Liberals on their part 
refer to the EU as the project of peace for Europe. 
Another novelty is that parties now discover the EU or, as it is often labeled, “the European 
level” as an addressee for criticism or specific claims for policy reform, which was not the case in 
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1995, when the focus was exclusively on the governing parties’ responsibility for achievements 
or failure in preparing the country for accession. 
Conflict not only emerges concerning the direction of policies and ways of seeing the EU, but 
also about constraints and the room of maneuver for domestic policy-making as a consequence of 
the embedding in a European polity and market. Controversy on this question is most explicitly 
expressed in the debate between the ÖVP and the Greens: On a number of questions related to 
environmental protection, the ÖVP refers to initiatives at the EU level and denies an option to go 
it alone domestically, as this would cause a competitive disadvantage; the Greens, in response, 
criticize the governing parties for shirking off a number of problems towards Brussels, whereas 
existing domestic leeway would remain unexploited. In other debates, parties also refer to 
budgetary constraints resulting from the Maastricht criteria and the necessity for liberalization in 
certain sectors according to EU law. 
Different from 1995, conflict between parties does not reflect a government-opposition pattern, 
since conflict about alternative views towards European integration also occurs between the 
opposition parties—about EU enlargement in the case of the FPÖ and the Greens (and marginally 
between the FPÖ and the Liberals), and about the CFSP in the case of the Greens and the 
Liberals. What is similar, though not identically, is that by and large there is most discussion 
about Europe between the parties on the left (i.e. the SPÖ, the Greens, and the Liberals
102
) and 
between the parties on the right side of the political spectrum (i.e. the ÖVP and the FPÖ), rather 
than between the two camps. Since the Greens refrain from fundamental criticism towards EU 
integration (as they still did regarding accession in the 1995 campaign) and the Liberals more 
actively participate in the debate about Europe, this means that there is not only conflict between 
supporters and opponents of European integration, but also among EU supporters about different 
policy preferences and the course of integration.  
To sum up, European integration is discussed from several viewpoints in the 1999 election 
campaigns, offering different policy alternatives to voters and also discussing constraints for and 
the scope of domestic policy-making in an increasingly Europeanized political environment. 
Certain issues are discussed quite detailed between parties, allowing for a better understanding 
not only of what parties stand for regarding European integration questions, but also about the 
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 Despite market liberalism, the Liberals are to be considered a social-liberal party (Liegl 2006: 408) and is 
classified center-left on a general left-right scale, and closer to the left margin on the non-economic gal-tan scale (see 
Table 5.5 in Chapter 5).  
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general conditions for policy-making in the context of being part of the European market and 
polity. Despite harsh criticism towards the EU (on the part of the FPÖ) and EU policies (on the 
part of the Greens), it is again the EU supporters who put the critics under pressure to justify their 
rejection of integration or EU membership previously to Austria’s accession. The latter respond 
by stating to have always been supportive to the EU, but rejected the outcome of negotiations 
(FPÖ) or by emphasizing that the party had meanwhile changed opinions (Greens).  
 
The 2002 election campaign: The predominant topic related to European integration in this 
campaign is the upcoming EU enlargement. Though with varying intensity, it is put on the 
agenda in nearly all TV debates (the exception is the SPÖ-Greens debate). Conflict about 
enlargement primarily occurs between the FPÖ and all other parties. This is not surprising, given 
the FPÖ’s skepticism towards enlargement, whereas the other three parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, and 
Greens) are united in their positive stance towards and strong support for enlargement.  
Enlargement represents a highly salient issue in the debate between the two governing parties, the 
ÖVP and the FPÖ, dominating to a large extent the TV debate between the two. Besides 
mentioning the government’s alleged achievements in defending Austrian interests in accession 
negotiations with the candidate countries
103
, there is strong disagreement on the questions of the 
Beneš decrees and the nuclear power plant Temelín, both related to EU accession of the Czech 
Republic. In this respect, the FPÖ’s position remains rather unclear over the course of the debate. 
FPÖ representative Mr. Haupt first states not to support enlargement on the basis of the present 
negotiation outcome. After ÖVP-Chancellor Mr. Schüssel’s respond that this would amount to a 
veto and would definitely rule out any option for a renewal of the coalition government after the 
election, Mr. Haupt puts his prior statement into perspective. 
In the SPÖ-FPÖ debate, the SPÖ values enlargement as an extremely important project for both 
Austria and Europe, whereas the FPÖ criticizes the SPÖ’s “hurray-EU policy” (Hurra-
Europapolitik) that would leave Austria “bled to death” as a net contributor. 
Between the FPÖ and the Greens, conflict arises over the FPÖ’s public initiative against 
Temelín
104
 as well as transit traffic. On the latter, the FPÖ wants a solution as a precondition for 
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 E.g. the 7-year transitional period for the Austrian labor market. 
104
 The public initiative (Volksbegehren) claimed for a veto against EU accession of the Czech Republic in case the 
nuclear power plant Temelín would not be closed down. 
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EU enlargement, whereas the Greens reject this, arguing that the transit problem exists 
irrespective of candidate countries’ formal accession. 
Enlargement is also an issue between the Greens and the ÖVP—though in a different quality 
compared to the other debates: Here the dispute is not about enlargement per se or conditions for 
it, but about whether a coalition with a party refusing to support enlargement unconditionally 
(referring to the FPÖ) can be a serious option. In this respect, the Greens criticize the ÖVP for 
not ruling out a renewal of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition after the elections, while ÖVP-Chancellor Mr. 
Schüssel asserts that support to enlargement was and would remain to be a condition for any 
cooperation with the FPÖ. 
Due to the strong emphasis on enlargement, other issues related to European integration are 
pushed into the background in 2002 or are discussed in association with enlargement. This is the 
case with nuclear phase-out and transit traffic, which mostly are associated with the upcoming 
EU enlargement (see above). However, nuclear power policy is also debated without reference to 
enlargement, namely when discussing the Commission’s plans to increase the subsidies for 
EURATOM. This is put on the agenda by the Greens, who heavily criticize these plans in their 
debates with the SPÖ and the FPÖ, respectively.  
Other issues put forward in individual debates are Austria’s EU contributions (FPÖ), the 
establishing of a European defense system (Greens), and the fostering of a European economic 
program (ÖVP). Controversy on these issues, however, does not shape the overall debate about 
Europe in 2002.  
A remarkable feature in this campaign is that the ÖVP attacks all its competitors on their EU 
position, either referring to a party’s opposition against EU accession (FPÖ, Greens) or, in the 
case of the SPÖ, to the party leader’s rejection of EU membership in the early years of his 
political career.
105
  
In summary, the 2002 election campaign reflects a thematic narrowing in the politicization of 
European integration towards the predominant issue of EU enlargement, whereas other issues 
remain marginal. The campaign as well reflects an exceptional case with a view to party 
constellations, since conflict is largest between the two governing parties, represented in 2002 by 
the ÖVP and the FPÖ, rather than between government and opposition (as in 1995) or within 
both the left and the right party blocks (as in 1995 and 1999). 
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 Only once, the challenge comes from the Euroskeptic FPÖ, when accusing the SPÖ of a “hurry-EU policy”. 
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The 2006 election campaign: Controversy over European integration issues evolves into a 
fundamental debate about the virtues and downsides of the EU in 2006. As described in Chapter 
6.2, European integration is almost exclusively put on the agenda by the anti-EU FPÖ. 
Consequently, the FPÖ’s issue-focus is also reflected in the content of the overall debate about 
Europe, which is dominated by two issues: the EU Constitutional treaty and the question of 
Turkey’s EU accession. The FPÖ introduces these two issues in each of its four debates with its 
competitors, often in an almost identical phrasing, and often resulting in a battle of words about 
parties’ general EU positioning. The FPÖ constantly refers to the EU Constitutional treaty as 
“centralist EU constitution” and a “dictate from Brussels” designed to fully replace the Austrian 
constitution and therefore a threat to the country’s sovereignty. FPÖ-speaker Mr. Strache heavily 
criticizes all other parties for hampering a referendum on the treaty in Austria and for their 
support for a European referendum instead. According to the FPÖ, the latter idea would be 
grotesque, because it would mean to “let the Germans or Poles decide and vote about whether we 
want to keep our constitution”. As regards content, the FPÖ rejects the Constitutional treaty for it 
would lay Austria’s neutrality to rest, force the country to participate in preventive military 
missions, and strengthen the EU’s nuclear power lobby. The pro-European ÖVP, SPÖ, and 
Greens respond by emphasizing that the Constitutional treaty would bring about improvements 
compared to the status quo (e.g. more rights for citizens and parliaments), and would make the 
EU more democratic and efficient in decision-making.  
The FPÖ also sets the agenda regarding the ‘Turkey issue’, reproaching the other parties for 
acting against the will of more than 80 per cent of the Austrian population in their support to 
Turkey’s EU accession or accession negotiations. According to the FPÖ, accession negotiations 
with Turkey should never have been supported in the first place, since Turkey is no European 
country in the FPÖ’s view. The other parties differ in their reactions to this question. The SPÖ 
argues that neither the EU nor Turkey would be ripe for each other. The ÖVP highlights its own 
achievements for making sure that the EU’s capacity to expand would be an important criterion 
in the final decision about Turkey’s accession and promises that “there will never ever be EU 
accession of Turkey without a referendum in this country [Austria]”. In the debate between the 
FPÖ and the BZÖ, the Turkey issue escalates towards a battle of words about which of the two 
parties were the “real” EU-critics: When FPÖ- party leader Mr. Strache criticizes the BZÖ’s 
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electoral mobilization against Turkey’s accession despite BZÖ-party leader Mr. Haider’s 
repeated support to accession and the BZÖ’s voting in favor of accession negotiations, BZÖ-
speaker Mr. Westenthaler rejects the claim for a priviledged partnership with Turkey as 
represented in the FPÖ’s manifesto by stating that the BZÖ would not even want that. The 
Greens significantly differ from the other parties in their reaction towards this question: Though 
party leader Mr. Van der Bellen relativizes his former optimism, Turkey’s accession is referred to 
as real option and chance for both Europe and Austria and accession negotiations are justified as 
the right decision. Enlargement is also an issue beyond the question of Turkey: The FPÖ 
criticizes the prior enlargement towards Romania and Bulgaria as the wrong decision and speaks 
of alleged plans within the EU for EU accession of Marokko, Algeria, and Israel, “and then we 
would be right in the middle of the Middle East conflict, which we [FPÖ] want to avert”. 
Besides the FPÖ’s repetitiveness regarding the EU Constitutional treaty and the question of 
Turkey’s EU accession, the party also tries to challenge individual parties’ credibility on issues 
strongly associated with other parties’ core programmatic objective. This is clearly visible in the 
debate with the Greens and the BZÖ. In the former case, the FPÖ frames the Greens’ support to 
the Constitutional treaty as a withdrawal from the party’s policy against nuclear power; in the 
latter case, the focus on the BZÖ’s unclear position towards the Turkey question can be 
interpreted as an attempt to damage the BZÖ’s self-portrayal as a party defending Austrians 
against ‘foreigners’. In the debates with the SPÖ and the ÖVP, respectively, the FPÖ emphasizes 
these parties’ failure to protect the Austrian employers and small businesses from the “EU 
globalization-mania” and the EU’s policy to pay court to big concerns. 
In conclusion, the 2006 debate about European integration very strongly reflects the FPÖ’s 
concerns about the EU as a “dictate from Brussels” and a threat to Austria’s sovereignty. Though 
the pro-European parties respond by accusing the FPÖ of irresponsible behavior and of seeking 
Austria’s withdrawal from the EU, the absence of an active politicization on the part of EU 
supporters results in a bias of the overall debate towards the FPÖ’s topics and framing. The latter 
is dominated by negative catch phrases like “Brussels’ dictate”, “centralist EU 
Constitution/union”, and “EU globalization-mania”, which FPÖ party leader Mr. Strache 
repeatedly uses when referring to European integration. In Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) 
terminology thus the 2006 campaign clearly centers on questions of sovereignty/identity. Conflict 
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occurs between the FPÖ and all other parties. The latter display a clearly reactive behavior, while 
the FPÖ acts as the driver of the debate about Europe. 
 
The 2008 election campaign: Similar to 2006, controversy over European integration very much 
reflects a fundamental debate about parties’ position towards the EU. The structure of conflict, 
however, differs. While it was the FPÖ against the rest in 2006, parties’ EU positioning now is 
the cause of a dispute in several party constellations. This is related to the SPÖ’s 
announcement—previously to the campaign—to support national referenda on future EU treaties. 
Related to this, the EU Constitutional treaty and the Lisbon treaty, respectively, again represent a 
highly salient issue—though not primarily in a substantive way: Though the FPÖ and the Greens 
substantiate their rejection, respectively support for the treaty on substantive grounds, the overall 
debate is highly decoupled from pros and cons of the treaty or European integration more 
generally. It is rather dominated by the SPÖ’s policy shift on the question of national referenda. 
The EU-critics (the FPÖ and the BZÖ) question the SPÖ’s credibility, given that it previously 
hindered all attempts and initiatives that tried to enforce a referendum on the Constitutional and 
Lisbon treaties; the EU supporters, the ÖVP and the Greens, heavily criticize the SPÖ’s shift as 
an act of populism and capitulation to Austria’s anti-EU yellow press, which would not be 
acceptable for someone seeking political leadership in the country. The latter point refers to the 
fact that the SPÖ made its announcement in a letter to the editor of Austria’s biggest and clearly 
anti-EU tabloid, the Krone. 
Beyond the question of EU treaties and referenda, other issues also repeatedly appear in the 
debate, thus broadening the substantive scope of the debate in comparison with 2006. Among 
these issues are EU foreign policy, the EU directive related to Basel II, transit traffic, and 
Schengen and border control. On all of these issues, EU rules and action are mostly evaluated as 
undermining Austrian interests. A claim raised in a number of debates is that the government 
needed to engage more actively in negotiations at the EU level for fighting for Austrian interests. 
This claim is not only raised by the anti-EU and oppositional FPÖ and BZÖ, but also by the 
governing SPÖ that repeatedly refers to undesirable developments at the EU level, which would 
lead to a withdrawal of the EU from serving the interest of the people. 
The BZÖ, now out of government, is much more active in criticizing the EU compared to the 
2006 campaign and party leader Haider states to be disappointed by how the EU has developed. 
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Due to the BZÖ’s more active engagement in the debate about Europe, there are now two anti-
EU parties shaping the debate about Europe. Though the SPÖ seeks to distance itself from the 
EU-critics and underscores its support for European integration, it also repeatedly points out that 
the EU were on the wrong track regarding social and ecological policy and had departed from 
citizens. The ÖVP and the Greens, on their part, explicitly highlight the EU’s major importance 
and underscore their support for European integration. Hence in 2008, two camps can clearly be 
distinguished—the BZÖ and FPÖ on the one side, the ÖVP and the Greens on the other, and the 
SPÖ somewhere in between. Dispute about Europe consequently appears in several 
constellation—between (former) allies on the EU question (ÖVP/Greens versus SPÖ), between 
EU supporters and opponents (ÖVP/Greens versus FPÖ), and between alleged new allies within 
the camp of EU-critics (FPÖ, BZÖ, SPÖ). Different parties attack one another on their overall 
EU position; different from the other campaigns, however, there is no clear-cut pattern as to 
whether EU supporters or opponents give ground by putting their position into perspective, which 
can be seen as an indication for a stronger polarization in parties’ positions towards the European 
integration issue. Despite a broadening of the debate towards questions related to distribution, the 
overall debate is again largely biased towards the integration-sovereignty dimension, with 
concerns about national influence, identity, and the Austrian interests playing a significant role. 
 
6.3.4.2 Dynamics in the debate about Europe over time 
Is there a common pattern in the content of the debate about European integration in Austrian 
general election campaigns or can we identify significant differences between individual 
campaigns related to thematic priorities, conflict constellation, and pressure to justify one’s EU 
position? The comparison of individual campaign reveals that the debate about Europe indeed has 
changed over the course of time, as outlined in the following. 
 
Thematic priorities: The 1995 campaign reflects opposing views about the impact of EU 
membership on jobs, employment, and the country’s economic situation, while concerns about 
sovereignty do not appear on the agenda. Claims and critique exclusively address the 
government, while the EU is never referred to as an addressee, which clearly distinguishes the 
1995 campaign from all campaigns following. In 1999 a variety of different issues related to 
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European integration appear on the agenda, like enlargement, CFSP, nuclear power policy, and 
environmental issues. This campaign reflects the most diverse and comprehensive debate about 
European integration. Parties suggest different policy alternatives, express their understanding of 
or visions for the EU as a political project, and discuss the scope and constraints for domestic 
policy-making in an increasingly Europeanized economic and political environment. The 2002 
campaign first and foremost focuses on the upcoming EU enlargement and nuclear power policy. 
In this context, the question of the Beneš decrees and the nuclear power plant Temelín (both 
related to EU accession of the Czech Republic) appear as highly salient issues, whereas worries 
about unemployment and wage dumping are clearly of less concern in parties’ controversy about 
enlargement. In 2006 the debate about Europe is clearly dominated by two specific issues, 
namely the EU Constitutional treaty and Turkey’s potential future EU accession. Conflict on 
these issues evolves into a fundamental debate about the virtues and downsides of the EU project. 
Though concerns about Austria’s sovereignty already now and then appeared in the 1999 and the 
2002 campaign, they are now on top of the agenda, put forward by the anti-EU FPÖ: The treaty is 
referred to as being “centralist” and a “dictate from Brussels” threatening Austria’s sovereignty 
and identity. The two issues are still highly salient in the 2008 campaign. However, the debate 
about the Constitutional respectively the Lisbon treaty is less about the treaties as such than about 
the question of referenda (whereas it was about both in 2006). This is also related to the SPÖ’s 
announcement to support national referenda on future EU treaties previously to the election 
campaign. The debate about Europe is clearly biased towards mentions of the EU’s undesirable 
development for serving the interest of the people. 
 
Party constellation: The comparative perspective reveals considerable variation regarding party 
conflict in the different campaigns. This is the result of party change in four domains, namely 
individual parties’ activeness in mentioning Europe, policy shifts of individual parties, changes in 
the composition of coalition governments, and the emergence and drop out of new parties. In 
1995, conflict over European integration clearly follows a government-opposition divide, with 
the oppositional FPÖ and Greens on the one side, and the governing SPÖ and ÖVP on the other. 
Conflict first and foremost appears between the parties of the left (the SPÖ and the Greens) and 
between parties of the right (the ÖVP and the FPÖ). However, the third opposition party, the 
Liberals, somewhat constitute an exception to this pattern, since they do not engage in the debate 
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about Europe at all. This is likely to be related to the fact that, different from the other parties in 
opposition, the Liberals had been on the same side with the governing parties in their support for 
Austria’s EU accession. 
The situation looks slightly different in 1999. Though conflict again is expressed mainly between 
parties on the left (SPÖ, Greens, Liberals) as well as between parties on the right side of the 
political spectrum (ÖVP, FPÖ), the government-opposition pattern disappears. Disagreement 
thus not only occurs between supporters and opponents of European integration, but also within 
the camp of EU supporters striving for different EU policy alternatives. This is due to the 
Liberals’ more active participation in the debate about Europe and due to the Greens’ joining the 
camp of EU supporters.  
Different from all other campaigns, the 2002 election campaign is a contest between four parties 
only, given that the Liberals failed to reach the minimum threshold in the 1999 election. After a 
series of ‘grand coalitions’ between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, it is also the first campaign to follow 
the highly controversial coalition government between the ÖVP and the FPÖ after it collapsed. 
Conflict over European integration then also reflects a rather untypical pattern: It is actually the 
two governing parties between whom European integration is most controversial, i.e. the ÖVP 
and the FPÖ.  
In the 2006 campaign conflict emerges between the FPÖ and all other parties, but not appearing 
in any constellation excluding the FPÖ. Though the latter had been in government from 2002 
until 2005, it was back in opposition from 2005 onwards. This is due to the party split resulting 
from the foundation of the BZÖ in April 2005, changing the former ÖVP-FPÖ coalition into an 
ÖVP-BZÖ coalition—though with the very same governing team. Different from 2002, conflict 
over Europe did not appear between the coalition partners ÖVP and, now, BZÖ in the 2006 
election campaign. 
In 2008 parties’ EU positioning is the cause of dispute in several party constellations. The BZÖ, 
now in opposition, joins its former party fellows of the FPÖ in its EU critique, meaning that 
opposition to European integration is now issued by two radical right parties. Most importantly, 
however, the SPÖ’s policy shift in support of national referenda on EU treaties leads to conflict 
with its former allies on EU questions (the ÖVP and the Greens). Hence in the 2008 campaign, 
two opposing camps structuring conflict over the EU issue can clearly be distinguished: the FPÖ 
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and the BZÖ on the one side, the ÖVP and the Greens on the other side—and the SPÖ 
somewhere in between.  
 
Pressure to justify EU position: A very interesting shift in the debate about Europe appears once 
focusing on whether it is EU supporters or opponents who are under pressure to justify their 
overall EU position. From 1995 until 2002, it is clearly the EU supporters who challenge their 
competitors regarding their attitude towards European integration—though with distinct 
reactions. In 1995, both governing parties blame the oppositional FPÖ and Greens for not having 
supported EU accession, while paying tribute to the Liberals for their support.
106
 A similar, 
though not identical picture emerges in 1999: Again the challenge comes from the EU supporters. 
Both governing parties (the SPÖ and the ÖVP) highlight that had the FPÖ been awarded a 
mandate to govern, Austria would not have achieved EU membership. In addition (and different 
from 1995), the Liberals point to the Greens’ rejection of the EU prior to accession, while 
underscoring that the Liberals have supported European integration from the outset.
107
 In 2002, it 
is the ÖVP blaming all of its competitors either for their rejection of or hesitance in support of 
European integration—referring either to the party’s opposition against EU accession (FPÖ, 
Greens) or, in the case of the SPÖ, to the personal viewpoints of the party leader in the early 
years of his political career.
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 A complete reversal is observable in 2006: Now it is the FPÖ 
repeatedly challenging all other parties on their supportive position towards EU integration, and 
the EU Constitutional treaty in particular. In 2008 there is more variation, as EU supporters and 
opponents alternately challenge each other on their EU position. Different from the other 
campaigns, the anchorperson also repeatedly points to differences in parties’ EU attitude, asking 
parties to comment on their competitors’ position.  
A changing pattern can also be observed on parties’ reaction to such pressure. Whereas no 
noteworthy reactions are to be reported for the 1995 campaign
109
, parties by tendency emphasize 
to be supportive to the EU in the 1999 and 2002 campaign, respectively. This is the case for the 
Greens, who distance themselves from their former opposition by pointing to their policy shift 
                                                 
106
 Explicit pressure from EU-critics only appears once, when the FPÖ accuses the Greens of having waived their 
objections on the EU question. 
107
 Only once the pattern is reverse—namely when the FPÖ accuses its competitors of giving up on Austria. 
108
 Again, the challenge comes from the Euroskeptic FPÖ once, when accusing the SPÖ of a “hurray-EU policy”. 
109
 This is related to the fact that there is no general debate about the EU or EU integration in the 1995 campaign, 
when EU critics only address the government and point to alleged negative effects of accession for economy and 
employment in Austria. 
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and to the strong advocates of EU integration in their ranks. It also accounts for the FPÖ, despite 
the fact that the party at the same time substantiates its harsh EU critique. However, accused of 
being hostile to the EU, FPÖ representatives value EU membership explicitly and state that the 
FPÖ has always been supportive to the EU—though a different EU—and had already been so 
when others were still reluctant (referring to the SPÖ).  
In 2006 it is predominantly the EU supporters under pressure to justify their EU position. They 
respond briefly by substantiating their support for the EU and integration, whereas the BZÖ tries 
to compete with the FPÖ about who is the true Euroskeptic party. The situation is not as clear-cut 
in the 2008 campaign. This can be illustrated for the case of the SPÖ: Though distancing itself 
from the FPÖ’s anti-EU position, the SPÖ at the same time repeatedly refers to undesired 
developments in the EU and the need to stand up against that in Brussels. In line with the 2006 
campaign (and different from previous campaigns), the FPÖ does not hold its fire in expressing 
its rejection of the EU and integration. When accused by other parties of actually striving for 
Austria’s withdrawal from the EU, the FPÖ states that their must not be any taboos when the 
EU’s development is completely misdirected. The ÖVP and the Greens, on their part, substantiate 
their support to European integration and a strong EU. The hardened fronts between EU 
supporters and opponents in 2008 can be illustrated by an argument between the ÖVP and the 
FPÖ: When ÖVP-party leader Mr. Molterer states to hold Europe near and dear, FPÖ leader Mr. 
Strache retorts sharply that to him Austria would be near and dear.  
 
 
6.3.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the structure and dynamics in the debate about Europe in 
Austrian general election campaigns: What patterns can we observe in the politicization of 
European integration, and do they fit with hypotheses about the content of the debate derived 
from the literature? This concluding section will briefly summarize the empirical findings of the 
chapter and discuss them against the background of theories on party conflict and party 
politicization of European integration. 
The study of Austrian parties’ competitive interaction on TV during general election campaigns 
leads to three empirical conclusions for the content of the debate in the politicization of European 
integration in Austria: (a) One can observe significant changes in the thematic priorities between 
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individual campaigns: Over the course of time, concerns about Austria’s sovereignty become 
much more important, while the focus on particular policies and conflict about different policy 
alternatives largely diminishes. (b) Disputes between parties shift from conflict within the left 
and the right block, respectively, towards conflict between EU supporters and opponents, i.e. 
between the radical right and parties from both the left and the mainstream right of the political 
spectrum. (c) Whereas it is EU supporters challenging other parties’ on their EU position in the 
1990s and early 2000s, they eventually become pressured themselves and increasingly need to 
justify their supportive stance towards European integration against attacks by anti-EU radical 
right parties.  
How do these patterns reflect expectations derived from theories on party conflict and 
politicization? To recall, scholars have argued that party conflict over European integration can 
manifest on two distinct dimensions: the integration-sovereignty dimension and the functional 
left-right dimension about different policy alternatives (cf. Hix/Lord 1997; Hooghe/Marks 1999; 
Marks/Steenbergen 2002, 2004; Mair 2005; Hooghe/Marks 2009). The former reflects concerns 
about the nature of the EU, its architecture and competences vis-à-vis member states, rules for 
decision-making and spatial boundaries. The functional dimension, on the other hand, combines 
different views towards the policies of the EU, i.e. the policy direction of measures passed at the 
EU level. Relating these two dimensions of conflict to patterns of party Euroskepticism, Hooghe 
and Marks (2009) argue that the politicization of European integration will be biased towards 
conflict about distribution (i.e. the functional dimension), if the challenge comes from radical-left 
parties, whereas biased towards questions of identity/sovereignty (i.e. the integration-sovereignty 
dimension) whenever the challenge comes from radical right parties. For the Austrian case one 
would therefore expect European integration to be politicized as a question of 
sovereignty/identity rather than distribution. This is due to the fact that—given the Greens’ shift 
towards support for integration after EU accession—party Euroskepticism in Austria turns out to 
be a monopoly of the radical right (cf. Pelinka 2004; see also Chapter 6.1). 
The empirical findings of this study display a stronger focus on the functional dimension 
previously to the 2006 campaign—though not necessarily on questions about distribution in a 
narrow sense—and a clear bias towards sovereignty and identity from 2006 onwards. This pattern 
suggests mixed support from the Austrian case for the hypothesis put forward by Hooghe and 
Marks (2009). Though the importance of concerns about sovereignty/identity clearly increase 
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over time, the debate about Europe is not exclusively shaped by the fact that Austrian party 
Euroskepticism comes from the radical right. This is because disputes about Europe not only 
appear between Euroskeptics and EU supporters, but also among the latter group—in particular 
within the left block, which—in the Austrian case—biased the debates towards the functional 
dimension in election campaigns of the 1990s. 
 
The findings presented in this chapter add significantly to the study of the politicization of 
European integration in domestic party politics. In particular, they demonstrate (1) that the 
content of the debate about Europe is not only shaped by Euroskpetic parties and their left-right 
location, but also by pro-European parties and their disputes about alternative views towards 
particular EU policies or the course of integration. This is an important finding that qualifies the 
hypothesis derived from the literature that it is first and foremost Euroskeptic parties’ left-right 
location in the policy space, which is decisive for the politicization of European integration in 
terms of content. Once EU supporters take a back-seat in the debate about Europe, however, the 
Austrian case shows (2) that the emerging pattern indeed very well reflects the picture outlined 
by Hooghe and Marks (2009): If Euroskepticism is a radical right phenomenon, as is the case in 
Austria, the debate becomes increasingly biased towards questions of sovereignty/identity. 
Finally, this chapter has argued for more rigor in the operationalization of party conflict over 
European integration: For studying the dynamics in and the structure of the politicization of 
European integration, scholars need to distinguish between the potential for conflict and its 
expression in public—a distinction that is strongly related to questions of data selection and 
operationalization. In this respect, (3) the focus on parties’ competitive interaction in TV debates 
proved to be a good choice, as it not only allows to identify the issues actually appearing on the 
public agenda during a campaign, but also to explore the different party constellations in which 
conflict about Europe actually appears. This chapter thus concludes with a claim for careful data 
selection in the study of issue-politicization based on the demands of the research focus rather 
than easy accessibility of data. 
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7. Beyond election campaigns: European integration in decision-making arenas 
7.1 Introduction 
The main research objective of this dissertation is to study party politicization of European 
integration in the electoral arena. Therefore the core empirical part of the thesis has focused on 
the role of the EU issue in Austrian general election campaigns (Chapter 6). The findings 
demonstrate an increase in anti-EU, radical right party politicization of Europe that in recent 
years has clearly put its stamp on the debate about European integration in the Austrian electoral 
arena. These results raise the question whether Euroskpetic parties have been equally successful 
on the EU issue in other arenas decisive for domestic party contestation, namely the 
governmental and the parliamentary arenas. Though a comprehensive analysis of these two 
arenas is clearly beyond the empirical scope of this dissertation, the aim of this chapter is to 
complement the study of party politicization of European integration in the electoral arena with a 
short analysis of EU government policy and decision-making in parliament. More specifically, 
the chapter will explore how the issue of Europe appears (a) in coalition agreements between 
parties that diverge in their positioning towards European integration and (b) in parliamentary 
contestation about EU treaty ratification.
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Important to note, this chapter cannot and does not intend to explain the role of the EU issue for 
coalition building or parliamentary decision-making, since this is clearly beyond the analytical 
and empirical scope of this dissertation. It rather aims at exploring to what extent and, in 
particular, in which way European integration manifests itself in the policy program of coalition 
governments and in parliamentary discussion and decision-making about EU treaty amendments. 
Despite this narrow focus, however, the chapter significantly adds to the study of party 
politicization of European integration, shedding light on whether the politicization of the EU 
issue in the end also impacts on decision-making about Europe at the domestic level. This also 
allows for an assessment about whether government participation of Euroskeptic or anti-EU 
parties makes them more moderate in their assessment of European integration—a question that 
due to these parties’ continuous growth all over Europe is of particular relevance.  
                                                 
110
 The findings for EU treaty ratification in parliament presented in this chapter build on a previous analysis 
published in Meyer (2011). 
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The empirical findings demonstrate that—different from the electoral arena—EU government 
policy and parliamentary decision-making is largely biased towards pro-European parties’ 
supportive stance towards European integration, which holds true even in case of coalition 
configurations including a Euroskeptic or anti-EU party. However, similar to temporal trends in 
the electoral arena, the analysis of parliamentary debates on EU treaty ratification shows that the 
debate about European integration has become more polarized and, on the part of Euroskeptics, 
much more radicalized in recent years. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides a theoretical foundation for studying 
party behavior on the issue of Europe in different arenas of contestation. It will describe the 
functional logic characteristic to these arenas and point to constraints for parties’ room of 
maneuver resulting from this logic. This is followed by an overview on data used and methods 
applied in this chapter, before presenting the empirical findings. The latter are structured in two 
sub-sections. The first one focuses on the governmental arena, more specifically coalition 
building between parties strongly diverging in their EU position, and analyzes governments’ 
stated EU policy position as reflected in coalition agreements. The second sub-section is devoted 
to the parliamentary arena. Focusing on EU treaty ratification in parliament, it analyzes voting 
behavior and speeches held by MPs and explores whether ratification has taken place in a 
stronger or lesser politicized setting. The conclusion will summarize the main findings and link 
them back to the broader question about impact of EU politicization for decision-making and the 
role of anti-EU parties therein.  
 
 
7.2 Functional logics in different arenas of domestic party contestation 
Competitive interaction between political parties takes place in different arenas of contestation. 
Three functional arenas can be distinguished in party systems: the electoral arena, the parlia-
mentary arena, and the governmental arena (cf. Bardi/Mari 2008). Within each of these arenas 
there are different rules for interaction, given the different functions each of them fulfills. As 
discussed at length in the previous parts of this dissertation, party interaction in the electoral 
arena is determined by parties’ attempts to win votes. Party behavior will thus be oriented 
towards vote-maximizing and each party will first and foremost care about its own political 
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survival. This means that the electoral arena is strongly characterized by competition and conflict 
between different parties, each of them seeking to increase its vote share (ibid.). In the 
parliamentary and governmental arena, however, parties have to cooperate in order to achieve 
their goals—whether these are office-seeking or policy-seeking (cf. Strøm/Müller 1999). This in 
particular applies to systems of proportional representation, where parties typically depend on 
finding a coalition partner that provides them with a majority in parliament, which is decisive for 
getting office and thus the political power to shape policy. Hence in the parliamentary and the 
governmental arenas, parties have to come to terms with the policy goals of their competitors (cf. 
Bardi/Mari 2008). Talking about parliamentary systems (as different from presidential ones), the 
governmental arena can mostly be viewed as subsumed in the parliamentary arena, since both are 
determined by the same functional logic, namely to obtain and maintain a governing majority 
through coalition formation that provides parties with office and enables them to achieve their 
policy goals (ibid. 159). An important difference between the two arenas, however, regards the 
distinction between governing and opposition parties. Whereas the latter have no say in the 
governmental arena, both shape party interaction within the parliamentary arena that is typically 
characterized by competition between governing and opposition parties, cooperation between 
different governing parties, and sometimes cooperation between opposition parties (though not 
necessarily and in any case to a much lesser extent). This means that the parliamentary arena is 
characterized by a different functional logic for governing parties on the one hand and opposition 
parties on the other hand (Bardi/Mair 2008: 159). The former will be much more constrained in 
their room of maneuver compared to the latter, and particularly so in case of coalition 
governments: Whereas opposition parties can prioritize their own strategic goals quite similar to 
the electoral arena, governing parties are bound to the agreement reached between the different 
coalition parties that builds the foundation of their cooperation.  
 
The different logics characterizing party interaction in different arenas of contestation can—and 
often will—be at odds with one another, as illustrated in the following example: For a 
Euroskeptic party with a Euroskeptic voter base, anti-EU politicization will be beneficial in the 
electoral arena. However, if the party aims at coalition formation with a moderate mainstream 
party supportive of European integration, this strategy can be risky, since it may impede the 
reaching of an agreement in negotiations with a potential coalition partner (cf. Green-Pedersen 
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2011). If one of the two parties wins out over the other in negotiations or a compromise is being 
reached, this means that one or both parties have to accept policy sacrifice, even if this may affect 
them adversely in the electoral arena. On the other hand, if a party is not willing to make any 
policy concessions, the building of a coalition is virtually impossible, leaving the party not only 
without office, but with much fewer influence on policy. Opposition parties also have to balance 
different party goals—namely votes, office, and policy (cf. Müller/Strøm 1999)—against one 
another in the different arenas. Though opposition parties are relatively independent in both the 
electoral and the parliamentary arena (and per definitionem excluded from the governmental 
arena), to the extent that they are policy-oriented, they may also have to accept compromise in 
order to get a say in policy decisions taken in the parliamentary arena. 
Hence party behavior towards any political issue may be different in the electoral, the 
parliamentary, and the governmental arena, as will be demonstrated for the case of the EU issue 
in the empirical section of this chapter. Linking this brief discussion about different logics and 
constraints present in the different arenas of domestic contestation to the study of party 
politicization of European integration, one aspect shall be highlighted: Under conditions of low 
issue-politicization in the electoral arena, parties will find it easier to make compromise and 
accept policy sacrifices in government and/or parliament, since on a non-politicized issue, parties 
are not constrained by their positioning towards the issue in the electoral arena because the issue 
does not appear there in the first place. The more politicized the issue is, however, the more 
difficult it will be for parties to depart from their stated preferences in governmental and 
parliamentary decision-making, as this would mean risking the loss of votes in the electoral arena 
(cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009).  
 
 
7.3 Data and methods 
For analyzing the role of the European integration in arenas of domestic decision-making, we 
need to broaden the empirical base of this study beyond material explicitly produced for or 
created as a product of party competition in election campaigns. After all, party politicization of 
European integration in the electoral arena does not mean that parties will act accordingly in the 
other arenas that are both less in public focus and more important for actual policy-making. The 
empirical analysis conducted in this chapter is therefore based on a combination of different data 
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external the electoral arena. It includes coalition agreements as well as voting behavior and 
speeches in parliament. 
 
Coalition agreements: For analyzing coalition building under conditions of disagreement on EU 
policy between potential coalition partners, this chapter will consider coalition agreements. These 
documents present the final outcome of coalition negotiations and typically outline the 
government program for the upcoming legislative period. The empirical focus will be narrowed 
to those coalition constellations where European integration could be expected to be a conflictive 
issue due to parties’ contrary EU positions. This will be assessed building on the empirical 
analysis of Chapters 6.1 and 6.3 that explored party positioning and party politicization of 
European integration in the electoral arena, thus allowing identifying party conflict and its 
expression on the EU issue. The analysis of coalition agreements will explore whether the EU 
policy agreed upon between the coalition partners is biased towards either of the two partners’ 
EU position or rather reflects compromise on both parts. The comparison with parties’ EU policy 
priorities as outlined in 6.1 and 6.3 allows for such an assessment.  
 
Voting behavior and speeches in parliament: Party behavior towards European integration in the 
national parliament will be studied by looking at critical junctures of integration. EU treaty 
amendments qualify as such junctures: They set or modify the ‘rules of the game’ for EU policy-
making and deepen integration by expanding the EU’s competences towards policy domains 
formerly under the full sovereignty of member states and/or by communitarization of areas 
previously determined by intergovernmental cooperation. Though treaty negotiations are closed 
much earlier (namely when the heads of governments have reached an agreement), ratification in 
national parliaments often represents the peak of contestation between parties about the 
respective treaty—and often European integration more generally—at the domestic level: In the 
final debate prior to voting in parliament, governing and opposition parties are typically opposing 
each other, the former justifying its political decisions, the latter seeking to challenge the former 
on exactly these decisions.
111
 Therefore, this part of the dissertation will focus on the ratification 
process of EU treaty reforms in the Austrian Nationalrat, more specifically the final debates and 
voting. Since Austria joined the EU, the parliament ratified four treaties: the Treaty of 
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 This simplified outline of course describes the situation in parliamentary systems.  
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Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the Treaty 
of Lisbon.
112
 Though differing both in scope and intention, each of these treaties introduced 
changes to the EU polity and, consequentially, the sovereignty of member states. As will be 
demonstrated in the following, parties do use these debates for general evaluations of European 
integration, sometimes irrespective of the actual change induced by treaty amendments. 
The empirical analysis focuses on three aspects. First, I will examine voting behavior for or 
against the ratification of treaties; second, I will analyze speeches held by MPs; third, I will 
consider contextual characteristics of the debate. Voting behavior sheds light on patterns in 
support for/opposition to European integration; speeches reflect parties’ strategies for justifying 
their voting behavior and provide information about their view towards the respective treaty and 
European integration more general; finally, contextual characteristics help assessing whether 
ratification took place in a stronger or lesser politicized setting. Information on voting behavior 
and contextual characteristics are derived from the website of the Austrian parliament; speeches 
are based on the literal transcriptions of all debates, also derived from the parliament’s website. 
Since the debates vary in intensity and duration, two speeches are selected for each party in each 
treaty debate. As a general rule, speeches by the first two speakers of each party—including 
members of government—are selected. This provides for a common and systematic approach and 
also allows for intra-party variation in arguments and justifications presented, which, as will be 
shown, does indeed appear for some parties. The analysis of speeches will be conducted by 
focusing on three aspects related to European integration: 
 EU finality: This category includes parties’ visions of the EU as a political project, like a 
federal union, a Europe of nations, a solidarity union etc.
113
  
 Evaluating the status quo: How parties evaluate the current state of the EU most likely is 
associated to what kind of EU they strive for (finality). It is thus part of the broader 
perspective a party undertakes when it comes to its preference of how the EU should look 
like or what kind of a political building it should become. 
 Treaty consequences: This category allows for including parties’ evaluations related more 
specifically to the treaty being subject to ratification. Depending on whether parties 
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 For reasons of readability, I will subsequently refer to the treaties as the Amsterdam, Nice, Constitutional and 
Lisbon treaty. 
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 For an interesting analysis of different conceptions and understandings of EU finality cf. Jachtenfuchs (2002). 
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support or reject a treaty, they will either point to benefits and improvements (e.g. more 
influence for Austria or strengthening EU democracy) or to disadvantages and worsening 
(e.g. loss of national sovereignty or endangering neutrality).  
 
Since the parliamentary debates selected for analysis of this study are explicitly devoted to the 
European integration issue, namely treaty reform, party politicization cannot be assessed by 
exploring individual parties’ emphasis on the EU issue vis-à-vis other issues or by focusing on 
how actively parties engage in the debate, as this is also dependent on the speaking time 
scheduled for different party groups as agreed upon between party group leaders and the 
president of the parliament prior to a parliamentary session. However, a number of qualitative 
indicators can be used to assess the intensity of politicization in the parliamentary arena during 
treaty ratification, i.e. whether a treaty debate took place in a less or more politicized setting. As 
indications for the politicization of the setting, I will consider the total number of speakers in 
each debate, the party rank of speakers (i.e. whether highly ranked party officials, parties’ EU 
experts, or ‘backbenchers’ act as speakers), the ‘publicness’ of debates indicated by television 
broadcast, and whether a roll-call vote has been demanded.  
 
 
7.4 Empirical findings 
This section presents the results from the analysis of the EU issue in arenas of decision-making. It 
starts with the analysis of coalition agreements and then turns to EU treaty ratification in 
parliament. 
 
7.4.1 European integration as conflictive issue in coalition building? 
The empirical focus of this section is on the stated EU policy of coalition governments as agreed 
upon in coalition agreements. The analysis is limited to those governing constellations where 
conflict about the EU issue can be anticipated due to the divergent EU positions of the coalition 
parties. As already mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, the aim of the analysis is 
not to explain coalition building under conditions of conflict, since this is beyond the analytical 
and empirical scope of the present study. Rather, the analysis is focused on the joint government 
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position finally agreed upon by the coalition partners towards the potentially conflictive EU 
issue. 
Based on the analysis of parties’ EU positioning in manifestos (Chapter 6.1) and conflict between 
parties about European integration during election campaigns (Chapters 6.2 and 6.3), the 
potential for conflict over the issue of Europe is highest for the building of the ÖVP-FPÖ 
coalitions after the 1999 and the 2002 elections, and for the renewal of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition 
after the 2008 election. In each of these cases, there was considerable conflict between the later 
coalition partners during the previous election campaign. With the ÖVP and the FPÖ, two parties 
with largely contrary EU positions agreed on a coalition twice (2000 and 2002): The ÖVP always 
understood itself as Austria’s one and only Europapartei, whereas the FPÖ has become Austria’s 
most Euroskeptical party. EU enlargement, on which both parties held fundamentally different 
positions during the 2000 and the 2002 election campaigns, can be expected to become the 
trigger for conflict between the two. The conflict potential of the EU issue for the building of a 
coalition government between the SPÖ and the ÖVP is of different character, since both parties 
share a very pro-European stance. However, the SPÖ’s overnight announcement in 2008 to 
support national referenda on future EU treaties eventually led to the collapse of the SPÖ-ÖVP 
coalition and thus to snap elections. Consequently, this made the question of referenda on EU 
treaties a salient issue and crucial point for a renewal of the coalition after the 2008 election. The 
remainder of this section summarizes the EU position agreed upon in the coalition agreements 
between the ÖVP and FPÖ (in 2000 and 2002) and between the SPÖ and the ÖVP (in 2008) and 
illustrates which of the two party competitors’ EU position prevails in coalition agreements. 
 
Starting with the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition agreement in 2000, an important note has to be made for 
contextualizing the formation of this coalition government. This coalition was the first at the 
federal level to include the FPÖ since Jörg Haider had taken FPÖ-party leadership in the mid-
1980s and had far reaching political consequences: When agreement in the negotiations between 
the ÖVP and the FPÖ looped, the other 14 EU member states’ governments announced to take 
bilateral measures against the Austrian government (referred to as ‘EU sanctions against Austria’ 
in public and scholarly debate), this way expressing their concern about the FPÖ’s political 
nature, both related to the party’s dealing with National Socialism and also its anti-EU position 
(cf. Merlingen et al. 2001; Karlhofer et al. 2001; Hummer/Pelinka 2002; Busek/Schauer 2003). In 
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an attempt to calm the waves, Federal President Thomas Klestil—who strongly opposed the 
building of an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition—demanded the signing of a preamble to the coalition 
agreement from the two coalition partners prior to the nomination of the government. This 
preamble included a commitment by the government to human rights, tolerance, and European 
integration
114
. 
The coalition agreement—entitled Österreich neu regieren—carries forward this commitment. 
The first section of the document is devoted to foreign and European policy and states that 
“[i]n the government’s view, the deepening of integration lays the foundation for coping 
with the challenges of this millennium in various areas. Therefore there exists no 
reasonable alternative to the EU integration. (…) The government commits itself to the 
rapid establishing of a European peace, security, and defense community”115 
(Koalitionsvertrag 2000: 2).   
 
Besides this general commitment to a united Europe, the second sub-section deals with EU 
enlargement, which is understood “to expand the peace and stability zone on the European 
continent” and would therefore be in the interest of Austria “that has already benefitted 
economically from the developing and opening of new market economies in [Austria’s] 
neighborhood” (Koalitionsvertrag 2000: 2). The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition thus states to “advocate the 
enlargement process” taking into account Austrian over-all and competitive interests (ibid. 2). 
Though a number of points are mentioned as part of the preparation process for enlargement, 
these are rarely formulated as indispensable conditions, but as priorities and goals for accession 
negotiations. This is also the case for the two issues emphasized by the FPÖ in the 1999 election 
campaign, namely nuclear phase-out and the closing down of nuclear power plants in candidate 
countries on the one hand, and the abolition of the Beneš decrees on the other. Considering the 
variety of conditions for enlargement set by the FPÖ in its 1999 manifesto and during the 
campaign, the commitment to enlargement and the softened framing related to accession 
requirements as reflected in the coalition agreement is clearly biased towards the ÖVP’s strongly 
                                                 
114
 “The Federal Government is committed to the European peace project. Cooperation between the coalition parties 
is based on a commitment to Austria's membership in the European Union. The Federal Government is bound by 
those principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
which under Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union are common to all member states of the European Union. 
Austria's future, too, lies in the deepening of integration and the enlargement of the Union. (…) The European Union 
as a community of values corresponds to a definite concept for the future development of European integration. (…)” 
See http://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/?em_cnt=356734&em_cnt_page=2, accessed 
30/11/2011. 
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 Translation of this and all following citations from coalition agreements by SM. 
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supportive stance towards European integration in general and enlargement in particular. Without 
speculating on negotiating skills, this outcome must also be viewed in connection to the EU 
critique against the building of the ÖVP-FPÖ government signalized prior to the termination of 
the negotiations.  
 
In the 2002 election campaign, the FPÖ presented a rather inconsistent position towards 
European integration, and enlargement in particular. This was most clearly visible in FPÖ-
frontrunner Herbert Haupt’s unclear utterances during the TV debates between rival parties, 
where it was difficult to grasp whether—and under what conditions—the FPÖ would say Yes to 
the imminent decision at the EU level about the 2004 enlargement round (see Chapter 6.3). 
Already when the coalition was still intact, the FPÖ mobilized against enlargement, in particular 
against EU accession of the Czech Republic, on which the party even started a public initiative 
(see Chapter 5). During the election campaign, the FPÖ substantiated its rejection of enlargement 
by stating to make support for enlargement conditional on reaching a binding promise by the 
Czechs for the closing down of the nuclear power plant Temelín and for the abolition of the 
Beneš decrees. Notwithstanding, the coalition agreement drafted by the ÖVP and the FPÖ after 
the 2002 election again included a commitment towards enlargement—and a very clear one 
reading as follows: 
“Commitment to the enlargement of the European Union, obligation to sign and ratify 
the EU Treaty of Accession on schedule (adoption in the Council and parliamentary 
discussion and decision-making)” (Koalitionsvertrag 2003: 3f, emphasis added). 
 
Regarding the Beneš decrees, the document says that the government “seeks (…), in accordance 
with the decisions of the European Parliament, a solution until the ratification of the EU Treaty 
for Accession” (ibid. 4). The ‘Temelín question’ is not mentioned in connection with EU 
enlargement at all but referred to in the document’s section on sustainability, environment, and 
agriculture, stating to continue talks with the Czech Republic about the zero option, i.e. the 
closing down of the nuclear power plant Temelín (ibid. 27f). Hence once again the anti-EU FPÖ 
agreed to support EU enlargement without demanding the conditions set in the run-up to the 2002 
election, thus following the position of its coalition partner ÖVP, which had explicitly made 
support for enlargement a conditio sine qua non for a potential renewal of the coalition during the 
campaign (see Chapter 6.3). 
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The SPÖ and the ÖVP in principle share a very supportive position towards European 
integration. However, the SPÖ’s announcement regarding national referenda on future EU 
treaties ultimately led to the collapse of the coalition built between the two after the 2006 election 
and to snap elections in 2008. It was this question then—rather than the general EU position—
that also led to some controversy during the negotiations of a renewal of the coalition after the 
2008 election. The question also appears in the final coalition agreement as part of the section on 
foreign and European policy. It states that the government would wish for the EU to become 
more democratic, transparent, and in touch with the people; the government would “therefore in 
principle speak up for European-wide referenda” (Koalitionsvertrag 2008: 242). Regarding the 
question of national referenda, the document includes a proviso, saying that 
“both coalition parties commit themselves not to initiate or support parliamentary 
proposals […] demanding a referendum against the will of the coalition party. In case 
one party votes down the other party […], the coalition partners pledge to jointly 
propose for new elections” (ibid.).  
 
The coalition agreement could be read as limiting the SPÖ’s room of maneuver on this question, 
since it would risk the termination of government cooperation with the ÖVP if supporting a 
proposal for a referendum. Notwithstanding, the compromise primarily led to intra-party conflict 
within the ÖVP: Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik announced her resignation because of 
dissatisfaction with the compromise that would, in her opinion, lead to unpredictability and 
threaten the reliability of the country’s EU policy.116  
 
 
7.4.2 European integration in parliamentary contestation: EU treaty ratification 
This section focuses on EU treaty ratification in the Austrian Nationalrat. It starts with an 
analysis of parties’ voting behavior in parliament and highlights changes therein over the course 
of time. Such change could be caused by party repositioning or can simply be the product of 
constraints resulting from government participation. In order to come to a conclusion about the 
mechanism behind changes in parties’ voting behavior, I will then analyze speeches by MPs prior 
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 See http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/432388/Finale-Koalitionsverhandlungen-Plassnik-tritt-zurueck 
and http://www.news.at/articles/0847/11/226695_s1/plassnik-eu-linie-gehoert-regierung, both accessed 30/11/2011.  
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to the final voting. Comparing how parties explain and justify their voting behavior on different 
EU treaties allows for a better understanding of the causes behind changing patterns in voting 
behavior and thus varying degrees of party conflict over the different treaties. Finally, I will 
provide a brief summary of characteristics in the setting of the parliamentary discussions on the 
different treaties, arguing that these indicate an increase of salience of European integration for 
party contestation within the parliamentary arena.  
 
7.4.2.1 Voting behavior as a government–opposition pattern? 
Looking at voting patterns in EU treaty ratification, we find evidence for varying levels of party 
conflict about EU treaty ratification: Periods of conflict alternate with periods of consensus, with 
two out of the four treaties—the Nice treaty and the Constitutional treaty—being ratified (almost) 
unanimously.
117
 Voting behavior on EU treaties in parliament is summarized in Table 7.1, which 
presents the voting results for each party on each treaty. In order to highlight patterns in the 
positioning, parties have been structured along their left-right position in the political space. 
Looking at voting behavior in the ratification of the Amsterdam treaty, we see a perfect 
representation of the inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al. 2002) described earlier in this dissertation: 
Parties on both the left and the right margins vote against the treaty, whereas mainstream 
parties—plus the Liberals—ratify it. The picture changes four years later, when the Nice treaty is 
been ratified: All parties now vote in favor of treaty ratification. The situation is similar with the 
Constitutional treaty—except for a single MP opposing ratification. The vote on the Lisbon treaty 
entails yet another shift, with ratification opposed by the two radical right parties (FPÖ, BZÖ).  
 
Table 7.1: Voting behavior in parliament on treaty ratification 
Treaty Greens SPÖ Liberals ÖVP BZÖ FPÖ 
Amsterdam - + + + / - 
Nice + + / + / + 
Constitution + + / + + (+/-) 
Lisbon + + / + - - 
Note: Grey shadings indicate government participation. The results in parentheses 
for the FPÖ votes on the Constitutional treaty point to the exceptional situation for 
the party after the party split only weeks before ratification. 
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 A single MP, however, voted against the Constitutional treaty (see below for details). 
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This changing pattern in support for EU treaty ratification is due to changes in the voting of 
individual parties: The Greens voted against the Amsterdam treaty but supported all later treaties; 
the BZÖ voted in favor of the Constitutional treaty but rejected the Lisbon treaty; and the FPÖ 
voted against the Amsterdam and the Lisbon treaty, supported the Nice treaty, and was divided 
on the Constitutional treaty.  
Having argued elsewhere in this dissertation that parties cannot easily shift their policy positions 
(cf. Marks/Wilson 2000), how can we explain these changes? The most obvious explanation 
would be changes in parties’ government–opposition status, since participation in coalition 
governments clearly constrains parties’ room for maneuver in voting behavior according to the 
coalition agreement to which the governing parties have committed themselves. Looking at the 
grey shadings in Table 7.1, which indicate government participation, it seems that becoming a 
governing party indeed corresponds with most of the shifts in parties’ voting behavior: The FPÖ 
and the BZÖ only voted in favor of EU treaties during their government participation, while 
rejected EU treaties when being part of the parliamentary opposition. The unclear signs for the 
FPÖ for the ratification of the Constitutional treaty (see final column, Table 7.1) are due to the 
exceptional circumstances under which the parliamentary discussion was carried out from the 
perspective of the FPÖ: Only a month before ratification in parliament, the FPÖ-members of 
government left the party and founded the BZÖ. The BZÖ also took over the parliamentary party 
group, since most of the former FPÖ MPs followed the governing team. However, at the time of 
ratification there was still some confusion about several MPs’ loyalty to either the FPÖ or the 
BZÖ, which was reflected in these MPs voting behavior. While those MPs that had followed the 
governing team into the newly founded BZÖ voted in favor of the Constitutional treaty without 
exception, there was disagreement among the two remaining MPs that had expressed their loyalty 
to the FPÖ. One of them (Eugen Bösch) followed the BZÖ and voted Yes, whereas the other one 
(Barbara Rosenkranz) was the only MP rejecting the Constitutional treaty in the final vote in 
parliament. Government participation, however, cannot explain the Greens’ shift in voting 
behavior: The Greens opposed the Amsterdam treaty but supported all treaty amendments since 
Nice, being in opposition throughout the whole time span.  
Looking at EU treaty ratification as a proxy for support and opposition to European integration, 
voting behavior thus only tells part of the story. In order to get a clearer picture of parties’ 
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positioning towards EU treaties, the next section will focus on speeches held by MPs during the 
final debate directly before the vote.  
 
7.4.2.2 Do yes-votes indicate support for European integration? Evidence from MPs’ speeches 
This section explores whether change in parties’ voting behavior on different EU treaties is 
accompanied by change in parties’ views towards and evaluations of European integration and 
the EU. The empirical analysis focuses on speeches in parliament held by MPs prior to the final 
voting. I will first provide a very brief summary about the thematic priorities in the treaty 
debates. I will then focus explicitly on those parties reflecting an inconsistent voting pattern on 
the different treaties in order to views about Europe and justifications of their voting behavior. 
These are the Greens, the FPÖ, and the BZÖ.
118
 
 
Thematic priorities in EU treaty debates: 
Comparing the treaty debates, we can see that the discussion centers on different topics, which 
are not always clearly related to the substance of the respective treaty. The Amsterdam debate 
very much centered around diverging interpretations of Austria’s neutrality and foreign and 
security policy more generally, including whether or not Austria should or would take part in 
international or European military alliances (NATO, WEU). The treaty was supported by the 
governmental parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) and the Liberals, whereas the FPÖ and the Greens voted 
against it. During the Nice debate, the focus was basically on two thematic blocks. The first one 
was about the EU’s European and international responsibilities and activities (which is to be 
viewed and has also been explicitly referred to in connection with the 9/11 terror attacks). The 
second focused on EU enlargement, including controversy about (alleged) challenges for Austria 
resulting from enlargement and about the FPÖ’s strategy to utter veto threats against ratification 
of enlargement. The treaty was ratified unanimously. In the debate about the Constitutional 
treaty, parties primarily focused on the historical significance of the EU’s development for 
Europe, on the limitations of a constitution regarding substantive scope and, to some extent, the 
question of a referendum for ratifying the treaty. Different from the former debates, most of the 
speakers also referred to public criticism of the EU and/or its development. Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
118
 A complete analysis for all parties represented in the Nationalrat can be found in Meyer (2011), on which the 
findings summarized in 7.4.2.1 and 7.4.2.2 build. 
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however, speakers from different parties offered quite diverging explanations for public 
Euroskepticism. The treaty was supported almost unanimously, with one MP of the FPÖ voting 
against it. Finally, the debate on the Lisbon treaty was primarily about the impact of the treaty, 
discussing positive and negative, expected and unintended consequences. It also very much 
reflected a fundamental debate about the virtues and downsides of European integration. The 
question of whether or not to conduct a national referendum for ratifying the treaty also figured 
prominently in the debate. Compared to the other debates, the discussion was much more 
emotionalized, with nightmare scenarios presented by the radical right FPÖ (see below). The 
treaty was supported by the governing parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) and the Greens, while the radical 
right FPÖ and BZÖ voted against it. 
 
The Greens: a clear shift towards unconditional support to further European integration 
Consistent with their voting behavior, we can identify two phases in the Greens’ evaluation of 
European integration from the analysis of treaty debates. The debate of the Nice treaty constitutes 
a breach with the views formerly expressed by green MPs and introduces a different 
understanding and framing of the relationship between the national and European level as frame 
of reference for policy-making. Though criticism during the Amsterdam debate was first and 
foremost leveled against the government (for its re-definition of solidarity towards a military 
understanding in the context of neutrality and EU foreign and security policy), the Greens also 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the EU: With regard to the dominance of a military 
understanding of security neglecting environmental and social policy, the Greens wondered 
whether this were really the Europe the young would wish for, “armed to the teeth, at the 
frontiers a new Iron Curtain of sorts, data systems where citizens can be registered without 
measures for legal protection. Is this the free, ecological and social Europe you wanted to stand 
up for in 1994? Is this our great dream, our future utopia?” (Petrovic, A119). Moreover, the 
Greens refer to absent EU activities in support of Austrian interests since accession, as indicated 
by the following quote: “Where has European solidarity with Austria been [with regard to 
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the Amsterdam treaty, N for the Nice treaty, C for the Constitutional treaty, and L for the Lisbon treaty). For a 
detailed list including the names of the speakers see Appendix. Translations for all citations from speeches by SM. 
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Austria’s endeavor against the nuclear power plant Mochovce]? What happened as to genetic 
engineering? (...) The EU has consistently turned against Austria” (Petrovic, A).  
Though Austrian neutrality (Nice debate) and foreign and security policy (Lisbon debate) keep 
playing an important role in the party’s critique of EU treaties, the Greens’ understanding of 
European integration seems to have changed with Nice, as the party now focuses on 
improvements coming with treaty amendments (e.g. enlargement in the Nice debate, 
democratization and the Charta of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution and Lisbon debates). 
Enlargement, in particular, is referred to as a key concern of the party and the reason for “why, in 
spite of all objections and difficulties resulting from the absent institutional reform, we support 
this treaty [Nice, SM] today” (Lunacek, N). Different from all other parties, the Greens also 
oppose the seven-year transitional period denying access to the Austrian labor market for new 
member states, as this is seen as “a negative signal towards accession countries that we cannot 
support” (Lunacek, N). Compared to all other parties, the Greens are most clear when 
expounding a European perspective for policy-making within the EU. They criticize national 
governments for understanding treaty negotiations as a “bazaar for national interests”, and the 
Austrian government in particular for piquing themselves on protecting Austrian interests, which 
the Greens judge as “a mistaken prospect of European politics”, where EU interests should be 
represented (Lunacek, N). They further highlight that certain challenges (environmental 
protection, global competition) could only be faced in the European context. Though other parties 
as well support European—as opposed to national—referenda on EU treaty amendments, the 
Greens are most explicit in judging national referenda not only as inefficient, but as illegitimate, 
arguing that “it [the Constitutional treaty, SM] concerns the European people, and only a joint 
decision over its future is legitimate. Thus, it is completely illegitimate if a small group imposes 
its dictatorship over the others” (Glawischnig, L). Though the Greens continue to criticize certain 
aspects of European integration (e.g. environmental and energy policy, social policy, security 
policy etc.), they support and claim for further integration based on the improvements they see 
from the debate on the Nice treaty onwards—and different from their positioning in the 
ratification debate about the Amsterdam treaty. The Greens’ policy shift is aptly illustrated in the 
following statement by deputy party leader Eva Glawischnig: When referring to the Greens’ 
skepticism towards the EU before accession, she states that back then 
“we had a vision to realize an alternative Europe together with the EFTA countries 
comprising all that was still reprehensible in the European Union—at that time: EC. 
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This vision did not come about. (…) We now see our duty in working at all levels for 
an advancement of the European Union: to become more ecologic, more sustainable, 
more social, to become a power for peace in the world—who else should do so 
worldwide—and for that we work” (Glawischnig, C). 
 
 
The FPÖ: temporarily suppressed party Euroskepticism 
The FPÖ is least coherent both in its voting behavior and its evaluation of European integration 
as expressed in speeches by MPs. This is to be viewed in connection with, first, the party’s 
government participation from 2000 until 2005 and, second, the party split-off due to the 
foundation of the BZÖ in 2005, which put the party back in opposition before the end of the term. 
Most consistency when comparing the different treaty debates can be observed in the party’s 
concerns about Austria’s sovereignty—though framed differently depending on whether the party 
holds office or is in opposition: In the former case, support to treaty ratification is justified on the 
grounds of the perpetuation of unanimity and thus veto power in important policy areas (Nice 
debate); in the latter cases, EU treaties are described as a threat to Austria’s sovereignty. Another 
consistent criticism points to the EU as an undemocratic, centralist bureaucracy and the FPÖ’s 
unwillingness to accept the primacy of EU law over Austrian law. Generally, the focus is 
exclusively on Austrian interests, for which the EU is most of the time seen as a danger. Evidence 
for party repositioning can be identified concerning the question of neutrality. In the Amsterdam 
and the Lisbon debates, the FPÖ sees Austria’s neutrality in danger and therefore argues that a 
referendum is needed. However, while supporting a referendum as a means to abolish neutrality 
in the debate about the Amsterdam treaty, the FPÖ demands a referendum in order to protect 
neutrality during the Lisbon debate. At both points in time, the party was in opposition.  
The debate on the Constitutional treaty has to be qualified an outliner, since it was carried out 
under exceptional circumstances from the perspective of the FPÖ (see above). The two remaining 
MPs that were still associated with the FPÖ at that time did not demonstrate any coherence. 
While MP Eugen Bösch argued in favor of the treaty, the other MP, Barbara Rosenkranz, was the 
only MP who declared to vote against the treaty, arguing that this issue would require a 
referendum. However, she did not refer to the treaty in substantive terms. Back in opposition and 
recovering from the damages of electoral losses and party split, the FPÖ intensified its EU 
criticism in the Lisbon debate. The Lisbon treaty is labeled “a European constitutional dictate”, 
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“a gagging and disenfranchisement treaty” and an attack on Austrian democracy and its 
constitution, putting Austrian citizens under tutelage (Strache, L). The focus on sovereignty is 
now complemented by a pronounced anti-globalization critique, describing the EU as a motor of 
globalization and lobby of industry and great groups aiming at destroying identity and diversity 
that would lead to a cutback of social rights and welfare. Moreover, it would allow for 
reintroducing the death penalty in Europe. Party leader Mr. Strache closes his speech in the 
Lisbon debate with the words “God save Austria”—a quotation of Kurt Schuschnigg (Austrian 
Chancellor between 1934 and 1938 during the period of the Austrofacist State) from 1938 on the 
eve of Austria’s Anschluss to Nazi-Germany. 
To sum up, the FPÖ does not perform unambiguous during the whole period of investigation. 
Still, we can observe several patterns: First, the loss of sovereignty constitutes a recurrent issue in 
the speeches about EU treaties—indeed modified with a view to its framing, but still far from 
changing during the period of government participation. Second, the party strongly intensified its 
EU critique in the most recent, i.e. the Lisbon treaty debate. 
 
 
The BZÖ: struggling for a party position towards European integration 
Since the BZÖ was only founded in 2005, as a party it only took part in the ratification of the 
Constitutional and the Lisbon treaties—though several MPs had previously been represented in 
parliament as party members of the FPÖ. The BZÖ had been in power from its foundation in 
April 2005 (which is shortly before the ratification of the Constitutional treaty) until the end of 
the term in 2006. It was thus in opposition during the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. The BZÖ’s 
evaluation of European integration then also strongly varies between the two debates—as well as 
between different speakers in the most recent debate (Lisbon).  
In the debate on the Constitutional treaty, Vice-Chancellor Mr. Gorbarch underscores 
improvements regarding EU democracy, the EU’s capacity to act, the strengthening of values 
(like freedom, equality, minority and social rights), and the principle of subsidiarity. Mr. 
Scheibner, former minister of defense in the first ÖVP-FPÖ coalition (2000-2003), substantiates 
support to the treaty by reference to security aspects and EU responsibilities (like emergency 
management, suppression of terrorism, peace-keeping). Points of criticism are EURATOM, the 
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loss of one representative for each member state in the Commission, and the implementation of a 
European prosecution. 
In the Lisbon debate, the two BZÖ speakers diverge quite apparently from each other in their 
evaluation of the EU and the Lisbon treaty. Whereas Mr. Westenthaler, head of the parliamentary 
group, heavily criticizes the EU’s status quo and points to undesired consequences of the Lisbon 
treaty, Mr. Scheibner argues very much in favor of the treaty, highlights positive aspects and 
criticizes false information spread by treaty critics. Scheibner presents the EU as a security 
community and justifies the obligation of military assistance coming with the Lisbon treaty as 
important for a small-sized state like Austria. He describes the treaty as a “compromise of 
compromises”, but an improvement compared to the status quo (Scheibner, L). Despite this 
positive assessment, Scheiber opposes the ratification of the treaty, which he justifies by 
reference to the need of a national referendum on that question. Mr. Westenthaler, on the other 
hand, associates the EU with interdiction, prohibition, and corruption. According to him, the 
Lisbon treaty would decrease Austria’s sovereignty due to an increase in majority decision-
making in immigration, asylum, environmental, and health care policy. 
In conclusion, the BZÖ’s evaluation of European integration seems to depend heavily on 
government participation (both of the party and of individual speakers). Thus, it is not surprising 
that we find considerable differences in positioning both between the two treaties as well as 
between speakers.  
 
 
Linking the findings from the analysis of MPs’ speeches to patterns in voting behavior, two 
conclusions can be drawn. First, though government participation clearly constrains Euroskeptic 
parties’ room for maneuver in parliament, the arguments put forward in speeches by MPs of both 
the FPÖ and the BZÖ clearly indicate that these parties’ Euroskepticism has at most be 
suppressed, but did not make them supporters to either the respective treaties or European 
integration more generally—with the exception of (former) members of the governing team. 
Second, party repositioning beyond voting is not a short-term task. This is reflected in the 
behavior of all three parties that changed their voting behavior at one or the other point: On the 
part of the FPÖ and the BZÖ, party Euroskpeticism resurfaced and even seems to have reinforced 
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once these parties are back in opposition.
120
 The case of the Greens, one the other hand, 
demonstrates that substantive party repositioning takes its time. Though the party already 
distanced itself from its former skepticism towards the EU after the positive outcome of the 
Austrian accession referendum, it still prioritized EU deficits and undesirable developments in its 
evaluation of European integration during the ratification process of the Amsterdam treaty—four 
years after Austria had joined the EU. Though still expressing critique during the later debates, 
the Greens clearly shifted their focus towards improvements and over the course of time have 
become strong advocates of further integration and a European perspective on policy-making. 
 
7.4.2.3 The setting of treaty ratification in parliament: a trend towards stronger politicization 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6 and in the previous sections of this chapter, European integration 
indeed is a contested issue among Austrian political parties in the electoral arena, for coalition 
building, and in the parliamentary arena. In this section I will explore whether there is evidence 
for stronger politicization of European integration reflected in EU treaty ratification. Different 
from the electoral arena, politicization in this case cannot be assessed by exploring parties 
emphasis on European integration—after all, the whole parliamentary discussion is on the subject 
of European integration. However, differences in the settings within which the ratification of 
different treaties took place in parliament can be used as an indication for variation in the salience 
of the treaty ratification for domestic party contestation. This is quite revealing for inference 
about the politicization of European integration in the parliamentary arena, which seems to have 
increased over the course of time. This conclusion builds on evidence derived from four 
indicators regarding the setting of the parliamentary discussion and voting: (1) the public 
visibility of ratification, indicated by TV broadcasting, (2) whether or not a roll call vote has been 
demanded by a party group or several MPs, (3) the intensity of the debate, indicated by the 
number of speeches, and (4) the intra-party status of speakers, i.e. whether it is party leaders and 
their deputies or parties’ EU experts and ‘backbenchers’ participating in the debate about 
European integration. Table 7.2 summarizes the four indicators and each of them shall briefly be 
discussed in the following.  
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 The fact that the Lisbon treaty is based on the Constitutional treaty also rules out the possibility that different 
positions towards the two treaties resulted from their different scope and content. 
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Table 7.2: Indicators for the politicization of EU treaty ratification 
Indicators Amsterdam Nice Constitution Lisbon 
Broadcast No No Yes Yes 
Roll call vote No No No Yes 
No. of speakers* 19 14 32 56 
Speakers** S;G S;Ö S;Ö;G;B S;Ö;F;G;B 
 
Note: * refers to the total number of speakers participating in the debate; ** indicates whether highly ranked 
party representatives acted as speakers in the debate (capitals refer to parties where party leader, leader of the 
parliamentary group, and/or members of government acted as speakers in the debate: S=SPÖ, Ö=ÖVP, F=FPÖ, 
G=Greens, B=BZÖ). 
 
 
(1) Public visibility/TV broadcast: Certain parts of plenary sessions are usually broadcasted by 
the public TV broadcast station (ORF). The timetable of the agenda for plenary sessions is 
decided upon in the Präsidiale, where the president of the parliament and the leaders of the party 
groups meet and schedule the program for the meetings. Whether EU treaty debates are 
scheduled for the time of TV broadcasting can thus be considered an indicator for the salience 
parties ascribe to the issue of Europe for domestic contestation. As displayed in Table 7.2, the 
parliamentary debates on EU treaty ratification have only been broadcasted in recent years: The 
debates about the Constitutional and the Lisbon treaties have been broadcasted, while those about 
the Amsterdam and the Nice treaties have not. 
(2) Roll call vote: If parties fear intra-party dissent in voting behavior or want to pressure MPs 
from other parties to show their colours, they can request a roll call vote.
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 In both cases, this 
signalizes a certain importance of the subject. As indicated in Table 7.2, a roll call vote was only 
conducted in the most recent ratification, namely the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2008. 
(3) Intensity of debates/number of speeches: Another indicator for the politicization of an issue is 
the intensity of the debate. The previous section has pointed to intensity in terms of polarization, 
showing that the debate about EU treaties has become more polarized over the course of time. 
With regard to quantity, the intensity of debates can be assessed by considering the number of 
speeches held during the parliamentary discussion.
122
 Except for the 2001 outlier, we can observe 
a continuous increase in the number of speeches. The comparatively low number in the debate 
about the Nice treaty is easily explained: First, it is the only point in time where only four parties 
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 A roll call vote has to be conducted if a certain number of MPs requests so. 
122
 The length of the debate would be another telling indicator. However, the overall length of the plenary sessions, 
the total speaking time for each party group, and the number and scope of issues on the agenda vary for different 
plenary sessions. Since parties can flexibly distribute their speaking time and are not limited to a maximum number 
of speakers or speeches, the number of speeches is a much better indicator for comparison. 
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are represented in parliament; second, the Nice treaty is the only treaty that was ratified 
unanimously. By trend, thus, the parliamentary debates about EU treaty ratification seem to have 
intensified over the course of time. 
(4) Speakers: It is reasonable to expect that on issues considered salient by parties for domestic 
contestation, i.e. issues that are also politicized, party leaders and other highly ranked 
representatives within parties will participate in the parliamentary discussion about them. Over 
the course of time, the number of party leaders participating in the debate constantly increases. In 
the debate about the Amsterdam treaty, only the Greens’ party leader as well as the leader of their 
party group participated in the debate; due to the absence of SPÖ-Chancellor Viktor Klima, 
another SPÖ-member of government represented the SPÖ and the government. In the debate 
about the Nice treaty, ÖVP-Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and SPÖ-party leader Alfred 
Gusenbauer acted as speakers, while the other parties either let their EU experts (Greens) or 
ordinary MPs (FPÖ) comment on the treaty. In the parliamentary discussion about the 
Constitutional treaty and the Lisbon treaty, respectively, highly ranked officials from all parties 
engaged in the debate, including party leaders, leaders of party groups, the chancellor, and the 
vice-chancellor.
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To some up, the temporal trend altogether indicates that Austrian political parties consider the 
issue of Europe more and more important for domestic contestation in parliament. EU treaty 
ratification has thus become highly politicized over the course of time. This is also consistent 
with the findings for the electoral arena, where strong evidence can be found for an increase in 
the politicization of EU treaties since the 2006 general election campaign (see Chapter 6.3). 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
123
 That the FPÖ is not mentioned in the respective cell for the Constitutional treaty in Table 7.2 is due to the fact that 
the party group was already taken over by the BZÖ and that the FPÖ’s newly elected party leader, Heinz-Christian 
Strache, was not yet member of the parliament at that time. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to finally broaden the empirical cope of this dissertation beyond the 
electoral arena in order to assess to what extent the politicization of the EU issue impacts on 
decision-making about European integration at the domestic level. The chapter started with a 
brief discussion about the different functional logic that shape party interaction in the electoral, 
the governmental, and the parliamentary arena, pointing to constraints for party behavior in each 
of these arenas. Against this background, the empirical analysis focused on coalition agreements 
between parties that diverge in their positioning towards European integration and on 
parliamentary contestation about EU treaty ratification. 
The analysis of coalition agreements showed that even in coalitions with one Euroskeptic partner, 
the government’s stated policy program includes a strong commitment towards European 
integration in general and also on imminent decisions that further the widening and deepening of 
integration. In that sense, the government’s EU policy as outlined in coalition agreements is 
strongly biased towards the EU position of the coalition partner supportive to European 
integration, namely the ÖVP. However, the coalition agreement between the pro-European SPÖ 
and ÖVP currently in power (December 2011) indicates that conflictive questions are being 
postponed, thus avoiding a loss of face for both parties under conditions of strong EU issue-
politicization.  
The empirical findings for EU treaty ratification in the Nationalrat demonstrate that changing 
patterns in voting behavior towards treaty ratification are mainly due to government participation. 
The Euroskeptic FPÖ and BZÖ change their voting behavior in support of treaties when they are 
in governmental responsibility, but revert back to and even sharpen their rejection of European 
integration once they are back in opposition. The case is different for the Greens, who have 
constantly been in opposition. Their change in voting behavior towards support of EU treaty 
ratification is clearly accompanied by substantial repositioning on the issue of Europe, as 
indicated by the analysis of parliamentary speeches by Green MPs. Finally, the empirical results 
point to an increase in the politicization and a stronger polarization of EU treaty ratification in 
parliament, which is in line with the temporal trends identified in the electoral arena (see 
Chapters 6.2 and 6.3). 
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From this analysis we can conclude that despite an increase in the politicization of Europe on the 
part of Euroskeptic parties in the electoral arena, these parties’ impact on EU decision-making at 
the domestic level so far has remained limited. This even holds true for periods of government 
participation of Euroskeptic parties, which seems to suppress their Euroskepticism temporarily. 
This is indicated by both the EU policy program of coalition governments and EU treaty 
ratification in parliament. However, government participation does not make these parties more 
supportive to European integration. This is suggested by the analysis of speeches held by MPs 
during government participation and substantiated by these parties further radicalization on the 
issue of Europe once back in opposition.  
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8. Conclusion 
The aim of this dissertation was to study the politicization of European integration in Austrian 
domestic party contestation. The project first and foremost focused on the electoral arena by 
studying the role of the EU issue in general election campaigns. However, the study also looked 
at decision-making arenas, investigating coalition governments’ EU policy program outlined in 
coalition agreements and EU treaty ratification in parliament. Together this makes for a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of party politicization of European integration in Austria. 
This concluding chapter will summarize the main findings of the dissertation and will link them 
to the broader study of party politicization beyond the Austrian case. The chapter starts with a 
short note towards the relevance of the research question. It will then point to key assumptions 
that have guided the analytical framework and research strategy of the dissertation, before 
summarizing basic points in the research design of the empirical part of the project. This is 
followed by a condensed presentation of the main empirical findings for party politicization of 
European integration in Austria. After revealing limitations regarding the empirical scope of this 
analysis, the chapter concludes by outlining the contribution of the dissertation to the broader 
study of party politicization of European integration. 
 
Relevance of the topic & research gaps: 
Politicization fulfills an important function in democratic politics. By broadening the audience 
towards the public, politicization makes visible conflict about an issue between political actors. It 
thus informs about the different political preferences and policy alternatives available in the party 
system. Party politicization increases the public salience of an issue: When political parties 
include an issue in their policy repertoire for domestic competition, they signal importance of the 
issue to voters, who may in turn consider the issue in their party choice in elections. Hence 
politicization is important for structuring political conflict and could ultimately even lead to new 
party–voter alignments and/or reconfigurations in alliances for cooperation between different 
parties (cf. Carmines/Stimson 1986, 1989; de Wilde 2011).  
With a view to European integration, politicization can also have serious political consequences. 
It can give rise to questions of accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy of EU policy-
making, since decision-making within the multi-level EU polity is strongly determined by 
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political elites (some of them appointed rather than elected), whereas the scope for electorally 
mandated politics is limited and differs from citizens’ experience of democracy at the member 
state level (cf. Follesdal/Hix 2006; Mair 2005). Politicization could thus on the one hand 
contribute to strengthening the electoral linkage between citizens and political elites, since 
governmental actors “must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues” 
(Hooghe/Marks 2009: 5). Under conditions of widespread public skepticism against the alien EU 
polity, however, politicization may also endanger the further developing of the European 
integration project. Against this background, scholars take up different positions as to whether 
politicization of European integration is of value or danger. Most prominently within the former 
camp, Simon Hix (2006) argues that politicization would translate EU politics into a left-right 
structure similar to the one decisive for politics at the national level and absorbing the pro-anti 
European integration dimension, thus also alleviating Euroskepticism. In sharp contrast, Stefano 
Bartolini (2006) argues that the EU polity would not be capable of such politicization, which 
could turn out to be “a medicine worse than the disease” (2006: 47). This is because politicization 
can be expected to spill over from what Bartolini calls isomorphic issues (e.g. welfare, education 
or immigration policy) to constitutive issues about the EU polity as such (i.e. its competences, 
boundaries etc.), which are not transformable into left-right conflicts and challenge the territorial 
and constitutional base of the polity. Whether the politicization of Europe is viewed as the right 
or wrong sort of medicine, to borrow from the title of the Hix–Bartolini debate, on any account it 
can be expected to be a process that once started cannot easily be reversed. 
What the Hix–Bartolini debate clearly reveals is that the normative dispute about whether or not 
the politicization of European integration is to be desired or to be feared has an important 
empirical component: Hix and Bartolini’s diverging conclusions are to a large extent based on 
different expectations about the substantive character of the debate about Europe. Will it translate 
into left-right conflict about different policy alternatives, or will it challenge the territorial and 
constitutional base of the EU polity? To put it differently, politicization of European integration 
can be about distribution (in a broad understanding of the term) or sovereignty and identity. As 
argued by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009), whether Europe is politicized in terms of 
distributional or identity conflicts will be dependent on which political parties pick up the issue 
for domestic competition. This argument points to the two components intrinsic to the concept of 
politicization, namely content and emphasis. Content refers to the specific concerns about 
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European integration and the framing employed by parties in the politicization of the EU issue. 
Emphasis refers to the degree of politicization in quantitative terms, i.e. the salience ascribed to 
the issue by different political actors according to which they will emphasize the issue. Though 
we can find much scholarly work focusing on either of the two aspects, they are rarely studied in 
an integrated approach: A number of studies focus on party positioning towards European 
integration (cf. Pennings 2006; Gabel/Hix 2004; Hooghe et al. 2002) and in recent years research 
on issue-salience has also made much progress (cf. Steenbergen/Scott; Netjes/Binnema 2007; de 
Vries/van de Wardt 2011). Still, we have only limited empirically-based knowledge about the 
politicization of European integration, about the driving actors behind it and the content of the 
debate as part of the process of politicizing European integration. Given the potential political 
consequences for the EU project, studying the politicization of European integration is an 
important endeavor since it can provide a better understanding of the phenomenon based on 
systematic and empirically grounded exploration.  
 
Guiding assumptions & research design: 
Party politicization of European integration can be studied from different analytical angles and 
with different empirical foci (cf. de Wilde 2011). This dissertation started from the following key 
assumptions or arguments that have strongly informed the analytical framework and research 
design of the present study: First, it argues that the politicization of European integration should 
be studied at the domestic level and, more specifically, in the context of domestic party 
contestation, for which national election campaigns serve as a particularly suitable setting. The 
assumption behind this argument is that the national level still constitutes the decisive sphere for 
delimiting mass politics and political communication (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008). Second, the 
dissertation claims that it is important to distinguish between the potential for party conflict and 
the actual expression of the latter. While much of the research stating to explore party 
contestation over European integration actually investigates the potential for such conflict 
(resulting from differences between parties in their positioning towards the issue), this study 
explicitly considers to what extent conflict becomes publicly visible and thus part of parties’ 
competitive interaction. This distinction is crucial, since not every issue towards which parties 
hold different positions becomes politicized, as conflict can remain latent or only expressed in 
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non-public party interaction (e.g. in parliamentary committees or as part of unofficial 
negotiations between parties’ EU specialists). 
Though the issue of European integration may be considered sui generis compared to other 
political issues (due to its multi-facet character and the fact that it is neither a foreign policy nor a 
prototypical domestic issue), the dissertation starts from the premise that, thirdly, the 
politicization of European integration must be understood as a matter of domestic competition, 
thus following the same rules as competition on any other issue. With a view to the analytical 
framework of the dissertation, this means that the study is analytically embedded in comparative 
party research rather than theories of European integration or Europeanization. Finally, the 
concept of politicization as applied in this dissertation contains two components, namely content 
and emphasis. It is argued that these have to be distinguished empirically and analytically, 
because they connect to different strands of theory, namely the cleavage theory of party 
positioning for understanding the content of politicization (cf. Marks/Wilson 2000; Edwards 
2009) and the salience theory of party competition explaining parties’ emphasis and engagement 
in the process of politicization (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006; Netjes/Binnema 2007). 
 
The above-mentioned assumptions and arguments have strongly informed the research design of 
this dissertation. The core empirical part of the study focused on general election campaigns. It is 
based on rich and carefully selected data corpus specifically collected for the purpose of this 
study. It thus refrains from using available data for party positioning and issue-salience of 
European integration from comparative projects due to these data’s limitation in capturing 
politicization appropriately. The data used instead are manifestos, TV debates between rival 
candidates as part of the election campaign, and parties’ election posters. The study also departs 
from comparable research in its methodology. The vast majority of research in the broader field 
of party contestation over European integration applies a cross-national comparative perspective 
and is quantitative in its nature. Differently, the present study conducts an in-depth analysis of the 
Austrian case. The content of politicization is explored by means of a detailed qualitative text 
analysis that considers both parties’ evaluations and claims for reform of European integration. 
Issue-emphasis is investigated by combining quantitative measures with additional qualitative 
indicators for parties’ active engagement in the politicization of Europe. This approach can be 
qualified as quite innovative not least because it allows for considering the dynamics in 
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politicization resulting from party interaction during the campaigns. The main empirical part of 
the dissertation about politicization in the electoral arena is finally complemented by a smaller 
study of the European integration issue in decision-making arenas. It focused, first, on coalition 
agreements between parties reflecting a high potential for conflict on the EU issue due to their 
contrary positioning towards European integration. Second, it investigated EU treaty ratification 
in parliament, looking both at voting behavior and parliamentary speeches. Altogether, the 
research strategy employed in this dissertation makes for a comprehensive and detailed picture of 
party politicization of European integration in Austria.   
 
EU politicization in Austria: opportunity structure & main empirical findings: 
The Austrian case has been selected for its high likeliness of EU politicization to appear in party 
contestation. The case selection followed a purposive sampling approach, meaning that it has 
been guided by demands of the research question: The research purpose of this project is to learn 
more about the mechanisms behind and the manifestation of the politicization of Europe, which 
presupposes politicization to actually appear. Not least due to the comparatively high level of 
public Euroskepticism, the strength of a Euroskeptic party firmly established in the party system, 
and strong anti-EU coverage in the yellow press, Austria was to be expected a suitable case for 
the study of party politicization of European integration. These specific conditions in the Austrian 
political environment also account for the disadvantageous conditions that parties supportive to 
EU integration face. Adverse conditions for EU supporters remain when considering the narrower 
party-specific opportunity structure: The pro-European parties in Austria are all confronted with a 
divided electorate on the question of Europe and/or the problem of ideological misfit of the issue 
to parties’ overall policy program. Austria’s anti-EU parties, on the other hand, act under 
favorable conditions for Euroskeptic EU politicization—both with a view to the broader political 
environment and the party-specific opportunity structure. To recall, the former is characterized by 
low public support to European integration, considerable anti-EU media coverage, and a 
mainstream-party consensus in support of European integration against public and published 
opinion. The advantageous party-specific opportunity structure for Euroskeptics is reflected in 
the overlap of party and voter position, the latter’s unity in rejecting the EU, and the fact that the 
EU issue very well fits Austrian radical right parties’ program of protecting perceived in-groups 
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from out-groups or ‘the others’—whether the latter are colluding political elites, immigrants, or 
the alien EU polity that is viewed to entail heteronomy.  
 
The empirical findings for party politicization of European integration in the electoral arena 
reflect these asymmetric conditions for EU supporters and opponents in the Austrian party 
system—though with certain disruptions. The analysis of election manifestos showed that the 
European integration issue is most challenging to the programs of the SPÖ and the Greens, which 
is reflected in their framing of the issue: Despite a clear commitment to European integration, 
these two parties express strong claims for reform. Such claims concern both the EU architecture 
and its policy priorities. However, the former always appear in connection with claims for 
different policy alternatives or the functioning of EU democracy, rather than concerns about 
national sovereignty. For Austria’s other pro-European parties, the ÖVP and the Liberals, the 
issue of Europe fits better into their policy program, reflected in more enthusiastic evaluations of 
European integration in election manifestos and less emphasis on claims for reform. The EU 
issue also corresponds well with the party profile of Austria’s Euroskeptic parties, which are to 
be found on the right fringes of the party political landscape. Accordingly, the FPÖ and the BZÖ 
first and foremost refer to European integration as a threat in their election manifestos—whether 
to the country’s economy and employment or to Austrian sovereignty and identity.  
The analysis of election posters and, in particular, TV debates between rival candidates more 
specifically explored the politicization of European integration during election campaigns. The 
findings demonstrate that it is indeed the anti-EU FPÖ that actively politicizes the issue and, 
considering the temporal trend, increasingly so. That EU politicization is driven by 
Euroskeptics—as suggested by the literature—is also indicated in the findings for the Greens: 
They politicize Europe more actively in the 1990s, when first and foremost pointing to negative 
consequences of European integration, and less so later on, when expressing a stronger and less 
conditional commitment to EU integration. However, the results for the ÖVP demonstrate that a 
pro-European party can and does actively engage in the politicization of European integration if it 
considers the issue key for its party profile: Despite the lack of a clear electoral incentive, the 
ÖVP repeatedly refers to Europe as a top-priority issue and constantly portrays itself as the 
Austrian ‘Europapartei’ during election campaigns. 
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What patterns can be observed for the Austrian case regarding the content of the debate in the 
politicization of European integration? Scholars have hypothesized that the politicization of 
Europe will look differently depending on whether Euroskeptic parties are located at the left or at 
the right fringes of the political spectrum, i.e. distributional conflict in the former case and 
sovereignty/identity conflict in the latter case (cf. Hooghe/Marks 2009). For Austria we would 
thus expect a strong bias towards question of sovereignty and identity in the politicization of 
Europe, since party Euroskepticism has become a radical right phenomenon (cf. Pelinka 2004). 
The empirical findings demonstrate that over the course of time, concerns about national 
sovereignty and identity indeed become much more important, whereas the focus on particular 
policies and conflict about different policy alternatives diminishes. This is strongly related to 
changes in conflict configurations: Disputes between parties shift from conflict within the left and 
the right block, respectively, towards conflict between EU supporters and opponents: In the 
1990s, conflict not only appeared between Eurskeptics and EU supporters, but also among the 
latter group—in particular within the left block (SPÖ, Greens, Liberals124). This biased the debate 
towards questions of distribution and/or different policy priorities; from 2006 onwards, however, 
conflict about European integration first and foremost occurs between the radical right 
Eurokpetic parties and EU supporters and the debate clearly shifts towards concerns about 
sovereignty/identity.  
A very interesting pattern could be observed regarding parties’ pressure to justify their support or 
opposition to European integration: Whereas it is EU supporters challenging other parties on their 
EU position in the 1990s and 2002, they eventually become pressured themselves and 
increasingly need to justify their supportive stance towards European integration against attacks 
by anti-EU radical right parties.  
The results for Austrian general election campaigns thus show that despite a disadvantageous 
opportunity structure, EU supporters significantly informed the debate about Europe in Austria in 
the 1990s. Once they take a backseat in EU politicization, however, the content of the debate 
becomes clearly biased towards Euroskeptic radidal right parties’ thematic priorities. This is not 
least reflected in the SPÖ’s repositioning on the question of national referenda on EU treaties that 
reinforces the depiction of European integration as a matter of protecting national sovereignty 
and identity. The findings also indicate a stronger polarization over the course of time in the 
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 See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation why the Liberals are considered as a left party at this point. 
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debate about Europe, which very much reflects a fundamental debate about virtues and 
downsides of the EU, with pro-European parties being pressured to justify their support for 
European integration against attacks by the radical right Euroskeptics. The temporal trend thus 
clearly indicates an increase in anti-EU, radical right party politicization of Europe that in recent 
years has clearly put its stamp on the debate about European integration in the Austrian electoral 
arena. 
The situation is different in decision-making arenas. Though the analysis of parliamentary 
debates over the course of time indicates stronger politicization and a polarization of conflict 
about European integration between parties—which is in line with the findings for the electoral 
arena—, the impact on decision-making has remained limited so far. The analysis of coalition 
agreements showed that even in coalitions with one Euroskeptic partner, the government’s stated 
policy program includes a strong commitment towards European integration in general and also 
on imminent decisions that further the widening and deepening of integration. This was the case 
for both ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ coalitions between 2000 and 2006 and was also reflected in the FPÖ’s 
(later: BZÖ’s) votes in support for the Nice and Constitutional treaties in parliament. This 
indicates that despite these parties’ Euroskeptic politicization in the electoral arena, government 
participation constrains their room for maneuver in the governmental and parliamentary arenas. 
However, the stronger politicization and polarization of the debate about European integration as 
observed in recent years may in turn result in stronger constraints resulting from parties’ 
commitments on EU policy as expressed in the electoral arena. This is indicated by the most 
recent coalition negotiations between the SPÖ and the ÖVP. The SPÖ’s promise for national 
referenda on EU treaties and the ÖVP’s strict denial of the same indeed impeded an agreement 
towards a joint EU position supported by both coalition partners. For Austria’s current SPÖ-ÖVP 
coalition government, an agreement could only be reached due to a compromise to jointly call for 
reelections in case one of the partners supports a proposal for a national referendum against the 
will of its coalition partner. This clearly shows that the issue of European integration has become 
quite important in the Austrian party system. 
 
Limitations and contributions of the dissertation: 
Despite the attempt to conduct a detailed and comprehensive analysis of party politicization of 
European integration in Austria, the present study has certain limitations regarding its empirical 
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scope, whereof I would like to explicitly mention the following three. First, despite the 
importance of both the supply side (political parties) and the demand side (voters) for the process 
of politicization, the empirical focus of this dissertation has been narrowed to an analysis of the 
supply side of politicization. This decision is based on a top-down perspective towards 
politicization that considers political actors and elites as decisive for politicization (cf. 
Hooghe/Marks 2009; Carmines/Stimson 1986, 1989). Though this might be different for other 
political issues (for which politicization may clearly be a response to mobilization efforts on the 
part of civil society and grassroots movements), I would argue that the top-down perspective is 
particularly reasonable with a view to the elite-driven EU issue. Therefore the demand side has 
only been considered superficially in the present study by pointing to voter preferences towards 
European integration as part of the party-specific opportunity structure. Second, the focus of this 
study is clearly on the electoral arena, whereas the impact of EU politicization on decision-
making has been addressed only briefly in the last chapter. Though this is reasonable if 
considering the importance of the electoral arena for competition between parties, a more explicit 
and systematic focus on interactions between the different arenas of domestic contestation will be 
of great value in future research. Finally, the study of party politicization of European integration 
conducted in this dissertation is limited to the Austrian case. As is always the case with single-
country studies, the generalizability of the empirical findings thus remains weak. On the other 
hand, the narrow focus on a single country allowed for a detailed analysis including a rich and 
diverse data corpus that distinguishes this study from much research within the field. 
Despite the weaknesses resulting from limitations in the empirical scope of this dissertation, the 
latter makes an important contribution to the study of party politicization of European integration 
both analytically and with a view to research strategy. First, it points to the necessity of 
distinguishing the potential for conflict from the expression of such conflict in domestic 
contestation between political parties. This proves to be important, since the empirical findings 
for the 1990s and to some extent also for 2008 show that conflict does not only occur between 
supporters and opponents of European integration, but also among the former, which also affects 
the content of the debate about Europe. 
Second, the dissertation provides an integrated approach to the study of party politicization that 
considers both content and emphasis as constitutive of the concept of politicization, whereas most 
research in the field only focuses on either of them. As argued in this dissertation, distinguishing 
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between the two—while at the same time considering both—is of utmost analytical importance, 
since both connect to different strands of theory. The content of politicization is strongly linked 
to parties’ issue-positioning that, in turn, is connected to the broader programmatic and 
ideological profile of a party that constrains parties’ response to the issue of Europe. Content is 
therefore best understood by employing a cleavage perspective. Emphasis, on the other hand, 
largely overlaps with the concept of issue-salience and is dependent on strategic considerations 
related to party competition. The salience theory of party competition thus provides the 
theoretical foundation for exploring parties’ emphasis on European integration in the 
politicization of the issue. Considering both aspects in an integrated approach allows for viewing 
parties as rational actors without neglecting that their ideological roots to a certain degree 
constrain them in their strategic attempts to maximize votes and power. This study thus 
acknowledges that parties are characterized by what Gary Marks and Carole Wilson (2000: 343) 
have called each party’s own “‘bounded rationality’”.  
Third, the dissertation is innovative in its empirical design that considers a variety of data sources 
and combines different methods for analyzing politicization. Exploring the content of 
politicization, the qualitative text analysis distinguishes different facets of European integration 
instead of using one general pro- and anti-integration category. As argued here, this is very 
important, since EU politicization can take very different forms as regards content. This argument 
is supported by the empirical findings. Considering the temporal trend, we see that the content of 
the debate about Europe has changed: Whereas questions of national sovereignty and identity 
appear only marginally in the 1990s’ election campaigns, this fundamentally changes in 2006, 
when the debate becomes strongly biased towards these questions. Furthermore, the text analysis 
considers both evaluative statements and parties’ claims-making. This proves to be important for 
parties that actually strive for a different EU despite committing themselves to European 
integration. Being reluctant to explicitly criticizing the current state of European integration, 
these parties rather frame their critique as claims for reform. The empirical analysis demonstrates 
that in Austria this applies in particular to the SPÖ and the Greens. Turning to parties’ emphasis 
on the EU issue, this study combined different data and complemented quantitative measures 
with qualitative indicators. This procedure provides for a more detailed and convincing picture 
about parties’ active involvement in the politicization of Europe compared to the findings derived 
from available comparative data sets (cf. Hooghe et al. 2010; Klingemann et al. 2006; Kriesi et 
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al. 2008). Given the contradictory results of these other data sources regarding Austrian parties’ 
EU issue-emphasis or -salience, the present study not only constitutes an important empirical 
contribution but also underscores the necessity for careful data selection and operationalizion of 
concepts in the study of party politicization and party research more generally. 
Finally, the dissertation thoroughly considers the relevance of the broader political environment 
(e.g. public and published opinion) as well as party-specific opportunity structures (e.g. 
ideological (mis)fit, overlap of party and voter position, constraints due to government 
participation) for party politicization of European integration. This not only sheds light on 
individual parties’ expectable (dis)advantage for engaging in the politicization of Europe, but also 
helps understanding why EU politicization in Austria manifests itself—in terms of content—the 
way it does: The empirical findings demonstrate that the politicization of European integration in 
the Austrian electoral arena is increasingly shaped by Euroskeptic radical right parties, which 
have called the tune in the debate about Europe in recent years. As argued previously, this is not 
least related to the strength of the Austrian radical right parties and furthered by the anti-EU 
campaigning of a politically influential media actor, the Krone. Despite limited impact on 
decision-making so far, the findings suggest that the politicization of Europe may also affect EU 
policy-making in the Austrian governmental and parliamentary arenas more seriously in the near 
future. Recent political developments like the establishing of the European Stability Mechanism 
and plans for yet another EU treaty amendment clearly entail potential for conflict in the party 
system. In Austria they have been accompanied by heated debates between supporters and 
opponents of an ever closer union—not least about the necessity of national referenda.125 We can 
therefore expect rather more than less politicization of European integration in the near future—
and probably not under conditions favorable to parties supportive of European integration. If the 
latter continue to strive for further European integration, they will thus need to find a way to 
actively engage (again) in the politicization of European integration in order to convince 
Euroskeptic voters. Otherwise they yield the floor to anti-EU radical right entrepreneurs, who 
already proclaim the failure of the EU project.  
 
 
  
                                                 
125
 See http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2011/PK0860/index.shtml, accessed 20/12/2011. 
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Appendix 
A1. Additional tables and figures 
Table A1: Governments in the Second Republic 
Governing period Government Governing parties 
27/4/1945-20/12/1945 Renner SPÖ-ÖVP-KPÖ
i
 
20/12/1945-8/11/1949 Figl I ÖVP-SPÖ-KPÖ 
8/11/1949-28/10/1952 Figl II ÖVP-SPÖ 
28/10/1952-2/4/1953 Figl III ÖVP-SPÖ 
2/4/1953-29/6/1956 Raab I ÖVP-SPÖ 
29/6/1956-16/7/1959 Raab II ÖVP-SPÖ 
16/7/1959-3/11/1960 Raab III ÖVP-SPÖ 
3/11/1960-11/4/1961 Raab IV ÖVP-SPÖ 
11/4/1961-27/3/1963 Gorbach I ÖVP-SPÖ 
27/3/1963-2/4/1964 Gorbach II ÖVP-SPÖ 
2/4/1964-19/4/1966 Klaus I ÖVP 
19/4/1966-21/4/1970 Klaus II ÖVP 
21/4/1970-4/11/1971 Kreisky I SPÖ 
4//11/1971-28/10/1975 Kreisky II SPÖ 
28/10/1975-5/6/1979 Kreisky III SPÖ 
5/6/1979-24/5/1983 Kreisky IV SPÖ 
24/5/1983-16/6/1986 Sinowatz SPÖ-FPÖ 
16/6/1986-21/1/1987 Vranitzky I SPÖ-FPÖ 
21/1/1987-17/12/1990 Vranitzky II SPÖ-ÖVP 
17/12/1990-29/11/1994 Vranitzky III SPÖ-ÖVP 
29/11/1994-12/3/1996 Vranitzky IV SPÖ-ÖVP 
12/3/1996-28/1/1997 Vranitzly V SPÖ-ÖVP 
28/1/1997-4/2/2000 Klima SPÖ-ÖVP 
4/2/2000-28/2/2003 Schüssel I ÖVP-FPÖ 
28/2/2003-11/1/2007 Schüssel II ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ
ii
 
11/1/2007-2/12/2008 Gusenbauer SPÖ-ÖVP 
2/12/2008-present Faymann SPÖ-ÖVP 
Notes: 
i 
Provisional government with members of SPÖ, ÖVP, and KPÖ in equal parts;  
ii
 Coalition between ÖVP and FPÖ and, after the party split on 17 April 2005, ÖVP and 
BZÖ. 
Source: Official records, http://www.bundeskanzleramt.at/site/3355/default.aspx 
(accessed 19/9/2011). 
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Figure A1: Attitudes towards European integration along social class (1999) 
 
Notes: N=479 (numbers for upper class low, N=6); 10-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already 
gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ recoded into two categories; classification of social class according to 
respondents’ self-perception. 
Source: EES 1999 (cf. Franklin et al. 2002). 
 
Figure A2: Attitudes towards European integration along social class (2004) 
 
Notes: N=967 (numbers for upper class low, N=11); 10-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already 
gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ recoded into two categories; classification of social class according to 
respondents’ self-perception. 
Source: EES 2004 (cf. Schmitt/Loveless 2004). 
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Figure A3: Attitudes towards European integration along social class (2009) 
 
Notes: N=962 (numbers for upper class low, N=16); 11-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already 
gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ recoded into three categories; classification of social class according to 
respondents’ self-perception. 
Source: EES 2009 (cf. Egmond et al. 2010). 
 
Figure A4: Attitudes towards European integration among (non-)readers of the Krone (1999) 
 
Notes: N=426; 10-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ 
recoded into two categories. 
Source: EES 1999 (cf. Franklin et al. 2002). 
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Figure A5: Attitudes towards European integration among (non-)readers of the Krone (2004) 
 
Notes: N=907; 10-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ 
recoded into two categories. 
Source: EES 2004 (cf. Schmitt/Loveless 2004). 
 
Figure A6: Attitudes towards European integration among (non-)readers of the Krone (2009) 
 
Notes: N=966; 11-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ 
recoded into three categories; readers of Krone if reading the paper at least three times a week. 
Source: EES 2009 (cf. Egmond et al. 2010). 
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Figure A7: Attitudes towards European integration according to voting behavior (1999) 
 
Notes: N=356; 10-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ 
recoded into two categories; respondents stating to have voted for party x in previous national election. 
Source: EES 1999 (cf. Franklin et al. 2002). 
 
Figure A8: Attitudes towards European integration according to voting behavior (2004) 
 
Notes: N=803; 10-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ 
recoded into two categories; respondents stating to have voted for party x in previous national election. 
Source: EES 2004 (cf. Schmitt/Loveless 2004). 
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Figure A9: Attitudes towards European integration according to voting behavior (2009) 
 
Notes: N=733; 11-point-scale ranging from ‘European integration has already gone too far’ to ‘should go further’ 
recoded into three categories; respondents stating to have voted for party x in previous national election. 
Source: EES 2009 (cf. Egmond et al. 2010). 
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A8: Attitudes towards European integration according to voting behavior (2004) 
A9: Attitudes towards European integration according to voting behavior (2009) 
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A3. Documentation of data sources and data collection 
List of election manifestos: 
SPÖ 1995 manifesto (accessed via CMP, cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) 
SPÖ 1999 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
SPÖ 2002 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
SPÖ 2006 manifesto (collected by SM) 
SPÖ 2008 manifesto (collected by SM) 
ÖVP 1995 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
ÖVP 1999 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
ÖVP 2002 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
ÖVP 2006 manifesto (collected by SM) 
ÖVP 2008 manifesto (collected by SM) 
FPÖ 1995 manifesto (collected by SM) 
FPÖ 1999 manifesto (collected by SM) 
FPÖ 2002 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
FPÖ 2006 manifesto (collected by SM) 
FPÖ 2008 manifesto (collected by SM) 
Greens 1995 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
Greens 1999 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
Greens 2002 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
Greens 2006 manifesto (collected by SM) 
Greens 2008 manifesto (collected by SM) 
Liberals 1995 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
Liberals 1999 manifesto (accessed via CMP) 
BZÖ 2006 manifesto (collected by SM) 
BZÖ 2008 manifesto (collected by SM) 
 
List of TV debates: 
1995 campaign: 
08.11.1995:  Brigitte Ederer (SPÖ) – Madeleine Petrovic (Greens) 
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11.11.1995:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
15.11.1995: Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Jörg Haider (FPÖ) 
17.11.1995:  Caspar Einem (SPÖ) – Volker Kier (Liberals) 
20.11.1995:  Madeleine Petrovic (Greens) – Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
22.11.1995:  Jörg Haider (FPÖ) – Madeleine Petrovic (Greens) 
24.11.1995:  Jörg Haider (FPÖ) – Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
27.11.1995:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Madeleine Petrovic (Greens) 
01.12.1995:  Viktor Klima (SPÖ) – Jörg Haider (FPÖ) 
05.12.1995:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ) 
06.12.1995:  Franz Vranitzky, Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP), Jörg Haider (FPÖ), Madeleine 
Petrovic (Greens), Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
 
Debates collected and fully transcribed by SM. 
 
1999 campaign: 
01.09.1999:  Barbara Prammer (SPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
03.09.1999:  Elisabeth Gehrer (ÖVP) – Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
08.09.1999:  Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP) – Madeleine Petrovic (Greens) 
10.09.1999:  Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer (SPÖ) – Hans Peter Haselsteiner (Liberals) 
14.09.1999:  Alexander Van der Bellen (Liberals) – Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
16.09.1999:  Thomas Prinzhorn (FPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
17.09.1999:  Thomas Prinzhorn (FPÖ) – Christian Köck (Liberals) 
21.09.1999:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Thomas Prinzhorn (FPÖ) 
22.09.1999:  Rudolf Edlinger (SPÖ) – Jörg Haider (FPÖ) 
28.09.1999:  Viktor Klima (SPÖ) – Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) 
30.09.1999:  Viktor Klima (SPÖ), Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP), Jörg Haider (FPÖ), Alexander 
Van der Bellen (Greens), Heide Schmidt (Liberals) 
 
Debates accessed via Österreichische Mediathek; transcribed by SM (full transcription of EU 
related text passages only). 
 
2002 campaign: 
29.10.2002:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
31.10.2002:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) – Herbert Haupt (FPÖ) 
05.11.2002:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Herbert Haupt (FPÖ) 
07.11.2002:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
12.11.2002:  Herbert Haupt (FPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
14.11.2002:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) – Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) 
21.11.2002:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ),Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP), Herbert Haupt (FPÖ), 
Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
 
Debates accessed via Österreichische Mediathek; transcribed by SM (full transcription of EU 
related text passages only). 
 
2006 campaign: 
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05.09.2006:  Karl-Heinz Grasser (ÖVP) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
06.09.2006:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) – Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) 
07.09.2006:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) – Peter Westenthaler (BZÖ) 
12.09.2006:  Martin Bartenstein (ÖVP) – Peter Westenthaler (BZÖ) 
13.09.2006:  Josef Pröll (ÖVP) – Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) 
14.09.2006:  Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
15.09.2006:  Heinz-Christain Strache (FPÖ) – Peter Westenthaler (BZÖ) 
19.09.2006:  Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
20.09.2006:  Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) – Peter Westenthaler (BZÖ) 
21.09.2006:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) – Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ)  
28.09.2006:  Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP), Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ), Heinz-Christian Strache 
(FPÖ), Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens), Peter Westenthaler (BZÖ)  
 
Complete transcripts retrieved from Apa De-Facto data base. 
 
2008 campaign: 
22.08.2008:  Heinz-Christain Strache (FPÖ) – Jörg Haider (BZÖ) 
26.08.2008:  Werner Faymann (SPÖ) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
28.08.2010:  Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP) – Jörg Haider (BZÖ) 
02.09.2008:  Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP) – Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ) 
04.09.2008:  Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) – Jörg Haider (BZÖ) 
09.09.2008:  Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) – Heinz-Christain Strache (FPÖ) 
11.09.2008:  Werner Faymann (SPÖ) – Jörg Haider (BZÖ) 
16.09.2008:  Werner Faymann (SPÖ) – Heinz-Christain Strache (FPÖ) 
18.09.2008:  Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP) – Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens) 
23.09.2008:  Werner Faymann (SPÖ) – Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP) 
25.09.2008:  Werner Faymann (SPÖ), Wilhelm Molterer (ÖVP), Heinz-Christian Strache 
(FPÖ), Alexander Van der Bellen (Greens), Jörg Haider (BZÖ) 
 
Complete transcripts retrieved from Apa De-Facto data base. 
 
List of election posters: 
Greens 1995: ‘Unsere Brüsseler Spitze. Für eine ökologische und soziale Allianz in Europa. 
Gegen das Europa der Technokraten. Für die Neutralität. Gegen den NATO-
Beitritt’ 
 
Greens 1999:  ‘Raus aus Gentechnik und Agrarfabriken. Gesundes Essen sichern’ 
Greens 1999:  ‘Raus aus der Verkehrshölle. Transit Lawine stoppen’ 
Greens 1999:  ‘Raus aus dem NATO-Wahn. Neutralität garantieren’ 
 
FPÖ 2002:  ‘Wer EU-kritisch ist, wählt blau’ 
 
FPÖ 2006:  ‘Heimat statt Schüssel und Brüssel. Wir für Österreich’ 
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FPÖ 2006: ‘Duell um Österreich. ÖVP-Schüssel & SPÖ-Gusenbauer: […] Türkei zur EU. 
FPÖ-HC Strache: […] EU-Beitritt verhindern. Sie haben die Wahl’ 
 
FPÖ 2008:  ‘Volksvertreter statt EU-Verräter. Wir für Euch’ 
 
Poster collected by SM. 
 
List of coalition agreements: 
Coalition agreement ÖVP-FPÖ 2000, see Koalitionsvertrag (2000) in the bibliography 
Coalition agreement ÖVP-FPÖ 2003, see Koalitionsvertrag (2003) in the bibliography 
Coalition agreement SPÖ-ÖVP 2008, see Koalitionsvertrag (2008) in the bibliography 
 
Documents collected by SM. 
 
List of parliamentary debates on EU treaty ratification in the Nationalrat: 
Treaty of Amsterdam: final debate 18 June 1998 
Information on voting behavior and literal transcripts of speeches retrieved from  
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XX/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00130/fname_114249.pdf  
(accessed 30/8/2010). Speeches included in analysis: 
- FPÖ: MP Ewald Stadler, MP Herbert Scheibner 
- Greens: MP Madeleine Petrovic, Doris Kammerlander (Greens) 
 
Treaty of Nice: final debate 21 November 2001 
Information on voting behavior and literal transcripts of speeches retrieved from  
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXI/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00083/fname_114521.pdf  
(accessed 30/8/2010). Speeches included in analysis: 
- FPÖ: MP Wolfgang Jung, MP Anna Elisabeth Achatz 
- Greens: MP Ulrike Lunacek, MP Eva Lichtenberger 
 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: final debate 11 May 2005 
Information on voting behavior and literal transcripts of speeches retrieved from  
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00109/fname_046454.pdf  
(accessed 30/8/2010). Speeches included in analysis: 
- FPÖ: MP Eugen Bösch, MP Barbata Rosenkranz 
- BZÖ: Vice-Chancellor Hubert Gorbar, MP Herbert Scheibner 
- Greens: MP Alexander Van der Bellen, MP Eva Glawischnig 
 
Treaty of Lisbon: final debate 9 April 2008 
Information on voting behavior and literal transcripts of speeches retrieved from  
http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00055/fname_113800.pdf  
(accessed 30/8/2010). Speeches included in analysis: 
- FPÖ: MP Heinz-Christian Strache, MP Barbara Rosenkranz 
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- BZÖ: MP Peter Westenthaler, MP Herbert Scheibner 
- Greens: MP Alexander Van der Bellen, MP Eva Glswischnig 
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Abstract 
English: 
The aim of the dissertation is to study the party politicization of European integration in Austria. 
In particular, the dissertation seeks to explore conditions for the politicization of European 
integration as well as its manifestation in substantive terms. It argues that the former will be 
dependent on parties’ strategic considerations for maximizing votes, whereas the latter is also 
dependent on the broader historical and ideological framework within which political parties are 
embedded. Accordingly, the theoretical framework of the study is built both on theories of party 
competition (in particular: salience theory) and cleavage theory. The research design is 
characterized by a comparison of different arenas of competition (electoral and decision-making 
arenas), a combination of different data sources, and a careful qualitative analysis of the selected 
data. The empirical findings demonstrate that though the conditions for the politicization of 
European integration in Austria clearly benefit Euroskeptic parties, EU supporters still actively 
engage in the debate about Europe in the electoral arena—at least in the first years following 
Austria’s EU accession. In recent years, however, they have clearly taken a back-seat in the 
politicization of European integration. This pattern is also reflected in the content of the debate, 
i.e. the substantive manifestation of politicization, which increasingly becomes biased towards 
Euroskeptic parties’ concerns about European integration. However, this has not affected the 
ratification of EU treaties or enlargement so far, as revealed in the analysis of decision-making 
arenas—even if Euroskeptic parties had been in power. So far, thus, the political significance of 
increasingly Euroskeptic party politicization of European integration is confined to the electoral 
arena.  
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Deutsch: 
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Politisierung des Europathemas (d.h. der 
europäischen Integration) durch politische Parteien in Österreich. Im Mittelpunkt des 
Forschungsinteresses stehen dabei einerseits Bedingungen für die Politisierung sowie andererseits 
die inhaltlich-thematische Ausprägung der Debatte. Die Arbeit argumentiert, dass für ersteres 
strategische Überlegungen hinsichtlich Stimmenmaximierung entscheidend sind, während für 
letzteres auch die ideologische Verankerung der Parteien ausschlaggebend ist. Es wird daher 
sowohl auf Theorien zum Parteienwettbewerb (insbesondere die Salienztheorie) zurückgegriffen 
als auch auf die Cleavage-Theorie. Das Forschungsdesgin berücksichtigt verschiedene Wettbe-
werbsarenen (Wahlkampf- und Entscheidungsarenen) und einen umfassenden Datenkorpus, der 
mittels qualitativer Analyse eingehend untersucht wird. Die empirischen Ergebnisse der Analyse 
zeigen, dass sich pro-europäische Parteien trotz nachteiliger Ausgangsbedingungen aktiv in die 
Wahlkampfdebatte um Europa einbringen – zumindest in den ersten Jahren nach Österreichs EU-
Beitritt. In den letzten Jahren sind sie gegenüber EU-skeptischen bzw. -feindlichen Parteien 
jedoch deutlich ins Hintertreffen geraten. Diese Tendenz bestätigt sich auch für den inhaltlichen 
Fokus der Debatte, der im Zeitverlauf zunehmend Themen und Perspektive der EU-Gegner 
widerspiegelt. Nichtsdestotrotz hat dies bislang die Ratifikation von EU-Verträgen und 
Erweiterungsschritten nicht behindert, wie die Analyse der parlamentarischen Arena zeigt – 
selbst dann nicht, wenn EU-skeptische/-feindliche Parteien in Regierungsverantwortung waren. 
Die politische Bedeutung der zunehmend EU-feindlichen Politisierung der europäischen 
Integration beschränkt sich demnach – vorerst – auf die Wahlkampfarena. 
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